

OVERSEAS NEWS

ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA CONFLICT

Both sides report heavy fighting

BY OUR FOREIGN STAFF

BOTH SIDES in the Ethiopian-Somali conflict have reported renewed heavy fighting in the area. But it is still unclear if the Ethiopians have begun their much-heralded counter-offensive with the aim of invading Somali itself.

Reports from the region speak of a large Ethiopian force possibly Russian led collecting in preparation for a major offensive designed to slice the country in two with a drive to the port of Berbera.

U.S. intelligence sources, quoted in the New York Times, say that Cuban pilots flying Russian Mig 21's and 23's are now carrying out raids inside Somalia in a significant escalation of support for Ethiopia.

The sources believe the counter-offensive may still be

some weeks off, given the weakness of the Ethiopian forces. But Somali radio claimed today that the counter-offensive had begun throughout southern Ethiopia backed by Cuban and Russian troops.

The Somalis say they inflicted heavy losses on the Ethiopian garrison at Nagele in the southern part of Sidamo during fierce fighting. They claim they destroyed two Ethiopian troop carriers and captured large quantities of rifles, machine guns and ammunition.

Addis Ababa radio quoted the Ethiopian news agency as saying that 70 Somali regular troops were killed and 150 captured in a big probing operation in the Harar region carried out by Ethiopian regular troops, militia and peasant squads. The agency said fortified Somali posi-

tions were destroyed and large numbers of Somalis put to flight. Somalia has denied that regular troops were involved in the fighting maintaining that only guerrillas of the West Somali Liberation Front took part.

John Worrall adds from Nairobi: Observers and diplomats here tend to discount reports that the Ethiopians, backed by the Russians and Cubans, plan to make an attack into Somali proper.

They say it seems unlikely that the Russians would allow the Ethiopians to open up what is at present a localised war and make it a full-scale international conflict.

Meanwhile, West Germany is making available DM53m. for financial and technical co-

operation in Somalia this year under an agreement signed yesterday in Mogadishu after six days of discussions. Somali radio reported.

Rami Khouri adds from Amman: A prominent Eritrean Liberation Front leader said here in an interview that the Ethiopian Government was receiving direct help from Cuban troops in Eritrea and South Yemeni troops in the Ogaden and Entebbe.

Mr. Uthman Saleh Sabbi, president and executive committee chairman of the People's Liberation Forces of the Eritrean Liberation Front said that between two and three thousand "Adenese" were fighting with the Ethiopians—charge hotly denied by the Ethiopians.

Economics to dominate Giscard, Schmidt talks

By Robert Mauthner

PARIS, Feb. 5.

INTERNATIONAL economic problems are expected to top the agenda of the regular six-monthly Franco-German summit talks between President Giscard d'Estaing and Herr Helmut Schmidt, which open here tomorrow.

The West German Chancellor is reported to be anxious to sound out President Giscard on the agenda of the next Western economic summit due to be held in Bonn in July. Their exchange of views is expected to cover the whole range of economic problems from the international currency situation to the fight against inflation, unemployment and energy questions. In this context, the present difficulties of the U.S. dollar and the French franc will certainly be touched upon.

Another important subject due to be discussed by the two leaders is the proposed enlargement of the European Community and, in particular, the problem that is posed by the exports of Mediterranean products such as Greece, Portugal and Spain.

Though both France and West Germany have strong political backing to Greece's entry into the Common Market during Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis's recent tour of European capitals, they continue to have economic reservations.

The French Government is only too well aware that the powerful French farmers lobby is extremely worried about the competition of such important crops as olive oil and wine producers as Greece, Portugal and Spain, while the Germans have expressed fears that they will have to foot most of the bill of an expanded European agricultural market.

Spanish moves to bolster small banks in trouble

BY ROBERT GRAHAM

MADRID, Feb. 5.

THE Bank of Spain and a group of private banks have decided to establish a special financial body to take over and administer banks which find themselves in difficulties.

This is seen as an attempt to bolster confidence in the banking system which received a serious jolt following the collapse of a small commercial bank, Banco de Navarra, in mid-January.

The Navarra collapse has already directly affected at least three other banks.

The new entity, yet to be named, will have Pts.5,000m. capital (\$6m.) subscribed 50 per cent. by the Bank of Spain. The remainder will be held by a varied group of large, medium and small-sized banks. The large banks will be represented by Banesto, Central Hispano-Americano, Bilbao and Vizcaya; the medium-sized ones by Pastor and Sabadell and the smaller ones by March, Lopez Quesada, Mas Sarda and Internacional de Comercio.

A notable absentee is the large Banco de Santander which last week was negotiating to take over Cantabrico one of the banks affected by the Navarra collapse. Acquisition of the 60 per cent. controlling interest of Cantabrico has been the new entity's first move (on a nominal 1 peseta per share basis).

This acquisition is to be followed by a take-over of Navarra which is currently in the hands of the Bank of Spain which stepped in to guarantee the depositors.

The Spanish banking system which contains over 110 banks, mostly small ones, is currently going through a serious crisis. The problems produced by a credit squeeze and economic recession are taking their toll on the small and badly-managed banks. The creation of this new caretaker bank, agreed yesterday, suggests that the authorities fear more banks will have to be rescued. Indeed, the new institution was formed with considerable haste.

Slender signs of hope over Italian Government crisis

BY PAUL BETTS

ROME, Feb. 5.

SIG. GIULIO ANDREOTTI, the Christian Democrat President designate, is to embark on Tuesday on a tour of the country in a round of talks with the country's other political parties, including the Communists, to attempt to resolve Italy's three-week-old Government crisis.

Over the week-end there emerged slender signs of a possible compromise between the country's political forces. This follows the decision by the Christian Democrat's central directorate to give Sig. Andreotti a more flexible mandate for his negotiations with the Communists.

Sig. Andreotti is likely to propose to the Communists, whose demand for direct participation in power led to the latest Italian government crisis, an as yet undefined deal to associate them in some disguised form with a Parliamentary majority.

In substance, the Christian Democrats are now proposing the establishment of an interim administration, with Communist

support but without direct Communist participation, to serve until the December presidential election. The new administration would have an economic and social programme commonly agreed by the country's main political parties, and guaranteed by a parliamentary commission to include the Communists.

This overture by the Christian Democrats was acknowledged this week-end by the Communist newspaper l'Unita, said today that it would be "foolish" not to recognise the move as a step forward. The newspaper, however, said the Christian Democrat proposals were "ambiguous and unclear" and that the solution of a protracted crisis would rest on Sig. Andreotti's consultation this week.

Should Sig. Andreotti fail, and the political deadlock persist, the most likely outcome is an early election, which for a variety of reasons neither the Communists nor the Christian Democrats want at this time.

Salazar's home town riots

BY JIMMY BURNS

LISBON, Feb. 5.

PORTUGAL'S carnival week-end was marred by violence today when para-military national guardsmen using rubber bullets and cavalry charged over 3,000 demonstrators in the village of Santa Comba Dao, birthplace of the late dictator Antonio Salazar.

The villagers were protesting at a Government decision banning the replacement of the head of a bronze statue of the dictator in front of the village court house. The original statue was decapitated in 1974 by what local opinion took to be Communist vandals.

Yesterday's Government ban, signed jointly by the new Ministers of Justice and the Interior, was provoked by fear that any public demonstration of support for Salazar would lead to violence between Right-wing and Left-wing political groups. Nevertheless, the plan seemed to have back-fired.

Rioting began when local villagers wielding burning timbers and hurling stones rushed local police.

Although Antonio Salazar died eight years ago, his dictatorship was not finally overthrown until April 25, 1974, when a military coup backed by democratic forces sent his successors either into prison or exile. Recently a new cult around the old dictator has emerged particularly among students in secondary schools and among certain extreme Right-wing political groupings.

With Parliamentary debate on the new package of austerity measures set to begin this week, the Communist-dominated general workers' confederation (Intersindical), which controls 85 per cent. of Portuguese labour, has decided to delay any outright confrontations with the new Government.

At a meeting of leaders of nearly 200 unions in Lisbon yesterday the confederation rejected a motion calling for a day of nationwide strikes and street demonstrations before March 15, when the Government is expected to announce its budget.

Tehran unveils record deficit budget

By Our Own Correspondent

TEHRAN, Feb. 5.

IRAN UNVEILED a record \$59.2bn. budget today which featured a massive deficit and a sharp rise in spending for infrastructure. It also includes a \$1.5bn. defence spending increase.

Formally presenting the budget to the Iranian Parliament in a special session Mr. Jamshid Amouzegar, the Prime Minister, said it reflected the Cabinet's mandate to remove development bottlenecks and fight inflation while continuing to ensure economic growth.

However, the size of the deficit financing that is apparently required to do this surprised economic analysts here. "It shows they've dropped their conservative fiscal stance," one diplomat said, referring to the austerity programme that the Shah ordered last year when he named Mr. Amouzegar to replace Mr. Amir Abbas Hoveyda, the former Prime Minister.

The budget, which is for the year beginning on March 21, estimates revenue at 4,039bn. rials (\$57.2bn.), which includes the equivalent of \$3.7bn. in domestic and foreign loans. The budget leaves an unfinanced gap of \$2bn. between revenue and expenditure, bringing the total deficit financing required to an unprecedented \$10.7bn.

A breakdown of the revenue side shows that the Government and state-owned agencies intend to raise \$4.3bn. in domestic loans and \$4.4bn. in foreign loans. Economic analysts said Iran certainly has the means to finance its deficit, which amounts to 18 per cent. of the budget.

Investment in India Page 3

Witteveen fund has problems in Congress

By Jurek Martin

WASHINGTON, Feb. 5.

THE U.S. contribution to the International Monetary Fund's \$10bn. supplementary credit arrangement, known as the Witteveen facility, is in doubt because of opposition in Congress, which must approve the \$1.7bn. American share.

The major problems lie with the House of Representatives, where floor managers of the Bill have been obliged to postpone a critical vote on the issue because of lack of support.

Moreover, there is the distinct possibility that the authorisation will only be approved with conditions attached—such as one which would require the U.S. executive director at the IMF to oppose any IMF loan to a country on the grounds of insufficient observance of human rights needs.

Financial Times, published daily except Sundays and holidays. U.S. subscription 1200 per annum \$20.00 per month per annum. Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y.

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Swapo rally in Namibia dispersed

By Quentin Peel

WINDHOEK, Feb. 5.

A MASS rally being held by the Namibian (South West African) nationalist movement, SWAPO, was broken up here this week-end as envoys from the five western member States of the U.N. Security Council were briefing internal security organisations on their proposals for a constitutional settlement in the territory.

The rally, attended by some 1,000 people, was being held in Rundu, the principal town of the remote north-eastern province of Caprivi, and first reports reaching here today said it had broken up in confusion after police fired tear gas into the crowd, following attempts by a small number of opponents to disrupt the meeting.

No Australian devaluation Fraser warns speculators

BY KENNETH RANDALL

CANBERRA, Feb. 5.

THE AUSTRALIAN Government has gone to unusual lengths during the week-end to warn currency speculators that they can expect to have their fingers burned in gambling on any substantial devaluation of the Australian dollar.

Yesterday, in an interview with the Sydney Morning Herald, Mr. Malcolm Fraser, the Prime Minister, said there would be no change in the present system of managing the exchange rate, which is a form of managed float.

On Friday, in an interview with "The Australian," Mr. Fraser said the present exchange rate management system had worked well, especially over the past six months, and he was determined to hold the value of the dollar at around its present level.

The series of statements amount to a concerted effort by the Government to end the uncertainty which has built up for several months over the possibility of another substantial devaluation.

Australian foreign reserves at the end of December stood at \$42,579m., compared with \$43,500m. a year earlier. The downward has continued since, with capital outflow affecting both the stability of the currency and an already tight domestic money supply.

A reversal of the capital flow is important to the Government in fulfilling its recent predictions of a reduction of 2 per cent. in interest rates in the general interest rate structure. It extracted a reduction of 0.5 per cent. from the banks for housing loans last week only after considerable pressure.

Hanoi calls for ceasefire in Cambodia

By Richard Nations

BANGKOK, Feb. 5.

HANOI CALLED today for an immediate ceasefire and a peace treaty guaranteed by an "international commission" to end its protracted border war with Cambodia.

However, the call coincided with renewed charges of aggression by Radio Phnom Penh, which reported a major Vietnamese operation supported by "several tanks under armour of many helicopters and MIG fighters" along the lower Bassac River near the Vietnamese town of Chau Duc.

Hanoi's three-point proposal called for an immediate end to all hostile military activities in the border region, for the armed forces of each side to be stationed within their respective territory 5 kilometres from the border, and for the two sides to meet at once.

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December 1977

HOME NEWS

Cost cut expected in raw material

BY MICHAEL BLANDEN

FURTHER SUPPORT for the Government's hopes of bringing the rate of price inflation down to single figures in the spring should be given to-day when the wholesale price indices for last month are published.

The figures are likely to show a further, possibly quite sharp, reduction in the cost of industry's raw materials and fuels as a result of the reduction in sterling during the month. The pound's value as measured by the trade-weighted index published by the Bank of England rose by more than 2 per cent. during the month.

The earlier improvement in sterling has already been reflected in a reduction in material costs, which fell by 51 per cent. between May and December.

This in turn has begun to work through bringing a slowdown in the underlying rate of increase in industry's output prices at the factory gate, which will influence retail prices in coming months.

There is some slight uncertainty over whether this process will have been maintained as there tends to be some seasonal bunching of output price rises in industry.

The Government's monetary policy will come under scrutiny tomorrow with publication of the latest leading figures from the clearing banks and the official statistics of the banking system's eligible liabilities.

These normally provide a pointer to the movements in the sterling money stock on the wider definition (M3). In the eight months to mid-December, this measure had risen at a rate just above the top end of the official target range of 9-13 per cent. for the full financial year to mid-April.

Spending money up 120% over 28 years

REAL PERSONAL disposable income increased by more than 130 per cent. between 1948 and 1976, while personal saving rose from only 1.5 per cent. of personal disposable income in 1947 to 14.6 per cent. in 1976, writes Michael Blenden.

These are some of the comparisons which can be made out of the third edition of the Central Statistical Office's Economic Trends annual supplement, published to-day.

It shows, for example, that the rise in basic weekly wage rates in manufacturing industry between 1958 and 1976 was nearly 380 per cent. But the internal purchasing power of the pound dropped by 18 per cent. between 1948 and 1976.

Average prices of new houses on mortgage rose by over 475 per cent. from 1956 to 1976. The annual supplement brings together long runs of quarterly and annual data for the key series of economic statistics. Some 300 series are included linked to give continuous runs as far back as possible in the post-war period.

Banker urges freedom for private sector

Financial Times Reporter

THE PRIVATE sector needs to be allowed to breathe, and even to make its own mistakes, if it is to maintain the morale and purpose which are its justification, Mr. Robin Leigh-Pemberton, chairman of the National Westminster Bank, writes in today's issue of the bank's quarterly review.

He draws attention to the increasing amount of external intervention, imposing "an enormous burden in terms of cost, senior management time and staff time."

For example, the bank estimated that full implementation of the Consumer Credit Act could mean the issue of an additional 5m. pieces of paper per annum in the National Westminster Bank at a time when the aim was to reduce the movement of paper.

Surplus on invisible trade 'likely to fall further'

BY MICHAEL BLANDEN

THE SURPLUS on Britain's invisible trade, which has provided a large and generally growing contribution to the balance of payments in recent years, is likely to fall further this year, say estimates produced by stockbrokers Wood Mackenzie.

The brokers say that the invisible trade surplus, which rose to a peak of £2.3bn. in 1976, slipped last year to an estimated £1.7bn.

A marked deterioration in the surplus on interest, profits and dividends, and a rise in the deficit on transfers, last year more than offset a strong improvement in the surplus on services.

Many forecasters argued that

Barnett faces probe on economic future

BY PETER RIDDELL, ECONOMICS CORRESPONDENT

MR. JOEL BARNETT, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, is likely to be closely questioned by an all-party committee of MPs this afternoon on the prospects for the economy.

Mr. Barnett has been asked to appear before the general sub-committee of the Expenditure Committee which is holding a series of hearings on the Government's spending White Paper.

There will be close interest in Mr. Barnett's evidence after the fairly pessimistic assess-

ment of the possible medium-term prospects presented last week to the sub-committee by a senior Treasury economist.

Mr. Frank Cassell, an Under Secretary responsible for medium-term analysis, said that unless there was a marked improvement in industrial performance a 31 per cent. annual rate of economic growth would leave unemployment above 1m. in 1982 and would mean that the current account would be back in deficit within a few years.

Members of the sub-committee, by their questions, indicated concern about the prospects for unemployment and the current account.

There has also been discussion about the balance between capital and current spending. Treasury witnesses pointed out the additional current expenditure produced by new capital investment as a partial explanation for the larger cuts on the capital side at a time when current spending was also being restrained.

Hoover to start expanding Welsh plant next month

BY ROBIN REEVES

BUILDING WORK on Hoover's expansion at Merthyr Tydfil, South Wales, is to begin next month and be completed by the end of next year.

The expansion, with Ford's new engine plant at Bridgend, is one of the two most important investment projects to be announced in South Wales over the past 12 months.

When completed, it is due to provide up to 3,000 new jobs in an area where high unemployment is being aggravated by closures and redundancies.

The new factory, being built beside Hoover's main plant for

washing machines and laundry appliances, will help by drawing redundancies arising from the run-down of steel making at the British Steel Corporation's works at Ebbw Vale.

Discussions with steel unions aimed at accelerating the run-down, in order to try to stem British Steel's financial losses, are already under way.

The buildings for the new Hoover manufacturing complex represent the single biggest investment to date—£10m.—by the Welsh Development Agency.

The main building contract, worth £7m., has gone to George

a 270,000 square feet production block, together with another 47,000 square feet of ancillary buildings.

A second contract, worth £1.7m., for the construction of a separate office block and laboratory building, with a basement car park, has been awarded to G. Percy Trentham.

Hoover plans to use the new facilities to produce a new model of washing machine and possibly also dishwashers.

The company is exploring the U.K. market potential for dishwashers with machines imported from its plant in West Germany.

Farmers count cost of snow

FINANCIAL TIMES REPORTER

SCOTTISH FARMERS are counting the cost of the "white-out" blizzards which swept across their land last week.

They have also been out with their dogs searching snowdrifts for the flocks of sheep and stray cattle lost in the blizzards.

No official estimates have yet been published of the number of livestock frozen or simply smothered in the snow storms, but Scottish Office officials say the total "will be quite frightening when we get it."

Difficulties caused by drifts blocking roads and rail lines have been compounded by the collapse of the telephone network over

the worst-hit, more isolated areas of the country.

Helicopters and other rescue services, which are commonly called on for transporting animals, have been fully stretched this year saving human lives.

Some farmers in the worst affected regions—snowdrifts 20 feet deep are still to be cleared and searched—have already started reporting losses of up to half their flocks.

Provided the snow stays away the first estimates of animal deaths and injuries should be available later this week.

Mr. Bob High, secretary of the Scottish National Farmers' Union, said the farmers would need compensation.

It is not normal for winter losses to be compensated in Scotland, where farmers live all the year with difficult conditions, but this year's disaster is so widespread that Government relief will certainly be needed.

Hundreds of acres of prime Norfolk farm land, soaked by floods of sea water during recent storms, are unlikely to produce worthwhile crops until at least 1980, according to the local branch of the Country Landowners' Association.

Land 'in grip of bureaucrats'

BY MICHAEL CASSELL, BUILDING CORRESPONDENT

THE GOVERNMENT'S land nationalisation legislation has resulted in a "bureaucratic mess," according to Mr. Michael Latham, MP.

The Conservative member for Melton said in National Builder—the journal of the National Federation of Building Trades Employers—that the Community Land Act and the Development Land Tax had proved of no value to house builders.

Only 33 acres of land acquired under the Act had actually been resold for development in England and Scotland in the first

year of operation, while, in the same period, 111 official instructions, orders or documents of advice had been issued—more than three for every acre of land resold.

Over-staffing in offices handling land matters was so large that, by last October, only 594 vendors had been found to owe any tax out of 8,500 land transactions, a ratio of one civil servant to every four tax assessments.

Mr. Latham, a former director of the House-Builders Federation, claimed that, although the

aim of the Act had been to bring land forward for development in an orderly way and to ensure a reasonable supply of land to the building industry, this had not happened.

At the end of the scheme's first financial year, the total loan sanction for land acquisition in England was just over £24m., of which only £12m. was spent.

This left "a remarkable £12m. unused, all of which promptly lapsed under the terms of a guidance note issued in December, 1976."

Shops 'disfigure' high streets

FINANCIAL TIMES REPORTER

LEADING STORE groups are criticised to-day for helping to "disfigure" high streets throughout the country with their shop fronts.

Kentucky Fried Chicken, Golden Egg, Tesco, H. Samuel, Debenhams, Radio Rentals, Saxon, Dayvilles and McDonalds are

rebuked for their "aggressive standard facias" by Designer magazine.

The magazine singles out the companies as examples of the "visual squalor and anarchy" in Britain's high streets to-day, but emphasises that they are by no means the only offenders.

A three-man panel, headed by

Sir Hugh Casson, president of the Royal Academy, says that the companies have not adapted their shop fronts to fit in with the local architectural characteristics.

The judges also object to oversized lettering, repetition and synthetic colours, such as Barclays Bank's cyan blue.

Poll will be tough—Thatcher

BY PHILIP RAWSTORNE

MRS. MARGARET THATCHER called on the Tory Party at the weekend to prepare for one of its toughest General Election contests.

"The coming election is a watershed election," she told a Tory local government conference in London. "The vote could decide what sort of country we are going to live in

for the rest of this century."

She expected an October election. The time in which the "Labour trap" could be sprung would be running out after that.

"Not only will the inflation figures be threatening to move up again, the Government will also be running into many of the problems they have postponed, not least on the pay front."

"For my part, October would do fine. I don't think Labour should be allowed to splutter on the dying days of this Parliament."

Her speech brought an immediate riposte from Mr. Eric Heffer, Labour MP for Walton, who accused her of trying to spread panic among voters.

Meriden deal fails to raise output

BY ARTHUR SMITH, MIDLANDS CORRESPONDENT

THE much-publicised productivity deal at the Meriden Motor Cycle Co-operative has failed, according to Mr. John Nelson, managing director.

The scheme had not produced the desired increase in output, and there was "unease" within the co-operative at the way in which differentials for skilled workers were calculated.

The co-operative had returned to its egalitarian principles—a productivity scheme would remain in force but any benefits would be distributed equally among the 650 employees. All workers received a basic wage of £5.50 a week.

The productivity deal, effective from the beginning of last month, aimed to introduce differentials for skilled workers for the first time since the formation of the co-operative nearly three years ago. But output has not been high enough to justify bonus payments.

£2m. housing contract

A NEW £2m. housing contract has been awarded by the London Borough of Lewisham to Y. J. Lovell (London), a Lovell Construction company. The scheme consists of 80 single-bedroom flats in four-storey blocks and 89 two-, three- and four-bedroom houses.

Wedgwood display

WEDGWOOD is showing nearly 100 new lines in fine bone china, earthenware, glass, tableware, Jasper, crystal and glass at its stand at the International Spring Fair, at the National Exhibition Centre, Birmingham. The last day to see the display is Thursday.

Welsh craft scheme

THE Development Corporation for Wales, the Wales Craft Council and the Wales Trade Centre, Los Angeles, are to introduce a scheme for marketing Welsh craft products through retail outlets in the U.S. The pilot project, to be launched on March 1 in Los Angeles, will involve 19 Welsh craft companies.

3p on pint, claim

MR. WALTER JOHNSON, Labour MP for Derby South, claimed at the weekend that the 3p a pint increase on beer being introduced by some brewers would mean a rise of at least 3p in the pub. "The brewers are acting in a disgraceful manner and seem to be cooking a snook at Price Commission regulations."

Bid to save company

THE BATTLE to keep the Newburgh Five Floorcovering factory out of the hands of liquidators enters a new phase to-day, when a Board meeting of the company's directors tries to organise more financial aid for the concern, given a £700,000 Government hand-out in December 1976.

Dunlop recalls tyres

DUNLOP is recalling about 1,000 tyres after reports of defects. The company said the tyres—for Jaguar and Daimler cars—were a batch of the special size 205-70 VR 15 SP Sport, made during the first week of June last year.

Councillors' pay

THE Association of Metropolitan Authorities has urged the Government to give councillors a basic £1,000 a year, with extra payments for special responsibilities. On the lines of the Robinson report on pay for members of local authorities.

Moral booster

SEX education could be a "powerful counter" to the influence of pornography, according to the National Union of Teachers in a submission to the Obscenity and Film Censorship Committee. It should also encourage "high standards of moral and social behaviour."

Bus fares rise

THE United Counties Bus Company in Northamptonshire increased fares yesterday by between 1p and 6p. Northampton town fares went up by between 1p and 3p.

More ships laid up

MORE than 1m. deadweight tonnage of the U.K. dry cargo fleet was laid up for lack of work at the end of 1977, says the General Council of British Shipping.

LABOUR NEWS

Unions oppose British Steel output plans

BY PAULINE CLARK, LABOUR STAFF

THE financially troubled British Steel Corporation was confronted at the weekend with a united front of opposition to its de-managing and productivity plans when union leaders for about 27,500 craftsmen rejected a package, including a 91 per cent. increase in pay.

The offer, revised from an original 6 per cent. package, was refused last week by the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, representing 67,000 manual workers employed by the Steel Corporation.

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Conditions snag

The craftsmen's meeting was described as adjourned. But no new date for further talks has been fixed. Negotiators said that they will first press for a meeting with Mr. Bob Scholey, chief executive of BSC.

The sticking point for both groups of workers seems to have been in the conditions of the offer rather than the percentage increase proposed.

The National Craftsmen Coordinating Committee, comprising 12 steel industry craft unions, was said to have refused to give certain commitments for co-operation in productivity measures to raise productivity and reduce manning.

After six hours' talks with the management at the weekend, Mr. Eddie Linton, the craftsmen's chief negotiator, said: "We are disappointed at the corporation's attitude."

His committee had made counter-proposals "far beyond anything we have offered before to BSC." These were said to have included an offer of early negotiations on closing certain steelworks.

British Steel is seeking agreement to closure of some high-cost plants and of those in the Beswick Report on the industry, before the planned dates.

No precise figure has been given on the number of jobs likely to be lost, but it has been suggested that it might be about 26,000.

Phase Four 5% bid 'would be robbery'

BY OUR LABOUR STAFF

MR. CLIVE JENKINS, general secretary of the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs, warns the Government to-day that any attempt to keep pay increases down to 5 per cent. in Phase Four of its incomes policy would be viewed as "robbery."

Incomes would improve next year and Government intervention would show an impact only on totally Government-funded operations, Mr. Jenkins said.

He writes in the union's quarterly economic review that merely to restore living standards to the level of three years ago the average wage-earner would need an increase of 23.4 per cent. after the guidelines expire in July.

Those who earned double the average wage would need 35.7 per cent. "Describing the Government's 'kite-flying' suggestions of a Phase Four increase of 5 per cent. as totally unacceptable, the article says that incomes policy, in particular the 15-month rule on gaps between individual settlements, would prolong the large cut in disposable incomes, in spite of tax reductions."

Senior staff at ICI win union rights

By Our Labour Staff

THE Association of Professional Scientists and Technologists has achieved full recognition on collective bargaining rights for senior managers in ICI after 12-month talks with the company.

Dr. Maurice Gifford, executive secretary of the association, and Mr. James Bell, general manager of personnel at ICI, signed an agreement for full representation rights for the union, in what is believed to be the first agreement of its kind on behalf of members at such senior level in a major British company.

Salaries for senior managers at ICI are upwards of £10,000 a year. The association claims 450 members out of a total 2,000 in the senior grade category, but in the past has been able to represent them only on an individual basis.

Those who earned double the average wage would need 35.7 per cent.

Describing the Government's "kite-flying" suggestions of a Phase Four increase of 5 per cent. as totally unacceptable, the article says that incomes policy, in particular the 15-month rule on gaps between individual settlements, would prolong the large cut in disposable incomes, in spite of tax reductions."

He writes in the union's quarterly economic review that merely to restore living standards to the level of three years ago the average wage-earner would need an increase of 23.4 per cent. after the guidelines expire in July.

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The Executive's and Office World


Barclays Bank: a share deal for employees

EXECUTIVE HEALTH

BY DR. DAVID CARRICK

HOW DOES one define intelligence? Many erudite people have attempted to meet that challenge. Of their numerous definitions the one that interests me most is that: "Intelligence is the ability to behave in a unique way under novel circumstances."

Keeping intelligent life at the top



it?" I asked. "A tidy while," was the answer. "Could you bicycle there from here in Essex?" I enquired. "Certainly, Sir, I'm very good on a bike." So I asked him whether this would present problems. "No, Sir," he said. "I'm good on me bike. Got it outside. Want to watch me?"

I declined the offer and pursued the matter with the question "Don't you think you'd get a bit wet on the way?" He gazed at me incredulously. "For Gawd's sake, Sir," he exclaimed, "I'd take me mac, of course! I ain't a fool, you know!"

At this point, some may be asking just what all this has to do with executive health. Plenty; because a valuable mind is just as important as a sound heart, and should be of great importance to management with selection. First one must presume that top people are themselves intelligent. This means that they are always ready to learn; to possess understanding; and are capable of listening to the views of employees of any rank; in other words, they must be endowed with the many facets of humanity and not just one outstanding attribute as blinding to others as to themselves. In short, they must have wisdom, which is a distillation of intelligence and experience. Then they are capable of placing those of differing abilities correctly; and also to be able to recognise the intelligent and thence groom them for succession.

In this way only does an enterprise deserve to flourish, perdurably. Instead of enjoying a comet-like existence, blind-ly awarded him a few more marks for amusing me. Another rapidly dying liability, whose brightened my drab life with glittering tail may yet cause crude logic. I asked him if he had heard of Ireland, and force has lost its ephemeral and meretricious magnificence.

However, that lacks comprehension and I am more happy with the OEDS' description: "The faculty of understanding," which I find more suitable and succinct. A picture begins to emerge from that and makes one appreciate that an intelligent individual differs from one who is merely clever.

Obviously it is possible for an individual to be clever and intelligent; but too often the separate qualities dwell a world apart. Now, a computer (which is but an electronic extension of a clever man) is amazingly clever but in no wise intelligent.

Even the ability to master many languages does not necessarily indicate intelligence; after all, some humbergrigs, with their tiny, primitive brains can speak whatever language their owner speaks, be it English, Spanish or even Chinese. As for arithmetic ability, I once had a patient who was, in those days, called an "idiot savant," but now would be described as "a severely educationally sub-normal person with special attributes."

Anyway, Joe, who could neither dress nor feed himself, was able within seconds of being told a stranger's date of birth, to state the day of the week when he was born; and he was never wrong. He also memorised every nurse's duty hours for an entire year, something the staff found very useful.

Intelligence tests are much criticised. Yet, when applied properly, many of the older ones are valuable guides. Properly, is the operative word. For example, if one applies an IQ test devised for one particular race and culture, to some-thing of a totally different race and cultural background, the result must be unacceptable.

Again, an allowance for age must be made. In a limited-time test, to the simple question: "What is one and one?" the 19-year-old will put "two" and man, rabbi etc.). What do you hurry on to the next question, suppose was happening?"

Without hesitation, one lad said: "Well, I reckon they said: 'Playin' cards. You see, enterprise deserve to flourish, perdurably. Instead of enjoying a comet-like existence, blind-ly awarded him a few more marks for amusing me. Another rapidly dying liability, whose brightened my drab life with glittering tail may yet cause crude logic. I asked him if he had heard of Ireland, and force has lost its ephemeral and meretricious magnificence."

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I used to have to carry out 30 I.Q. tests a week during a

he nodded. "How far away is meretricious magnificence."

The issue of profit sharing schemes in which employees acquire shares in their companies has gained new importance since last Thursday's consultative document from the Government and the decision to provide for such schemes in this spring's Finance Bill. Up to now only a few large companies in the U.K. (of which ICI is probably the best known) have introduced such schemes. Here Sue Cameron explains the Barclays Bank scheme and outlines another at Lucas Industries.

Employees will become stockholders. But he stresses that the bank does not put any pressure on people to retain the stock they receive under the profit-sharing scheme. Nor does it try to persuade the lower paid to choose stock rather than a lump sum.

"We want everyone to have a stake in the business and of course it does weaken the system if people sell their stock or opt for a cash payment," Mr. Vine says. "But we felt that people earning below a certain level would cash in their stock given which is why they were given a choice in the first place."

"It should also be borne in mind that many senior staff, who have to accept stock, have had a fairly rough time over the past few years because of inflation and pay restraint, and it is therefore understandable that some of them should have decided to sell."

Opportunity

Mr. Vine points out that the opportunity for staff to accept stock is repeated every year. Barclays hopes that the economic situation improves more people will do this.

"I think people are already identifying more closely with the bank as a result of the profit sharing scheme," Mr. Vine says. "The staff are more interested in how much profit we make and they are keener to compare one year's results with those of the previous year. Some of the bank's messengers can be seen looking up share prices and I'm sure this is because they themselves are now stockholders."

"The profit sharing system acts as an incentive scheme—though not on a day-to-day basis. Staff don't come in in the morning thinking they must work all out so as to increase profits and push up their own share of them. The money or stock they are going to receive next year is too remote to affect the amount of effort they put in to-day."

But profit sharing does make employees more aware of things like costs and senior staff in particular are now taking extra care to avoid waste and to keep expenditure to the minimum.

The scheme will be reviewed after it has been running for ten years, but so far we have found no real disadvantages. It was introduced with the support of the staff association and of the National Union of Bank Employees; and the administrative costs of profit sharing are not significant.

The one thing Barclays would like to see is a tax concession for employees who receive and keep stock. At present all staff pay tax at the normal rate on the profit shares they receive. It was because of the introduction of a "penal rate of tax" that Barclays has not implemented a stock option scheme which was devised at the same time as the profit sharing system and accepted by shareholders at the same extraordinary general meeting.

Under this scheme the 600 or so most senior bank employees would have been able to buy an option on ordinary bank stock for a nominal sum. They would have been able to take up the option between three and seven years later—at the stock price prevailing when they first bought the option.

The stock option scheme would have involved some element of risk to those who decided to participate because the stock price could fall over a three year period. And those eligible, including several hundred branch managers, would have had to choose between the stock option scheme and the profit sharing plan. They would not have been allowed to participate in both. On the other hand, the rewards, when stock prices rose, could have been considerable.

Barclays would still like to bring in its stock option scheme if the tax regulations were changed. There are two main reasons why it would be limited to senior staff: Barclays, in true paternal banking style, would not like lower- and middle-ranking employees to be exposed to financial risk; and in any case, people on lower salaries simply would not have enough money for the stock option scheme to be worth while.

Mr. Vine reckons that profit sharing and stock option schemes probably work best if the participants are white-collar employees. At present there are few manufacturing companies which have brought in schemes of this type. One of those which has is Lucas Industries, manufacturers of motor components.

Yet the Lucas share ownership scheme, begun 12 years ago, is limited to supervisory and managerial staff. Those who are eligible are given an annual bonus in the form of shares. The value of the shares each person receives varies from year to year, depending on the company's performance.

Two years ago Lucas introduced a share option scheme. This is open to shop floor workers as well as supervisors and managers, but to be

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8
LOMBARD

An undiplomatic ambassador

BY ANTHONY HARRIS

MR. ALONZO McDONALD has a name which is memorable in itself. And in the flesh he lives up to it. The tradition of trade negotiations is to achieve agreement by boring your opposite number out of his senses: everything is wrapped up in anodyne words and recalcitrant figures. Mr. McDONALD, who is head of the U.S. delegation for the Tokyo Round talks now starting in Geneva, has broken that mould. He looks every inch a diplomat, and is a former management consultant, but he is not a man to call a spade a soil excavation programme. His words are blunt and plain-up to a point.

When he came to London last week and addressed the Foreign Affairs Club on his way to Geneva, he was not ashamed to describe American policy as containing a "more or less aggressive megalomania" — an attitude that first emerged with an equally plain speaker, Mr. John Connally.

He was equally blunt about the political pressures under which he is negotiating. Unless some acceptable agreement can be put to Congress in principle towards the end of this year and in legislation by about the following spring, the whole issue may become hopelessly entangled in the next Presidential campaign. And in the U.S. liberal trade looks like a vote-loser.

This is likely to be the last trade round for a very long time and in the political situation which will emerge after mid-1979, some new rules are going to be needed.

Protectionism

This could, of course, be nothing but an acute negotiating ploy: the Ambassador was in effect asking his opposite number to provide something to help President Carter's new administration to agree to anything at all. Pleading powerlessness against your own voters is one of the oldest but still one of the most effective tactics in any bargaining between sovereign States, as every Brussels veteran knows.

However, there seems every reason to believe Ambassador McDONALD, for what he said is borne out both by political observation in the U.S. — and in other countries for that matter — and by the economic situation. At a time when the world is in obstinate recession, and it is fashionable in the financial world to say that this is the long downswing forecast by Kondratieff (who must be laughing at his Bolshevik grave)

some economic isolationism is natural and even rational. The natural result of this would be a mixture of cartelisation and *ad hoc* protectionism of the kind that was familiar 40-odd years ago. But, according to Ambassador McDONALD, that is exactly what the U.S. is now determined to avoid. His bluntness rather surprised him when he called on a regime which would avoid harsh internal adjustments while preserving competition, conducted under trade arrangements which would combine greater flexibility with greater discipline.

One is tempted to suggest that proposals to achieve these ends should be submitted to the U.S. authorities on a square, circular paper, and leave it at that. But the Ambassador did drop a few hints to help decipher his formulae. He denounced the GATT rules as rigid, cumbersome and slow, and he expressed impatience with some countries which ignore them altogether. And he talked about industrial capacity.

What he proposed was that there should be international consultations on plans for major new capacity in sensitive industries. He called this a step towards the French idea of orderly free trade, but it sounded more like an attempt to internationalise French indicative planning.

Horse trading

If the idea was to achieve binding agreement on new investment it would be a non-starter. It is hard to imagine sovereign governments negotiating such questions successfully, as the Industrial Commissioner in Brussels could testify, and equally hard to imagine how such agreement would be enforced.

But Ambassador McDONALD was quick to dismiss any such disciplinary options. He only wanted, he said, to achieve "transparency" in an area where little light had hitherto been shed. The meaning is still far from obvious. But if you take all these rather impenetrable remarks together, and stir in some more rather vague observations to the effect that "the coming of age of economic and political mechanisms for resolving trade disputes," a picture begins to emerge which can be described in two words: horse trading.

Ambassador McDONALD would be happy to start discussing the ground rules. Next time he says it though, I hope he will be more transparent.

THE WEEK IN THE COURTS

When promissory notes resemble commodities

BY JUSTINIAN

WHEN A BANK discounts a such element of "earned discount" from a year's tax computation. The leading majority speech was Lord Fraser's, who made four points: (1) discount, unlike interest, does not accrue and is not earned; (2) when a bank discounts a bill it does not, except in a very loose sense, render services to the borrower; (3) it is acquiring an asset, and so long as it continues to hold that asset it does not, and cannot, realise any profit or loss in respect of it; (4) if the bank takes credit for any "accrued discount" while it is still holding the bill, it is thereby anticipating a profit that has not yet been realised, just as would be the case if the bills were ordinary commodities.

Lord Keith put his finger on the logic of the contrary view when he said: "The reason why accounts prepared in the manner adopted by ICB show a true and fair view of its profits over the years is that, in order to have funds available for its bills of exchange transactions, the bank borrows money in the interest. The interest payable each year goes into the debit side of the profit and loss account and it is with the object of showing what benefit there is to counter-balance these payments that a fractional part of the discount on the bills is taken into the account on the credit side in each year." But he at once went on: "It is not accurate to say that the interest payments are earning these fractional parts of the discount," and he concurred with his Scots colleague's proposition (3) and (4) stated earlier. Significantly he did not adopt point (1), and (2) he adopted only in this qualified form: "ICB is not reasonably to be regarded as rendering services to the issuers of the bills for which the latter then and there become liable to pay." (Nobody could quarrel with that!)

Preparing

Very briefly, the facts were these: International Commercial Bank (ICB) discounted promissory notes for terms up to ten years for foreign borrowers, and in preparing its accounts followed the method generally adopted by clearing banks (and in accordance with accountancy principles) to give a true and fair view of the profits for each year during which they held a note, by taking credit for a time-based proportion of what they would earn, in discount, over its whole life. By way of example, a five-year note of face value £15,000, would be discounted for £10,000: ICB would be at the end of each of the ensuing five years bring £1,000 of the total discount into credit in its profit and loss account, instead of waiting until the note matured and then bringing in the whole £5,000. Each such annual slice of discount was variously described as "accrued," "earned," "discount," "ICB appealed against assessments to tax, based on its own figures for annual profit, on the ground that this method infringed the fundamental principle of tax law, that profit is not to be taxed until it has been realised.

So the whole argument turned on whether this judicially-coined principle applied to exclude any

for the fiscal year in which the loan agreement was made "with an allowance for the deferment of the payment of interest. That would be the year in which the bank earned the right to be paid the £5,000 in five years' time."

The minority (Lords Diplock and Russell of Kewton) took a simple view — the converse of Lord Fraser's unqualified point (3) — that discount (like interest) is the lender's reward for the service he provides in providing a service — the use of his money — over a period of time. Although such reward would be payable at the end of year 1, the service of providing the money through-out year 1 has been, by its end, completely rendered; hence earned; hence no principle of tax law precludes credit from being brought to account, when to do so accords with sound accountancy practice.

Maddening

Since there was no majority for Lord Fraser's unqualified (3), it is not easy to distil from all this any clear single principle upon which to conclude how the court decided to appeal. A further maddening complication is the suggestion, rejected by the minority but treated without disapproval by the majority that the whole of the discount could be brought into account as an earning in the year in which the note was acquired, though at a reduced figure to reflect deferment of the date of actual payment.

The inference must be — in the example put — that although to bring £1,000 into credit in year 1 objectively anticipates profit, to bring in £5,000 reduced by £4 would be unobjectionable; and presumably, in that case, the £4 would be taxable at the end of year 5.

The accountancy profession is likely to take that suggestion to its bosom with as little enthusiasm as the decision itself will be received by academic lawyers. With due respect to Lords Fraser and Salmon, they seem to have decided that a promissory note from his borrower has essentially stepped out of the business of providing a loan service, and marched into the commodity market.

Service except: 1.20-1.25 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 1.25-1.30 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 1.30-1.35 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 1.35-1.40 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 1.40-1.45 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 1.45-1.50 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 1.50-1.55 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 1.55-2.00 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 2.00-2.05 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 2.05-2.10 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 2.10-2.15 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 2.15-2.20 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 2.20-2.25 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 2.25-2.30 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 2.30-2.35 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 2.35-2.40 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 2.40-2.45 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 2.45-2.50 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 2.50-2.55 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 2.55-3.00 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 3.00-3.05 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 3.05-3.10 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 3.10-3.15 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 3.15-3.20 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 3.20-3.25 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 3.25-3.30 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 3.30-3.35 p.m. Penetration Newsday. 3.35-3.40 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FINANCIAL TIMES

BRACKEN HOUSE, CANNON STREET, LONDON EC4A 3DF

Telegrams: Finantime, London FSA. Telex: 886341/2, 883397

Telephone: 01-248 8000

Monday February 6 1978

Evidence for caution

THANKS largely to the activities of the House of Commons Expenditure Committee, an acute and well-informed discussion of the economic prospect is now taking place at a season of the year when traditionally there was a hushed silence ahead of the official judgment. The Committee's own insistence on discussing expenditure plans in a proper economic context has been the provocation; the development of many rival schools of economic forecasting, and especially those giving great weight to financial factors, has provided the necessary material over the weeks while the Treasury's own forecast is still being prepared.

Under pressure

The general picture that is emerging is fairly clear, though there is plenty of room for disagreement over details. The sharp rise in sterling since the last official forecasts were prepared has much the same influence on the outlook as any other method of providing a sudden boost for real incomes—for example, an accelerated rise in wages. In the short run, consumption is likely to be higher than was earlier supposed. However, as industrial surveys have confirmed, profit margins are correspondingly under pressure, and investment may lag behind earlier forecasts. This is happening at a time when it is generally accepted that world trade will grow only slowly.

On timing grounds alone it no longer seems appropriate to give a large fiscal boost to consumer demand this spring, just when it is likely to be rising most rapidly as a result of falling inflation and rising wages; and this message is reinforced by three other considerations. First, the persistent evidence of a shortage of skilled labour, both from surveys and from the fact that vacancies have risen sharply while output is still stagnating, is a warning that output cannot be expected to respond very sharply to improved demand. Overriding inflation would simply inflate imports. Secondly, there is unusual uncertainty about the forecast itself: a fall in the

savings ratio to more normal levels would produce a bigger rise in demand than is now officially forecast. Finally, and potentially most important, too much fiscal action could undermine financial confidence.

Indeed, the financial markets already seem to be anticipating the worst likely outcome, and discounting an over-expansionary Budget followed by excessively tight credit. These fears, which seem to be partly the result of an outburst of competitive forecasting by City institutions are probably overdone. The Chancellor and the Prime Minister are committed to tax reductions, but not to any specific figure for reduction, and have shown acute awareness of the need to keep Government borrowing within the capacity of the market. Meanwhile, the fact that both inflation and investment intentions are falling will reduce the need for corporate borrowing. The experience of other countries suggests that economic revival based on falling inflation does not lead to financial strain. Only an irresponsible Budget would be likely to do that.

The prospect

The prospect, then, is for a relatively subdued recovery, led by consumption rather than by investment or exports. Fortunately, with a strong current balance and an improving oil balance, that need not imply a return to stop-go; but both the industrial and the financial situation argue for a cautious acceleration. In present circumstances this may mean a somewhat smaller fiscal injection than Ministers may have been contemplating in the first euphoria of financial recovery. The best way to embody such caution in the Budget would be to stick to any existing plans for the relief and reform of income tax, but to get a larger offset through indirect taxes—notably the duties on petrol, tobacco and the like. The best way meanwhile to restore financial confidence, which has sagged recently, would be to give an authoritative warning to the public not to expect the moon in April. What the voters may hope for, the City fears.

Schmidt changes his team

LIFE HAS not been very kind recently to Herr Helmut Schmidt, the West German Chancellor. Two months ago, after his universally admired handling of the Mogadishu hijacking and a clear vote of confidence at his party's congress, his position looked sound enough. Now a succession of events has conspired to make his Socialist/Free Democrat coalition look much less secure—and few of them can be said to be entirely his fault.

Revelations

Most of the Government's recent misfortunes have occurred in areas under the tutelage of the Ministry of Defence. First there was December's shattering spy scandal, in which it was learned that important Western military secrets had been passed to the East by a former Ministry employee. Next came a series of bugging disclosures which seriously embarrassed the Minister, Herr Georg Leber. The spate of revelations was such as to arouse speculation in Bonn that a deliberate plot had been mounted to discredit him. Whatever the truth of the matter, Herr Schmidt, by accepting Herr Leber's resignation at the end of last week, has acknowledged that his Minister had become a serious electoral liability.

With Friday's major Cabinet reshuffle, Herr Schmidt is clearly hoping to put the affair swiftly behind him, particularly as he faces a crucial series of provincial elections later this year. But it may not be all that easy. In the first place, inquiries into the extent of unauthorised bugging are likely to continue. In the second, the men appointed to the two most important posts in the reshuffle, Herr Hans Apel, who replaces Herr Leber at Defence, and Herr Hans Matthöfer, who replaces Herr Apel at Finance, are both totally inexperienced in their new fields. Herr Apel has in the past made his distaste for dealing with military matters abundantly clear, while Herr Matthöfer, in former posts, acquired a reputation for over-spending his budget.

The changes can only help to strengthen the position of the experienced FDP Ministers in the Cabinet, all of whom remain

Opposition

So far, two powerful factors have combined to keep the FDP in coalition with the Socialists. The first is the divided state of the opposition, exemplified by the constant tension between Herr Helmut Kohl, the CDU leader, and Herr Franz-Josef Strauss, leader of the Bavarian CSU. The second is Herr Schmidt himself, a man with whom the FDP knows it can do business and who is head and shoulders above any other candidate for the Chancellery. But the FDP is not going to sit idly by and watch its fortunes dragged down by the Socialists if the forthcoming elections show a serious loss in their popularity. With the next national elections not due before 1980, the FDP leaders would have plenty of time to prove themselves in a new partnership. A great deal could thus depend on the performance of Herr Schmidt's new Ministerial team in the coming months.



Ian Smith

Bishop Muzorewa

Ndabaningi Sithole

Joshua Nkomo

Robert Mugabe

Dr. Owen

Britain and Rhodesia: no easy way out

BY BRIDGET BLOOM, Africa Correspondent

RHODESIA appears to be becoming a live issue in British politics once more, after several years during which it was left to the Government of the day to make the running.

Every time there is a Commons debate the traditional differences have been aired between Labour Left and Tory Right, with snippings about concern for kith and kin and mutterings about supporting terrorism. But for a decade, most MPs of all parties have been content to let the Government try its hand at settlement.

Interestingly, if not wholly unpredictably, this situation seems to be changing fast. Dr. David Owen, the Foreign Secretary, was noticeably irritable at his Press conference in Malta following the talks with the Patriotic Front. He has, of course, been criticised both by opposition MPs and in sections of the Press for meeting the Front at all and the criticism—which has tended to suggest that he is encouraging Patriotic Front intransigence—clearly angered him. "Unless the British public shows better understanding of the problems of bringing about peace, then they won't understand why I am here," he snapped at one point.

For its part, the Opposition has shown signs of wanting to make a political issue of Rhodesia. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher waded into the debate last August, before the terms of the Anglo-American proposals had been published, to say that if what she had heard of them were true, they would offer less than a fair deal to Rhodesian whites. Immediately before the Malta talks, Mr. John Davies, the shadow Foreign Secretary, suggested in a BBC radio interview that if the terms were right it would be impossible for a British Government not to recognise a settlement which came out of the current "internal" talks in Rhodesia.

In the Commons debate on Rhodesia last Thursday, Mr. Davies declared to Conservative cheers that it was "intolerable" that the Government was apparently only prepared to accept a settlement on the basis of the Anglo-American plan. The polarisation of British attitudes to Rhodesia stems directly from the polarisation within Rhodesia itself. As the nationalists of the Patriotic Front move further and further away from the so-called "internal" black leaders, and as the latter seem to get nearer to a settlement with Mr. Ian Smith, so the dilemma for British politicians, who in the end have to pass the legislation enabling Rhodesian independence to be recognised, becomes more and more acute.

Legitimate debate

The trouble is that the argument—whether it be in favour of the internal talks, the Anglo-American proposals or any other possible solution—is in danger of getting overheated; and in such circumstances, the real complexities of an issue can be lost.

There is of course a perfectly legitimate debate about whether the British Government might be forced to abandon its proposals, and come down in favour of a so-called internal settlement. Dr. Owen hinted at that possibility, in response to a statement from Mr. Jeremy Thorpe, the former Liberal leader. But whichever way British policy ultimately goes, account should surely be taken of the very real obstacles which could inhibit either type of settlement now being so heatedly canvassed.

The Anglo-American proposals which Dr. Owen and Mr. Young discussed with the Patriotic Front leaders in Malta last week have been fairly exhaustively analysed since their publication on September 1 last

year. The main problem of the Anglo-American plan is that while it is a genuine attempt to steer a middle course through often radically conflicting demands, it has not yet been fully accepted by either the Patriotic Front or Mr. Smith's Government. Two "internal" leaders, Bishop Muzorewa and the Rev. Sithole, have accepted it as a basis for negotiation, but they do not have the guns.

In some respects, the Malta meeting was encouraging, because for the first time since the plan was published, the PF was prepared to discuss it. The PF may be moving toward some compromise on the timing and control of elections, and Dr. Owen may feel able to give the nationalists a greater say during the transitional period before independence—yet what happened in Malta was largely shadow boxing. The PF does not accept key proposals—such as a UN peacekeeping force—of the Anglo-American package, and as the war proceeds its demands escalate. Neither does Mr. Smith show the least readiness to give up power according to its provisions. Unless he does—and both Whitehall and Washington still seem at a loss as how to make him do this—the proposals will not get off the ground.

As for the negotiations in Salisbury between Mr. Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and Senator Chief Chirau, perhaps one should recall the old adage about many a slip 'twixt cup and lip. Bishop Muzorewa, who the white Rhodesians believe commands majority black support, and whom they thus cannot afford to leave out of the talks, stayed away from the opening session in December and has gone back now, after several days' absence, only apparently to query a fundamental aspect of an agreement which all the other parties thought had been

finalised. Even if he does not walk out again, it is far from clear to-day whether he will accept separate white voting rolls. And there are many pitfalls ahead.

What has so far been agreed, is that certain provisions in a new majority rule constitution should be entrenched, which would mean that they cannot be changed except by more than three-quarters of the new MPs, including some whites (the precise "blocking" percentage must be up in the air until the provisions for electing the white MPs are agreed). The provisions cover the independence of the judiciary, a justiciable bill of rights, dual citizenship, remunerable pensions for civil servants, and an independent army, police, prisons and public services.

Once this list is completed by agreement on the white vote, an awesome number of other issues will have to be dealt with by a multi-racial transitional government which will presumably include Mr. Smith and the three black leaders. These range from appointment of judges, permanent secretaries and army commanders—all of whom are currently white and whose wholesale retention could make the achievement of majority rule in any decision making sense look very hollow—to the actual timetable for independence, which Bishop Muzorewa wants by September this year, and Mr. Smith insists should take two years.

Given the likely black compromises on the role for white MPs, agreement on such points could be vital in "selling" the terms of an agreement locally and internationally.

A point of particular relevance to international recognition is the promise of free and fair elections. Many people in Britain, including Mr. John Davies, have suggested that a "massive turnout" at such elections could be the basis

for international recognition. But can elections be free or fair against a continuing war, or where those controlling elections in rural areas are likely to be the white officials of Mr. Smith's Government, and where the absence of the two wings of the PF will reduce the existing parties from six to four?

Mr. Smith and the internal nationalist leaders would clearly hope to get some form of international supervision for the election. But that conjures up the recognition problem. Unless the PF participated (which is highly unlikely for reasons outlined below) the UN would not send observers, for that would be to tacitly recognise the internal settlement as a whole. But if the UN refused observers, could Britain send them unilaterally?

Anglo-American proposals

This seems improbable, not only because the Government is committed to the Anglo-American proposals, but because Britain is tied by innumerable UN resolutions, many of which were British sponsored, to a UN endorsed solution. It has been suggested in the past (especially on the Tory right) that Britain should flout the UN. But it is doubtful whether any British Government, faced with the problem which is still recognised world wide as being ultimately its sole responsibility, could do so. The dilemma here may be particularly acute for Dr. Owen if he were to accept the internal option. With Washington's backing, he was responsible for the last Security Council resolution last September, which tacitly endorsed the Anglo-American proposals.

If there are so many problems associated with the internal settlement as currently envisaged, what about the pos-

sibility, frequently canvassed in the past few months in Britain, in Rhodesia and elsewhere, that the Patriotic Front as a whole, or elements of it, might be persuaded to take part? While Mr. Mugabe is ruled out by Salisbury, Mr. Nkomo's return could be acceptable there.

Predictions about Rhodesia are dangerous, for its politics are murkier than most. But the reasons why Mr. Nkomo should want to stay out are stronger than those for his going in. He once tried and failed to negotiate bilaterally with Mr. Smith (whom he now deeply mistrusts); and he also mistrusts and seems to have a deep personal antipathy for Bishop Muzorewa (to say nothing of the Rev. Sithole, from whom he split in the early 1960s). More important than all this, his own army has been built up from a base less than two years ago of some 700 trained men, to an estimated 8,000 men now, with probably another 8,000-10,000 waiting for training. He has not deployed most of these men yet; he has close links with the Communist powers, as well as with the West and seasoned politicians that he is, he must reckon that he can reap the whole harvest by waiting, rather than rushing at half or a quarter of it now.

Where does all this leave British politicians, and the British Government? Perhaps the only possible conclusion at this time is that no easy conclusions exist, and certainly no simple remedies. All one can say perhaps is that if any solution which could improve the lot of the ordinary Rhodesian is to emerge—and it is very difficult to be optimistic—it will be helped rather than hindered by a bi-partisan and unemotional policy towards Rhodesia in Britain. Beyond that, one must hope that such a policy would seek to bring the two parallel lines currently represented by the internal talks and the demands of the Patriotic Front to a point of convergence.

MEN AND MATTERS

Scenting an Open and Shut case

The chemical industry smells a plot. Sensitive, as ever, to ways in which its image may be damaged or its actions called into question, it is pointing an accusing finger at the Open University.

The latest edition of the Chemical Industries Association's official newsletter, *Alchemic*, alleges: "The Open University is maintaining a strange silence about a new course it is running in 1978. The course is called Control of Technology and will feature, says the association, the subject of the health risks of vinyl chloride monomer, the gas used in PVC manufacturing."

The association says that "as the prime source of information on VCM in this country" it offered to provide help, but despite several telephone calls and letters, the offer was spurned. "The course organisers refused to put the Association in touch with the person writing this part of the course material or to disclose any names."

The association charges: "The main set book for the course is 'The Politics of Technology', a collection of papers edited by OU staff. None of the 28 papers are by a scientist or technologist in British industry: 12 are by U.S. authors, one by a Frenchman and five by members of the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science, a small political pressure group representing a tiny percentage of U.K. scientists and technologists."

The plot theory is developed by listing people whose writings are quoted in the set book: "Tony Benn (Oxford: Politics Philosophy and Economics), Ken Coates (Institute of Workers' Control, etc.), and Mike Cooley (Lucas shop steward)." The argument is driven home by adding that the course's only

other set book is *Nuclear Power*, by W. C. Patterson of Friends of the Earth.


But Robin Roy, chairman of the course team at the Open University, retorts the issue of vinyl chloride monomer hardly features at all. It is only mentioned—"without comment or criticism"—in the course's written material, not in the TV programmes. He says that the purpose of touching upon it at all is to show "an interesting example of co-operation between industry, the Government and the unions." Out at Milton Keynes they clearly think it quite appropriate that the Chemical Industries Association's initials happen to be CIA...

Joggers unite

Although Len Murray has helped to launch the latest fitness campaign, aimed at getting Britain on its toes the TUC is many years behind its Continental counterparts in keeping its supporters healthy. I learn that there may now be renewed attempts to join the country up to the Socialist International Sports Association, which was founded some 63 years ago. Under its present title of Comité Sportif International du Travail, it has national affiliates in all western European countries, except Britain.

Its most recent get-together was in Austria last September, when the CSIT organised a jamboree for more than 12,000 sportsmen and women from 18 countries. It seems that a few years ago a British Workers' Sports Association was formed, but soon expired from lack of funds, or maybe just energy.

There must be a chance here for general secretary Murray to set an example by sending his general council out jogging in matching track-suits (red ones, I should suggest). They will



"Unlike the buses, there was another one along in a minute."

tion of the so-called conservation area between Cheapside and Cannon Street.

At the southern end of Bow Lane, the razing of a large block of property has now begun; the demolishers estimate that their work will take them more than four months. The facade of what is coming down can be seen if you stand with your back to Mansion House underground station. Kept empty for seven years, it now looks conveniently ready for demolition. In due season, passers-by will be able to judge whether the new edifice, being developed by the Salter's Company and the pension funds of the Electricity Council, presents as human a face as what is now disappearing. The Victorian Society claims that the present demolition, and others in prospect, "make a mockery of conservation in the City."

Patching it up

A survey has revealed that the average British wedding-to-day costs £2,200. Since it is also reported that 20 per cent. of marriages end in divorce (like-wise an expensive activity), I was interested to see a timely advertisement in the *Mid-week Recorder* of Harpenden, Herts: "All Wedding Repairs. Mobile Body Service. Prompt Work."

Sadly, investigation disclosed a less rozzante reality. A printer's gremlin had been at work: some snappy wedding on battered cars was the intended offering.

Starting point?

Metaphysical mind-bender in a Sunday school teacher's handwritten announcement, seen on the wall of a Surrey church hall: "God made creation."

Observer

FACTS you will wish to consider when making a will

- Over 300,000 of Britain's old people are in genuine need; because of acute loneliness, bad housing or disability. The number is growing, as the proportion of elderly people increases.
- An official report records the sad fact that many old people are "huddled in icy rooms, wrapped in rugs, unable to afford proper heating." It is medically estimated that up to 20,000 are at risk in winter from "hypothermia" (fall in "inner" body temperature).
- The tragic need of old people is increasing.
- Voluntary service is increasingly needed to bring personal care to old people, and to meet widening gaps left by state organisations.
- Old people overseas also struggle against terrible hunger and lack of medical help.
- How Help the Aged get things done for those in the greatest need.
- It mobilises experienced volunteer effort, and achieves maximum results for every £ contributed to it.
- It has pioneered basic for old people; and now Day Centres for the lonely, Work Centres to provide light employment, and Day Hospices for those who need regular treatment but not full-time hospital. The charity is also active in funding volunteer transport for the housebound, extra medical research, and much more.
- In places stricken by earthquakes, floods and famine, and hunger, Help the Aged is well known for its swift practical aid.
- The charity's work has been endorsed by many eminent people, including Lord Shrewsbury, General Sir Brian Horrocks, Dame Vera Lynn and Mr. Adrian Khashoggi. Its President is the Rt. Hon. Lord Gardiner, Hon. Treasurer, The Rt. Hon. Lord Mayhew-King.
- Write or telephone for interesting and informative booklets and the annual report and accounts to: The Hon. Treasurer, Lord Mayhew-King, Help the Aged, Room 211L, 32 Dover Street, London W1A 2AP. (Telephone: 01-499 0973).
- Perpetuate a loved name and help work for old people. £150 establishes a name in enduring memory on the Dedication Plaque of a Day Centre.
- £100 provides a hospital bed in India or Africa with an inscription of your choice.

مكتبة الناصر



FINANCIAL TIMES SURVEY

Monday February 6 1978

Euromarkets

Between 1975 and 1977 the Euromarkets enjoyed unbroken growth and profitability. However, profit margins came under increasing pressure last year, both in bond markets and in the commercial bank lending sector. Prospects are less rosy.

Future looking less bright

By Mary Campbell
Euromarkets Editor

LAST YEAR broke new records for the Euromarkets in terms of the volume of business transacted, if not necessarily in terms of the profitability for the banks. However, except in one or two isolated sectors, the best was concentrated in the early part of the year and business became progressively more difficult as time went on. By the beginning of 1978 the never-fading-it-is-good atmosphere which was pervasive in 1976 had disappeared and bankers are looking forward with considerably less confidence than a year ago.

More detailed explanations for this change in each individual sector of the market emerge from subsequent articles; the reasons for the deteriorating position vary greatly from one sector to another.

For banks involved in the international syndicated lending (the process whereby several banks join together to make large loans, often to state-guaranteed borrowers, at rates

of interest which are tied to money market rates) profit margins have been hit sharply in the last year while the banks are being forced to commit their money for ever lengthening maturities.

In the bond markets, the recent dollar slump and rise in dollar interest rates crowned a year when uncertainty had been the rule rather than the exception. Although bond dealers are still running books at a profit (because short rates are below long rates) they have taken a hammering with the fall in prices in the last few months.

The only substantial sectors of the market where business has held up—indeed increased—are the bond issuing in the so-called strong currencies, particularly the D-Mark and the Swiss franc, but also including the yen and sterling which are not traditionally classified among the strong currencies, seems to be treated as one for capital market purposes at present. But even in these sectors, there is a cloud in the silver lining: banks are much more uncertain about future prospects than for some years.

In the bond market, some hard pricing decisions by lead managers recently have brought home to the Eurobond community that the underwriting fee cannot always be counted as sheer profit.

A key question facing the Eurobond institutions (and, at one remove, those borrowers and lenders/investors who depend on the smooth functioning of the Eurobond market) is the extent of the expected decline in profitability of Eurobond business.

There is no doubt that profit margins have in the past three years been extremely high and considerable falls from the peak levels would be needed before bankers might be expected to start feeling the pinch. In the bond markets, although individual institutions may well find themselves having to admit to losses, even after taking the good years with the bad, the markets provide their own medicine: business slows down in bad times, to be run at a small loss by comparison with the profits earned on the high volume business of good days.

The situation for commercial banks is more uncertain. One of the most severely argued points among bankers in today's low interest-margin environment is the extent to which margins can be shaved before banks should, as far as their long-term relations with customers allow, opt out of the business.

One line of argument (among

Problems

At the same time, the number of problems bankers have to cope with internationally is increasing day by day. The costs to the banks generally and to Citibank in particular of Zaire's default have probably long since outstripped what the banks earned on the loans before they went bad. Zaire is not alone in posing problems for the banks which will result in the loss of some of previous years' profits being whittled down.

In recognition of the impor-



The signing at Fishmongers Hall, City of London, last month of one of 1977's most notable loans: \$1bn. for Nigeria. Seated left to right: Mr. Musa Bello, Permanent Secretary, Nigerian Ministry of Finance; Mr. Otto Schoeppler, chairman, Chase Manhattan Ltd.; Major-General Oluleye, Nigerian Commissioner for Finance; Mr. Frank Stankard, executive vice-president, Chase Manhattan Bank; Mr. O. O. Vincent, governor, Nigerian Central Bank.

American banks) starts from the premise that the lowest acceptable profit margin on any individual piece of business is the yield which investors demand on the bank's equity. If investors start selling out when the dividend yield goes below say, 10 per cent., then no new loans should be booked which do not offer a 10 per cent. profit. If market rates go below that level, then the bank should buy up its own equity.

The U.S. banking authorities are believed to have been unhappy over Citibank doing just that so that this line of discussion has thus become of little more than theoretical interest. The real question which the banks have to decide is whether

to keep their money on short-term deposit until margins rise again—thus giving up potential profits in the short-term in order to retake more lending capacity for the time when margins have recovered—or whether to go ahead with any piece of business which covers costs.

To take the argument one stage further back, the issue banks are having to take a view on the extent to which the rise and fall in profit margins on international lending in the last five years has been a cyclical phenomenon and the extent to which the 1974-75 jump in margins was triggered by special factors (oil price rises, Herstatt, the U.S. banking authorities' crack-down on capital ratios) which will not be repeated.

Early last year a number of U.S. banks decided to stop lending when the margins on medium term loans went below one percentage point. This gave a considerably higher gross profit margin, once one has allowed for fees and the fact that the margin is charged on the rate at which banks place deposits with other banks rather than the rate which they pay for the deposits they take in. Margins have since then fallen to 2 for prime credits. At least one of those banks in retrospect regrets the decision and now wishes it had used up all its 1977 lending capacity right at the beginning of the year.

In many respects the market situation now is similar to that in about the summer of 1973. The U.S. dollar sector of the Eurobond market was broken by a currency turmoil early that year. The difference is that the yield gap had become unfavourable at the same time.

In 1973-74 there was a gap of about a year between the collapse of the dollar bond market and commercial banks' ceasing to push profit margins down in their international lending. The surge of international bank liquidity which came at the end of 1973 pushed the U.S. banks' capital ratios to breaking point and caused them to withdraw from the market six months' later.

If this situation is to be repeated one may expect an increasing strain on the U.S. banks' lending capacity during this year.

As is pointed out in a subsequent article, the economic situation in 1973-74 was different from what is current now. But there are also crucial differences in market terms, while U.S. banks' capital ratios are in a much happier state than in late 1973.

The major difference in the structure of the market is the increased number of banks relying on international business for an ever higher proportion of their business—many of them banks with less concern for capital ratios than those in the U.S. The Japanese banks in late 1973 turned themselves from large scale international lenders into even larger scale international borrowers almost overnight.

A large proportion of that debt to the international money markets has still to be repaid


and, with no prospect of a transformation of Japan's balance of payments such as was caused by the oil price rises, the Japanese banks are likely to remain a large net supplier of liquidity for some time to come.

Almost more important, the German banks which in 1973 were only dipping their toes into international lending business are now involved on an increasing scale. Even the Swiss banks, which more recently termed medium term a dangerous practice consisting of borrowing short and lending long are now participating in the business.

A feature of coming years will be increased diversification of the currencies in which international loans are made. Plenty of borrowers have already shown they are eager to raise funds in these currencies by making bond issues in them.

Oil prices

The one development which could change this general picture is a sharp shock such as happened with the oil price rises and money market losses in 1973-74. For, while the numbers of institutions involved in the Euromarkets—and the commitment of the old hands in the business—has grown immeasurably since in the last four years, the market mechanisms are more firmly based only to the extent that solutions to the particular problems posed in 1974 have been found. The potential remains for tiered rates and a sharp and speedy contraction in the volume of inter-bank deposits, in the absence of any meaningful lender of last resort. The money markets remain the fundamental basis of the lending pyramid.



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EUROMARKETS II

An excess of recycling

MARKET WORRIES about the excessive growth of world liquidity, which seems to be borne out by the experience of bankers at their wits' end to find outlets suitable in term and quality to the funds which keep accruing to them, are singularly difficult to pin down. Trying to define or measure world liquidity quickly degenerates into a kind of statistical hunting of the snark, with bankers, and the editors of the *International Currency Review*, desperately afraid that the thing may, as in the poem, turn out to be a boojum. A brief review of some of the available definitions will show up the nature of the problem.

A lay definition of liquidity is the money supply; and there is an index of the world money supply produced by the computer of the International Monetary Fund. It shows, through a geometrically weighted average of all currencies corrected for exchange rate changes, practically nothing at all.

What little it does show is encouraging. Growth accelerated in 1976 to 13 per cent, in 1977, but appeared to be back under control in 1977 at a little under 12 per cent—which allows very little over to finance growth above the almost fixed world inflation rate of 11.2 per cent, steady since the beginning of 1976.

Deposits

However, this measure only takes into account cash and demand deposits—our old friend M1: this is largely by the demand to cover transactions, and the inflationary boom is not doubt lurking somewhere else. The broader definitions of money are of little help: they behave on the whole just as well as M1, if not better. In the Euro-markets themselves?

This is a large trap for the unwary. First, its growth rate is always overstated when the dollar is weak, because it is measured in dollars: as a result, all the entries in stronger currencies grow simply by revaluation. More fundamentally, as study after study has proved, the Eurodollar market is not a factory, but a pipeline. Like the interbank market, it

mobilises liquidity, but does not create it. What kind of liquidity does it mobilise? Some years ago, in the days of fixed exchange rates and balance of payments disciplines, there was a lot of concern at the fact that some central banks were placing their funds in the Eurodollar market, so that excess liquidity created by balance of payments deficits was not mopped up, but continued to circulate. The members of the Group of 10 solemnly agreed to desist, and while the major industrial countries remained the world's major creditors, matters appeared to be brought under control.

Since 1974, of course, the OPEC countries have been the world's major creditors, and are under no such self-denying ordinance: they have become the major source of funds for the growth of the market. However, this is not a measure of liquidity, but of recycling; and it is only one of the ways in which debt is recycled. That which debt is recycled, but before we come to it, there remains the question of official and bank reserves—what some economists call high-powered money, and the IMF calls Mo.

However, there seems to be some confusion. Holdings of foreign exchange are not, like gold holdings once were, the basis for banking credit; the monetary authorities control the creation of reserve money, and its world-wide growth has been at a steady and undisturbed rate. The growth of foreign exchange reserves has been more rapid, because of the extent of official interventions in the exchange market, but this is not itself a measure of potential inflationary pressure.

World reserve growth during 1977 had by October reached \$31bn., of which the U.K. alone accounted for \$13bn. Like the Silt in a river delta, this is evidence of the enormous flows which have occurred. It is the rate of flow rather than any measure of liquidity which might threaten, to risk a hideous pun, to wash away the banks.

Now these flows can be analysed in two ways. Most popular and market discussion

looks at the current account of the balance of payments; but this leaves out of account capital flows which are a large element in the real world—no one, for example, is worried by the large financial deficits of companies developing the North Sea oil fields; and it equally overlooks the financial element.

The financial picture is really much easier to understand if one starts from the source of the money which either finances demand at home or circulates internationally—the creation of domestic credit. This is simply a matter of total new lending by banks in their own currencies; and since offshore banks simply transmit this lending, the total growth of domestic credit is the growth of world credit—the growth of bank money, broadly defined.

In any one country, however, the totals can diverge very widely: the difference is roughly the surplus or deficit on official settlements (the current balance

plus or minus flows of private capital). Weak currencies are those which are being created faster than they are used at home; and for 1977, that meant predominantly the dollar.

For part of the year, this excessive creation of credit was simply the result of a battle of ideologies. The U.S. believes in fairly clean floating. Others—notably ourselves—believed in exchange rate management. The U.S. authorities saw no reason to allow large British purchases of dollars to drain the U.S. economy of funds, so there was no restraint on the creation of the corresponding assets by the U.S. banks.

Up to this point it could be argued that the creation of excessive credit in the U.S. banking system was the result of meeting the demands of interventionists in other countries, and that the interventionists were causing the flows. Now, however, the Administration is concerned about the

international value of the dollar, and has turned interventionist itself; and in financial terms this means that the Fed, instead of stopping the creation of excessive dollars, is asking foreign central banks to supply funds with which to buy them up—both in New York and other centres. It is in effect asking foreign central banks to take on its own role of controlling the creation of dollars.

This crazy policy in effect perpetuates the flows, and is leading to a situation in which the U.S. banking system is becoming over-extended, while everywhere else bankers see excess liquidity as a problem. Confidence is destroyed in New York while in other centres excess liquidity is squeezing margins; and the efforts of the authorities to fund the huge rise in their dollar claims is dislocating the bond markets. A failure in the bond market could even lead to the inflation everyone fears—especially in

the U.K.

All this underlines the wisdom of the International Monetary Fund in imposing a limit on domestic credit expansion in debtor countries which come to it for help; it is a great pity that the creditors of the U.S. have not felt able to impose similar conditions, but have agreed instead to try to support the dollar by perpetuating the conditions which keep it weak. Balance may be restored simply because the U.S. banking system itself becomes stretched to the limit. The reported financial problems of New York City are suggestive of strain, though the figures suggest that there is still some way to go.

It is possible that the flood of dollars will so overstrain monetary control in countries which are assisting the recycling that we will all find ourselves in a relatively stable but much more inflationary boat (as the arch-recyclers, the OPEC countries, have already discovered to their cost). The most effective reassurance will be found not in any measure of liquidity, but in any news suggesting that the Fed, under its new management, is coming to believe that credit control begins at home.

Anthony Harris

and last year. Many of these shifts since 1974 are explained by what happened after the increase in the oil price in 1973-74. Initially the industrial countries were able to pass on much of the added burden to the non-oil producing developing countries by increasing the price of the manufactured goods they export. By 1976-77 many of these countries were forced to cut back exports drastically to improve their balance of payments.

At the same time many industrial countries, particularly the smaller European ones, were trying to climb out of the recession by spending money through State agencies. It was not surprising to find that the loans raised by these countries, despite being earmarked for a particular borrower, amounted to general loans. Funding the balance of payments deficit or shoring up the Central Banks' reserves was the real objective of countless loans to Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, Finland and France.

Much of the increase in borrowing from this source was accounted for by three countries, Canada, Sweden and France, while the increase in U.K. borrowing between 1976 and 1977 was largely as a result of the jumbo \$1.5bn. operation completed 12 months ago.

This same operation provided an illustration of what was going to happen to spreads in the ensuing months: Britain borrowed at less than 1 per cent, over the interbank rate. Sweden followed in its footsteps and then became the first developing country to crash that psychological barrier last spring. By the end of the year prime industrial country risk (France and New Zealand) rates at 1 per cent.

At the start of this year Venezuela and Malaysia joined the club of oil producers able to command a spread of 3 per cent, but banks were reluctant to let borrowers push spreads down further and resisted French Treasury arguments in favour of a 1 per cent spread for a small Caisse Nationale des Telecommunications loan.

Japanese and German banks were easily the most aggressive, although Chase Manhattan was not far behind in the race. The first were encouraged by the Ministry of Finance in Tokyo to seek customers abroad in an attempt to recycle the vast balance of payments surplus which had accumulated in Japan, while the second, urged on by the authorities and finding less and less scope for expanding profit-

able business at home, took to wider horizons with glee. Many leading U.S. banks tried to resist by refusing to participate in loans, especially when they felt the maturity and draw-down periods were too long, but to little avail. They boycotted the \$300m. 12-year loan to the Australian State of Victoria and the \$500m. seven year loan to New Zealand.

The net result was simple. When assembling the management group for the \$500m. loan for Electricite de France, the lead manager, Credit Lyonnais, wasted no time on the U.S. banks. The European and Japanese banks had demonstrated that they could do without the U.S.

The resistance put up by a number of banks to the tumbling of spreads which has characterised the past few months and their reluctance to countenance a further erosion of their return on assets has led quite a few of them to lend to borrowers of lesser standing (especially south of the Sahara) in order to secure business with better yields. Other banks have simply looked for more profitable business and appear less prominently on league tables of lead managers and managers. They simply feel that the market is coming to resemble, a little too much for comfort, a game of Russian roulette.

Maturities

The fall in spreads and lengthening of maturities has enabled a number of countries to refinance earlier loans of a few years' back valued at greater cost. After Britain and Ireland, a number of South-East Asian borrowers are resorting to this technique.

Two developments will be watched very closely by bankers in the months to come. The first is what measures the Comptroller of the Currency will take and the effect such a tightening of the rules will have on the pattern of lending (many bankers believe it will be considerable). The second is the pressure on the banks to ease some of the provisions in the legal documentation for new loans, in particular the designation of applicable courts of law in the event of legal proceedings.

Such problems may determine, just as much as the movement of interest rates and the amount of liquidity held by the banks, the pattern of lending and the conditions attached to loans agreements entered into this year.

Francis Giles

Medium-term lending

LAST YEAR is likely to be remembered in the medium-term syndicated market more for the cut-throat competition between banks, which enabled borrowers to improve the terms of their loans than for the very considerable increase in lending. This rose to a record \$40bn. from the 1976 figure of \$29bn.

Many borrowers, particularly among the developing countries, are to-day being lent money on terms which bankers ruled out of court only a few months ago. While in a very few cases a convincing argument can be put forward that a particular borrower's situation has improved, the period which often has elapsed between two loans for the same borrower and carrying very different terms has been so short as to make nonsense of such statements.

The sheer weight of liquidity in the market and the absence of any demand or perceived

demand for industrial loans in the developed countries is still ruthlessly shaving spreads and fees while lengthening maturities and grace periods.

Many observers are wondering whether it is not 1973 all over again. The frenzied competition which then ruled the markets bears a marked resemblance to what is now going on but the economic backdrop and the pattern of lending were very different.

In 1973, the world economy was growing fast, as was inflation; interest rates rose sharply though they fell off a little at the end of the year. To-day, we are still very much in a period of depression but inflation has been falling in the leading industrial countries and interest rates are presently fairly steady.

The size of the Euromarket as a whole and the syndicated sector of it in particular has grown: publicly announced medium-term credits have

almost doubled from a figure of \$21.8bn. in 1973 to a figure of \$40.1bn. last year. Equally important, the pattern of borrowing has changed: industrial countries accounted for two-thirds of syndicated loans in 1973, for under 45 per cent. last year. East European borrowers raised four times as much last year as four years before, while developing countries raised three times as much.

Borrowers from this last category are the ones which give rise to most anxiety among the banking community. Some have very large debts in absolute terms, others with much smaller debts overall have landed in trouble for reasons which are sometimes of their own making (Zaire, Turkey), while some may suffer from the growing protectionism in the West which, if increased, will simply not allow them to export sufficient goods to pay their way. 1974 (France and Britain) the Comecon countries used to re-emerge in force in 1976.

particularly the case with Poland and Bulgaria, whose external debt respectively was more than \$10bn. and more than \$2.5bn. Comecon's willingness to reduce its imports in the past year or so and the general assumption that Russia remains the lender of last resort have combined to dispel the disquiet felt by many in 1976.

A few developing countries (LDCs) were well-established names in the market in 1973 (Mexico and Brazil, the two largest borrowers over the past four years are in this category). But it was in 1973 and 1976 that this category of borrower started raising money in the market in a big way. Every other developing country tried its luck at very different prices.

Industrial countries which had been the main borrowers in 1973 (Italy and Britain) and the second, urged on by the authorities and finding less and less scope for expanding profit-

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EUROMARKETS III

Unstable year for interest rates

FLUCTUATIONS IN the currency markets have been the dominating influence on the comparative levels of interest rates and have had an important effect on activity in the Eurocurrency markets during the past year. The persistent weakness of the dollar during the second half of 1977 and the corresponding strength of the leading European currencies and the Japanese yen, have been reflected in contrary movements in the level of interest rates.

These movements have also contributed to a marked change in the balance of advantage in the choice of currencies for Eurobond financing. During the last quarter of the year in particular, activity in Eurodollar bonds was running at low levels, partly as a result of uncertainty over the currency, while issues in Deutsche marks continued to be made at a high rate and a new market in Eurosterling bonds began to develop.

The pressure on the dollar has produced sharp rises in the value of all the traditionally strong currencies, the Swiss franc and the yen in particular, and the West German D-mark. At the same time, the pound, one of the weak currencies, until nearly the end of 1977, has seen a remarkable transformation over the past year in the strength of renewed international confidence in Britain following negotiation of the IMF loan coupled with the sharp improvement in the balance of payments as North Sea oil has begun to make an impact.

Movements

These movements and the unrest which persisted in the exchange markets through most of the past six months have brought substantial problems for the countries on the receiving end of the speculative flows. Efforts to stem the pressure have included at times heavy official intervention in the exchange markets by the central banks with the stronger currencies, various measures to discourage inflows from abroad (including in Britain some modest easing of restrictions on outflows), and regular efforts by politicians and central bankers to talk the dollar up by emphasising that its decline had gone too far and by underlining the effects it was having on their domestic economies. It has also brought, notably in Britain but also in other countries, a decline in the general level of short-term interest rates—a movement which is in contrast with the increase in the U.S.

The prime reason for the pressure has been the very sharp increase in the U.S. trade deficit to a record level of \$26.72bn, four-and-a-half times its level in the previous year. A large contribution to the rise was made by sharply increased oil imports, and the problems of the U.S. Administration in gaining acceptance for its energy policy have contributed to inter-

OFFICIAL DISCOUNT RATES				
	24/1/77	14/12/77	12/1/78	% change on year
U.S.	5.25	6.00	6.50	+1.25
Belgium	8.00	7.00	7.50	-0.50
France	10.50	9.50	9.50	-1.00
Germany	3.50	3.50	3.00	-0.50
Italy	15.00	11.50	11.50	-3.50
Netherlands	5.00	4.50	4.50	-0.50
Switzerland	2.00	1.50	1.50	-0.50
Japan	6.50	4.25	4.25	-2.25
U.K.	12.25	7.00	6.50	-6.75

Source: National Westminster Bank.

EUROCURRENCIES—THREE-MONTH RATES				
	24/1/77	14/12/77	12/1/78	% change on year
Eurodollar	5.19	7.13	7.44	+2.25
Euro-Swiss Franc	1.25	2.44	0.97	-0.28
Euro-French Franc	12.13	14.38	12.38	+0.25
Euro-Deutsche Mark	4.63	3.88	2.88	-1.75
Euro-Guilder	6.44	6.75	6.50	-1.94
Euro-Sterling	12.98	7.13	6.24	-6.14

Source: National Westminster Bank.

national uncertainty. In contrast, Japan and West Germany have produced increased surpluses, while Britain saw a surplus of \$50m on its current balance of payments, the first one of the weak currencies, since 1973. The attitude of the U.S. towards the dollar and its apparent indifference for most of last year to the effects its decline was having on other countries have played a key role in the exchange market movements. Initially, the U.S. was inclined to regard the fall in the dollar as a useful contribution to correcting the payments imbalances. It was felt that these had arisen partly because the U.S. economy was growing more rapidly than those of other countries which had not followed the U.S. example in their efforts to sustain world growth.

With the growing pressure on the dollar after June, the dangers of this attitude became increasingly apparent. The market took the view that the Administration was trying to sink the dollar down, and as the decline in the value of the U.S. currency gathered pace later in the year it brought a growing volume of complaints from countries with the stronger currencies, particularly Switzerland and West Germany. The West Germans especially found their export-orientated industries complaining about the effect of the rise in the D-mark on their ability to compete in world markets, and brought growing pressure on the U.S. through a series of urgent public and private warnings of their responsibilities for ensuring greater stability in the exchanges.

The U.S. changed its attitude gradually, and towards the end of the year was beginning to argue that the decline in the dollar had gone too far to reflect the underlying economic realities. It was only in early January, however, that positive steps were taken to arrest the

and a regular and at times rapid fall in the level of short-term interest rates saw the Bank of England's Minimum Lending Rate (MLR) down from its peak of 15 per cent. set in the emergency measures of late 1976 to 8 per cent. by mid-May.

The accelerating pressures on the dollar, however, forced a change of approach in late July, with the Bank of England holding sterling steady in relation to the index against a basket of currencies rather than the dollar. Inflows continued, however, and MLR fell again during August to 7 per cent. The final stage was reached in September and October, when the inflows into the U.K. built up to a very high level and pushed rates down again, with MLR reaching 5 per cent.

At the end of October Britain was forced to abandon the policy of holding the rate down and allowed the pound to float with little intervention. This move was followed by a renewed jump in MLR to 7 per cent., reflecting the view that the inflows from abroad had taken it down to an artificially low level, though the rate slipped again to 6½ per cent.

With rates in the U.S. moving upwards as part of the efforts of the authorities there to protect the dollar, the changes in the levels of domestic interest rates in the leading countries have been directly reflected, and in some cases exaggerated, in their Eurocurrency equivalents. In spite of the widening of the gap between Eurodollar and D-mark rates, the unsettled currency scene remained the dominant influence on investors' attitudes up to the end of the year, reflected in a continued trend to move from dollar to DM-denominated bonds.

Michael Blanden

Strains

A particular problem associated with the strength of the D-mark was its effect on the European "snake" joint floating arrangement. The Scandinavian currencies were twice forced to devalue, in April and in August, and on the second occasion Sweden dropped out of the arrangement. The renewed strains later in the year were again reflected in interest rate movements, with Belgium raising its discount rate twice during December by a total of 3 per cent. to 9 per cent., largely in order to protect its currency in relation to the D-mark. Later, as the pressures eased, Belgium was able to bring the rate down again by 1½ per cent.

The impact of the currency movements on interest rates, however, was nowhere more obvious than in Britain. In the early part of the year the British authorities followed a policy of keeping the pound more or less stable in relation to the dollar, at around \$1.72,

Export credit systems

THE BRITISH decision to make use of the Export Credit Corporation (ECC) for the purposes of financing long-term export credits was made largely of necessity at a time when it was essential to reduce the burden on public spending and borrowing created by the refinancing activities of the Export Credit Guarantee Department.

Although the conversion of these Eurocurrency funds into longer term fixed rate lending to support major projects has not been easy, and the change over initially met with some opposition, the scheme has undoubtedly created a new dimension in the provision of export credits.

Buyers of British goods or services had become accustomed to the advantages of paying in sterling during the long period of its declining value, but in the short term at least, they have also benefited from the weakness of the dollar.

However, these fluctuations are relatively unimportant when seen over periods of up to 12 years and it is now interesting to speculate whether the Euro-market will be able to extend its loan capability from the current maximum period of about seven years to the full period required for major construction and industrial projects. At present, foreign currency loans operate on a basis of variable interest rates related to

a three to 12-month rollover period, being reviewed at the end of each rollover period and fixed according to the supply and demand of the currency concerned.

Conversion into longer term money is achieved by ECGD acting as co-lender with syndicates of commercial banks, usually the clearers but on some occasions with approved U.K. based foreign banks. Under an agreement fixed interest rate lending commitments for the maximum period possible under current market conditions.

ECGD, as lender of last resort, undertakes to cover over the whole period of the lending once the banks' commitments expire if the latter are not prepared to extend their commitment or if replacement lenders cannot be found, although this is thought to be unlikely.

So far only the Eurocurrency market has been used for this purpose because it tends to be more flexible than the bond market, although the latter has not been ruled out and may be used at a later date when the present system has been fully tested.

Under a separate agreement ECGD also guarantees the syndicates against borrower default and undertakes to take over the lending if members of the syndicate are unable to continue funding the loan facility. The department also makes up the fixed rate of interest receivable under the financial agreement to a level based on the commercial rollover rates prevailing in the market but which includes a margin agreed by ECGD at the outset in each case. If the fixed rate exceeds the market rate plus margin, the excess interest is paid to ECGD.

The volume of business generated for the Euro-market by the new scheme is now fairly substantial in relative terms and has reached a level of about \$650m. Since May last year and is expected to hit the \$1bn mark before very long.

From the U.K. point of view, the saving on public expenditure is thought to have been considerable, although this is difficult to quantify, but with the fall in the previously high domestic interest rates, Eurodollars are now marginally more expensive.

Although ECGD had aimed to make the facility as easy to operate as the sterling scheme, there have been unavoidable complications in dealing with the fluctuation of currencies. For example, where an exporter has dollar receivables under a supply contract, he has the option of either selling the dollars immediately at the spot

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
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
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EUROMARKETS IV

Controls on U.S. banks...

"IN FACT, the foreign claims of U.S. banks have grown at rates exceeding 15-20 per cent per year during the past few years. As a result, considerable public attention has been drawn to this issue and questions have been raised about the prudence of the international lending policies of the banks. We believe these concerns are greatly exaggerated and will continue to prove to be unfounded. Losses on foreign loans have been small. Loss experience has been better on foreign loans than on domestic loans. Moreover, with the recent improvements in the international payments pattern and successful adjustment effort in a number of deficit countries, U.S. bank lending abroad has been growing at a much slower pace. In the first nine months of 1977 the increase was at an annual rate of only ten per cent, compared with 24 per cent in 1976."

Since the speaker quoted above was Mr. C. Fred Bergsten, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, and since the date on which he offered his remarks was as recent as January 23 in testimony before a Congressional committee, an obvious conclusion is that the foreign operations of American banks were not feeling—and are not about to be subjected to—the federal regulatory pinch. It might almost seem as if the shock waves generated by the collapses in 1974 of Franklin National and the bank I. D. Herstatt had become no more than ripples of concern in waters made much calmer by the receding fear of an international debt repayment crisis. Such a conclusion would be wrong. Although it is undoubtedly true that the U.S. authorities no longer consider probable default on the part of most major foreign creditors,

the regulatory agencies have had with little fanfare but some effect been focusing their attention more firmly on the external position of American banks.

Two public disclosures in the course of the last month have illustrated this. One was the publication by the three principal regulatory agencies—the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation—of a country-by-country survey of U.S. bank lending overseas, the first in what is to become a semi-annual exercise, designed to heighten general, and particularly Congressional, awareness of the issue. The survey itself produced few surprises and, if anything, tended to bolster the point that the debt repayment problem was manageable at present.

The second and probably more important action was the exceptional decision by the Com-

troller's office to make public the criteria which it has privately been applying for some years in scrutinising U.S. foreign bank loans. Specifically this concentrated on the obligation of the banks in their foreign operations to abide by the 110-year-old "10 per cent rule" which stipulates that no bank may lend more than 10 per cent of its capital to a "single borrower."

The main difficulty here, freely admitted by the effective new Comptroller, Mr. John Heimann, was to determine what constitutes an individual borrower at a time when U.S. banks had been increasingly making foreign loans not only to foreign Governments but also to foreign agencies and institutions that are wholly or partly owned by the same foreign Governments.

The criteria require that potential foreign borrowers pass both a "means" and a "purpose" test in order to qualify as "single" entities entitled to borrow as much as 10 per cent of a U.S. bank's capital. The first stipulates that a borrower must have the resources or income of its own to repay any loan; the second that loan proceeds must be used in the conduct of the borrower's normal business and not diverted to other purposes, such as Government balance-of-payments needs.

Some flexibility, as Mr. Heimann pointed out, is being used in applying these standards, which on the face of it could severely circumscribe U.S. bank foreign lending. Mexico, for example, had made strong representations to the U.S. Treasury last autumn that it had failed to understand the full functions exercised by Mexican State agencies and was in effect cutting off the supply of American funds to them by interpreting too narrowly the lending criteria, which state that if a borrower cannot pass both tests, then its loans will have to be aggregated with other loans outstanding to the Government in question and other related institutions all coming under the 10 per cent ceiling.

The publication of these rules, Mr. Heimann maintained, was necessary to eliminate confusion both among potential borrowers and among American banks about the policies being employed by the regulatory agencies. But it was also, he made clear, designed to serve

another purpose—that of ensuring that U.S. banks kept full data on their foreign borrowings and transmitted such information in greater detail than hitherto to the regulatory authorities. This would not only enable the regulators to determine more accurately if proper prudent banking practice was being observed in the granting of loans but would also furnish much more complete consolidated information to those agencies whose responsibility is to anticipate trouble spots.

Agencies

The increased muscle being exercised by the regulatory authorities is still barely being flexed and there is plenty of evidence of internal bureaucratic disharmony among the three principal agencies, which does not make the task of the banks in complying with different rules any easier. However, under Mr. Heimann, who was previously New York State Bank Comptroller before being brought to Washington by President Carter, the Comptroller of the Currency's office is clearly seeking to assert itself more. The fact that Franklin National was a New York bank may have more than a little to do with Mr. Heimann's interest and concern.

It must also be borne in mind that nothing that the regulators have instituted to date amounts to substantive controls over U.S. bank lending overseas, but rather extended surveillance. U.S. regulation over the Euro-dollar market, for example, remains essentially non-existent. It is a state of affairs which is persistently criticised by some influential voices in Washington, such as the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on foreign economic policy. But even its most recent report on international debt, published last August, provided more of a discussion of present perils than a blueprint of corrective action. It was obliged to agree, for example, that closer liaison between the banks and the International Monetary Fund, for example, was "no complete panacea and that unless and until the industrialised world, led by the U.S., came to grips with the OPEC surpluses then imbalances would persist."

Jurek Martin
U.S. Editor

...and their lending activities

MOST OF the major U.S. money centre banks have been growing increasingly dependent on foreign lending for their profits over the past two years. Although the burden of helping the world adjust to the huge surpluses being earned by OPEC countries was thrust upon these banks, it is a burden which they have been happy to bear and without which their balance sheets and income statements would be looking threadbare.

In 1976, for example, the ten largest U.S. banks earned over half their profits from foreign lending and there is no doubt that in 1977 the figure will have increased—in some cases (Citibank is an instance) dramatically.

This dependence on foreign earnings is not something all the banks would have wished upon themselves, useful though it has been. In part at least it is a reflection of the stagnation of demand for loans from corporate customers who have been re-financing themselves in the bond markets, from retained earnings and using the commercial paper market for an increasing proportion of their short-term needs.

The imbalance between foreign and domestic loan demand has become an increasing problem for the banks. This is not just because of the hue and cry over the quality of foreign debt, particularly debt to less developed countries which do not export oil, which has had a depressing effect on bank share prices at a time when many banks need to increase their capital.

Of equal significance is the evidence emerging last year that the more than ample supply of funds to foreign borrowers from U.S. and European banks had turned the market into a borrowers' market.

Thus international lending rates to better quality country borrowers started last year with

a spread of one percentage point over London interbank offered rate (LIBOR), and in spite of resistance by some banks had narrowed to 1 of a percentage point. Although, as bankers are quick to point out, front-end fees have raised the lending banks' yields back to the 1 per cent level, a fall in fees has exacerbated the decline in the profitability of foreign lending. Advances are much less profitable than a few years ago. In addition, competition has also stretched out the length of loans from seven to ten years in some cases.

Anxious

As the U.S. banks move into 1978, therefore, they are growing more anxious about the outlook for domestic lending. If the commercial and industrial loan demand which regional banks in Texas and California experienced in 1977 spreads to New York banks, then it will bring with it a variety of desirable changes from the banks' point of view. At a time when liquid European banks are still anxious to lend overseas it will enable the U.S. banks to be more selective and at least stiffen resistance to further narrowing of banks' yields on much of this foreign business.

A higher proportion of domestic profit will not do bank share prices any harm at all and may help to bring forward the day when more of the money centre banks can ask shareholders for new capital.

It will also ease what anxieties they may have that the Comptroller of the Currency may adopt too rigorous an interpretation of his foreign lending regulations and provide the banks with arguments to support their view that a flexible approach is desirable.

When it comes to trying to guess just how likely the U.S. money centre banks are to see a surge in domestic lending demand there is no consensus.

Dr. Henry Kaufman, the respected economist and credit market analyst who is a partner in New York investment bankers Salomon Brothers, has forecast record credit demands in the U.S. this year in which the banks will share. Mr. William Butcher, president and chief operating officer of Chase Manhattan Bank, is less sanguine—as are top executives at another leading New York bank, Manufacturers Hanover.

Mr. George Putnam, a Citibank senior vice-president and head of Citicorp International group, says the bank expects domestic loan demand to start improving at money centre banks certainly towards the end of the year. When this happens, he suggests, it will first affect the spreads on syndicated loans, moving them in the lender's favour—and subsequently banks might find the length of loans shortening again.

With the big money centre banks also having to pare their prime rates to domestic corporate borrowers at present, they clearly have a lot at stake now on the outlook for their domestic lending.

As to the other side of the equation there seems to be general agreement with a recent view expressed in Morgan Guaranty Trust's World Financial Markets that international credit market activity this year will be no less, and may be higher than last year's level.

Venezuela will not be alone among the OPEC nations drawing on the international credit markets this year, bankers suggest. Others are expected to be Iran and Algeria. Morgan Guaranty has also forecast that there may be an acceleration of demands from non-OPEC LDCs too and from East European countries. Maturing loans will continue to be re-financed at a high level.

Stewart Fleming

Export CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

exchange rate then prevailing or selling them forward.

As the exporter's bank will hopefully have explained to him, selling at spot rates means that he cannot know in advance how much sterling a given dollar drawing will produce and this can naturally have implications over a long period.

However, by using the forward market this can be avoided, and when sterling is standing at a discount a forward contract will provide more sterling than conversion of the same dollar sums at date of contract. This margin may be used either to reduce prices, increase profits or as a hedge against inflation.

In circumstances when an exporter is unsure of when he will receive his dollar payments he may still use the forward market by means of an "option contract." Under this arrangement he will be enabled to deliver dollars between two future dates, during which time he will receive a fixed forward rate of exchange.

Alternatively he may decide that it will be more beneficial to "roll forward" the forward exchange contract if there is uncertainty as to when the currency payment will be received or if a previously established forward exchange contract will not be able to be honoured. Despite the complexities, the

use of the forward market is more of an insurance than speculation, but expert advice should always be sought. ECGD also provides, as an integral part of the facility, additional cover against losses which an exporter may suffer if the supply contract is terminated for reasons other than the supplier's own default and forward exchange contracts have to be unwound.

An indemnity against the extra costs which might be incurred in the process of this unwinding will be provided under the terms of the premium agreement entered into by ECGD and the exporter. In addition, to enable exporters with long lead times to take advantage of the forward market, arrangements have been made between the banks and the Bank of England to ensure that banks will be able to enter into forward contracts where the present forward market is insufficiently deep.

An additional problem associated with the use of the forward market arises where an exporter is required to tender for a project and to maintain a tender price for a specified minimum period while currency fluctuations may work against his interests. This has been met by the introduction of a new ECGD facility, tender to contract cover.

Because an exporter bidding in foreign currency cannot enter into forward exchange arrangements for periods beyond the date of contract signature until such time as the contract is awarded to him, his tender price can only be based on an estimate of the forward rates of exchange likely to apply, if and when he signs the contract.

In the event of movements in interest rates or if sterling appreciates against the currency of the contract, this estimate may prove wrong, exposing the exporter. The ECGD facility overcomes this risk by guaranteeing for exporters the sterling return for their contract which was envisaged at the date of tender and which was intended to be produced by the currency tender price.


While Britain's involvement in the Euromarket has created complexities and problems of this kind, it is clear that it has also been of great benefit. The successful operation of the scheme owes much to the strength of the British export credit system and while other European countries may wish to evolve a similar system using the Euromarket, it appears at present that few have export credit systems which are as ideally suited.

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EUROMARKETS VI

Japan recycles its trade surplus

JAPAN HAS been actively promoting its capital exports mainly through Japanese and foreign bond markets to recycle part of its growing trade surplus.

A change in the Japanese Government's policy, coupled with favourable market conditions, helped foreign issuers to float 15 yen-denominated bonds totalling ¥296bn. in Tokyo during 1977, a sharp increase from six bonds totalling ¥65bn. in 1976. Ten more bonds worth ¥200bn. are expected to be issued during the first quarter of this year. Japan is thus fast becoming a major international bond issue centre. To make sure that this will mean rapid capital exports, the Japanese Government is now asking foreign issuers to convert the yen proceeds of their issues into U.S. dollar or other foreign currencies as soon as possible.

Removal of tight controls also made it possible for Japanese investors to make net purchases of U.S. treasury bills and other foreign bonds worth ¥140bn. during the first eleven months of 1977, compared with an almost insignificant ¥390m. in the full previous year. Japanese investors were trying to diversify their investments, often taking advantage of interest differentials, despite a sharp appreciation of the yen, the Securities Dealers Association said.

The Finance Ministry said it plans to extend a special tax exemption measure called "maruyū" from April this year to yen bonds issued by private foreign enterprises or guaranteed by foreign local governments. In the past the "maruyū" which exempts individual holders of up to three million yen per person from income tax deducted at source and applied only to bonds issued by international institutions, foreign governments, and enter-

prises in which foreign governments had a stake. Japanese securities companies believe the change will open the way for big U.S. and West European enterprises to raise yen bonds in Japan. The "Big Four" Japanese securities companies are sending emissaries overseas to prepare for this.

Approval

Since last summer the Finance Ministry has been permitting Japanese underwriters to sell up to 25 per cent. of each yen bond issue to non-residents on a case-by-case basis. As for "Euro-yen" bonds, of which one issue was made in 1977 by the World Bank and the European Development Bank each, securities sources said the Finance Ministry is not very keen on approving new plans, because sales of such bonds will reduce the amount of foreign issues in Tokyo. Under the present rules, issuers of such bonds must get the approval of the Japanese Government, while syndicates for their issues must be managed by a Japanese securities company.

Securities sources said expansion of the Japanese market for foreign bond issues will continue, unless the Japanese Government's business-stimulating programme suddenly increases industrial demand for equipment investment funds or causes Japan's balance of payments to deteriorate. It will also be in line with the Bank of Japan's policy to liberalise the Japanese bond market as much as practicable.

Securities sources say the Tokyo bond market now has good "infrastructure", including a liberal government policy which leaves most transactions for negotiation between issuers and underwriters, and sophisticated knowledge obtained by Japanese securities companies through participation

Saburo Matsukawa

Deferred

Supply of trade credits by Japanese exporters, based on deferred payment facilities provided by the Export-Import Bank of Japan, also increased to \$1.4bn. during the 11-month period from \$571m. in the whole of 1976, owing mainly to an increase in the export sales of industrial plant facilities by Japanese companies.

Other forms of capital exports from Japan did not fare very well. Private direct investments overseas by Japanese enterprises fell to \$1.4bn. in the 11 months from \$2bn. in 1976. The Finance Ministry believes this was because many Japanese companies suffering from sluggish business conditions at home, were not in a position to consider large investments overseas. Japanese investments in foreign stocks in the 11 months showed only a small net purchase of ¥3.9bn. compared with a net sale of ¥7.9bn. in 1976.

Until mid-1977, when it became clear that Japan was going to have a large current-account surplus in fiscal 1977, contrary to a previous estimate that it would end up with a deficit, the Finance Ministry had been allowing foreign issuers to float one yen bond per month or at longer intervals, the bulk of the issue being about ¥10bn. each. Flotation of a ¥20bn. bond by the Republic of Ireland and a ¥30bn. bond by the World Bank (which was also allowed to issue a ¥30bn. "Euro-yen" bond at the same time) in August showed that the Finance Ministry had decided to permit foreign issuers to raise larger amounts at shorter intervals.

In the closing four months of 1977 ten yen-denominated bonds were issued in the Japanese capital market. The issuers comprised the Inter-American Development Bank (¥15bn.), the Canadian Provincial Government of New Brunswick (¥12bn.), the European Investment Bank (¥15bn.—second issue of year), Spain (¥15bn.), Mexico (¥20bn.), New Zealand (¥27bn.), Brazil (¥20bn.), the World Bank (¥30bn.—second issue of year), Venezuela (¥20bn.), and Singapore (¥15bn.).

A sharp decline in Japanese interest rates during 1977 also helped foreign issuers to increase their yen bond flotation. The yield to maturity for the AA grade industrial bonds were cut four times from 8.894 per cent. at the beginning of 1977 to 6.894 per cent. in October, which was substantially lower than most overseas markets except West Germany and Switzerland. Another factor which attracted foreign issuers to the Japanese market was that it could accommodate them owing to a decline in demand for industrial bond flotation by Japanese issuers because of a low level of capital outlays for plant and equipment, despite a sharp increase in the flotation of national bonds for deficit-financing.

In the rigidly-controlled Japanese interest rate structure, Japanese issuers were bound by agreed yields for new issues that are determined through consultation among market operators and officials. Foreign issuers, however, can ask for rates "on a spot basis", meaning the secondary market level, which is freer and usually

ahead of the issue market. The Tokyo bond market also has only loose grading of issuers according to the size of their capital and profit position, in sharp contrast with strict grading in the U.S. and other markets. Unofficial standards set by the Finance Ministry in 1972 for foreign issuers said they should have issued at least three bonds in the past five years or five issues in the past 20 years in the world capital market, all of which should be publicly-placed issues.

These were eased in December, 1977, to two issues in five years or five issues in 20 years, including only one publicly-placed issue in either case. The change has qualified some developing countries, including Malaysia and the Philippines, to raise yen bonds. The government of Denmark and the Canadian Provincial Government of Manitoba issued a ¥20bn. bond and a ¥15bn. bond, respectively in January, 1978, while Korean Development Bank has raised ¥10bn. Other issues expected in the first quarter of 1978 are Australia (¥40bn.), Finland (¥25bn.), City of Oslo (¥15bn.), Malaysia (¥15bn.), the French National Railways (¥25bn.), the Asian Development Bank (¥20bn.), and the Philippines (¥15bn.), securities sources said. In April the Governments of Norway, Sweden and the Argentine plan to float yen bonds.

The Finance Ministry said it plans to extend a special tax exemption measure called "maruyū" from April this year to yen bonds issued by private foreign enterprises or guaranteed by foreign local governments. In the past the "maruyū" which exempts individual holders of up to three million yen per person from income tax deducted at source and applied only to bonds issued by international institutions, foreign governments, and enter-

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Swiss franc still an attraction

SWITZERLAND'S CAPITAL market remained a great attraction for foreign borrowers last year despite the continued strengthening of the Swiss franc. Although no full figures are yet available, an indication of the 1977 volume is given by National Bank information that a dollar's total equal to some Sw.Frs. 11.5bn. was put on the market last year. These originated from conversion of Swiss francs of the proceeds of "concessionary" capital export transactions, a group of borrowings including public bond offerings and medium-term private placements by foreign interests and bank loans to foreigners. Going by past experience, this could mean that total Swiss franc borrowings by the outside world were Sw.Frs. 14-15bn.

In fact this sum will be noticeably down on the record Sw.Frs. 19.1bn. booked in 1976, when there was a sharp rise in all three categories of foreign borrowings. But it is still a very considerable amount—and very welcome to the monetary authority since the compulsory exchange into dollars of the Swiss franc proceeds goes far to finance the National Bank's interventions on the foreign exchange market. These interventions, necessary to prevent an even higher exchange rate, cost Sw.Frs. 15.5bn. in 1977, or a net expenditure of only Sw.Frs. 4bn. in the light of conversions.

It is already possible to calculate foreigners' Swiss franc bond offerings on the public capital market. These raised Sw.Frs. 3.68bn. of new money last year, or about 7 per cent. more than the Sw.Frs. 3.42bn. recorded for 1976. Altogether 54 issues were listed. Coupons began the year at about 5-54 per cent. for top names and up to 6-64 per cent. for less attractive floats, finishing at about 4-5 per cent. for the whole range of borrowers. The total excludes the "domestic" issues of international or foreign companies with a Swiss domicile (like Dow Banking, Societe Internationale Pirelli or Eurofima) but includes two "foreign" loans by Swiss Aluminium Australia, the Sydney subsidiary of the Zurich-based Alusuisse group.

While the high subscription level and the low and falling coupon rates led to a further

overall increase of foreign borrowing activity on the Swiss bond market, there was at the same time a marked rise in repayments by foreigners.

For the first eleven months of 1977 redemptions totalled Sw.Frs. 1.86bn. as against only Sw.Frs. 803.4m. for the January-November period of the previous year. Against the background of the rock-hard Swiss franc and the development of interest rates, there is a veritable swarm of premature redemptions coming up early this year on the part of foreign companies and Swiss-owned subsidiaries of multi-nationals, among the former Dittlers with a Sw.Frs. 50m. issue due in 1982 and a Sw.Frs. 80m. Tube Investments float maturing in 1980.

Unaltered

This makes the unaltered issue volume of Sw.Frs. 580m. for January and February, 1978, look much less imposing. Nevertheless, new foreign borrowers are finding interest conditions increasingly "congenial" with the going rate for first class names now down to 4 per cent. The cheap money available does something at least to offset fears of running up a debt in an upward-floating currency.

In the private placements sector volumes have fallen off considerably from the huge Sw.Frs. 10.5bn. raised in fact, medium-term Swiss franc notes in peak year 1976. Credit Suisse estimates the amount for the first three-quarters of 1977 at only some Sw.Frs. 5bn. The trouble last year with this side of the market did not lie in lack of demand but rather in lack of supply of quality paper. Demand grew in 1977, particularly with the insufficient availability of domestic bonds in the latter part of the year, though investors were not prepared to buy just anything.

To-day there is a remarkable spread between first-class, private placements (where they exist) and exotics. Rates of some 4½ per cent. are reckoned a standard for good five to seven-year maturities and the market says a highly desirable three-year issue, by a quality borrower could go at under 4 per cent. At the other end of

the scale, 7 per cent. and 7½ per cent. are being offered on less attractive notes.

New private placements in Switzerland are no longer allowed to be repaid before maturity—in the same way as a special levy has been introduced for premature redemptions of public-offer bond issues. But there have been very large-scale reimbursements on existing notes; so much so that these payments were said by National Bank President Fritz Leuwiner late last year to be a contributory factor in the surge of the Swiss franc.

Bank loans to foreigners will probably have risen in 1977 over the Sw.Frs. 5.2bn. booked for the previous year. According to a recent survey by the Union Bank of Switzerland, interest in Swiss franc loans on the part of public authorities abroad has been "relatively great", especially in the case of countries whose domestic capital markets dispose only a limited financing capacity. In the case of private enterprise borrowers, however, a high level of liquidity and a pretty low investment volume is seen as having reduced the need for loans of this kind. This is quite apart from the fact that by no means all potential borrowers consider the low Swiss interest rates reason enough to risk a currency loss. The latest figures for Swiss franc bank loans to foreigners is Sw.Frs. 3.53bn. for January-September, 1977.

For the year ahead Switzerland seems set fair to provide further large funds for the rest of the world. Certainly, with annual inflation currently running at only 1.1 per cent. and an administration keen on keeping interest rates low, Swiss franc borrowings look cheap. While the Swiss franc could well strengthen somewhat against numerous other currencies, it is doubtful whether it will rise quite so fast as in 1977, with a jump in the trade-weighted exchange rate of no less than 17.8 per cent. It remains to be seen how large the "back addition" of foreign borrowings will be after the rash of mature and premature redemptions.

John Wicks
Zurich Correspondent

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EUROMARKETS VII

EUROBOND ISSUES 1977

(\$m.)

Country of borrower or guarantor	No. of issues	Fixed rate	Floating rate	Canadian \$	D-marks	Gulden	Kuwaiti Dinars	Total	% of total	% of total 1976
Algeria	2	25.00	30.00					55.00	0.62	0.48
Argentina	1				43.00			43.00	0.27	0.00
Australia	11	455.00			107.50			562.50	3.64	6.57
Austria	14	80.00	120.00		258.50	63.25		516.75	3.28	1.87
Bolivia	1	15.00						15.00	0.10	0.00
Brazil	3	100.00	60.00		336.00			436.00	3.02	1.53
Canada	39	935.00		470.00	305.75			1,834.10	11.65	12.31
Denmark	7	115.00	30.00		41.50			186.50	1.18	2.11
Finland	5	55.00	60.00					148.00	0.94	1.21
France	20	245.00	825.00		188.50			958.50	6.09	12.59
West Germany	3	300.00						300.00	1.91	0.53
Hong Kong	3				127.81			127.81	0.81	0.00
Hungary	1				43.00			43.00	0.27	0.16
Iceland	2	20.00			20.75			40.75	0.26	0.22
Iran	2		30.00		49.50			79.50	0.51	0.19
Irish Republic	1		30.00					30.00	0.19	0.00
Israel	3	10.00	50.00					60.00	0.38	0.19
Italy	3	80.00	75.00					155.00	0.98	0.56
Japan	40	730.00	200.00		200.11			1,150.11	7.31	8.34
Korea	2	25.00			43.00			68.00	0.43	0.32
Luxembourg	1				41.50			41.50	0.26	0.48
Malaysia	1				41.50			41.50	0.26	0.09
Mexico	13	150.00	100.00		337.25	30.28	24.50	645.03	4.08	1.59
Netherlands	9	125.00			83.00	29.95		137.95	0.88	1.82
New Zealand	3	25.00								
Norway	19	373.00			606.30	80.77		1,062.07	6.75	6.74
Panama	1	25.00						25.00	0.16	0.09
Papua New Guinea	1	25.00						25.00	0.16	0.00
Philippines	3				43.00		17.61	81.69	0.52	0.00
Poland	2		35.00				14.09	49.09	0.31	0.32
Portugal	1		50.00					50.00	0.32	0.00
Singapore	2	15.00			41.50			56.50	0.36	0.93
Saudi Arabia	1							9.92	0.06	0.00
Spain	4				166.00		17.39	183.39	1.17	1.28
Sweden	16	580.00			330.75			910.75	5.15	3.56
Switzerland	1	195.00						195.00	1.24	2.34
U.K.	22	1,040.00	260.00	80.00	222.90			1,577.90	10.06	4.20
U.S.	18	955.00		126.00				1,081.00	6.87	7.34
Venezuela	1	100.00						100.00	0.64	0.00
Yugoslavia	4		80.00				15.00	95.00	0.60	0.34
Multinationals	3	500.00			64.50			564.50	3.59	
Supranationals	35	1,180.00		25.00	189.75	29.95	17.39	1,614.29	10.25	16.45
Total	324	8,500.00	1,715.00	641.00	3,832.36	402.63	105.97	15,741.00	100.00	

Source: Inter-Bond Services.

Eurobond activity at record level

EUROBOND LEAD MANAGERS 1977

	Issues	U.S.\$	DM	Other	Totals	%
1 Deutsche Bank	37	1,845.00	1,221.05	—	3,066.05	19.48
2 Credit Suisse-White Weld	25	1,915.00	—	45.00	1,960.00	12.45
3 S. G. Warburg	29	1,275.00	—	163.20	1,438.20	9.14
4 Union Bank of Switzerland (Securities)	14	1,375.00	—	25.00	1,400.00	8.89
5 Westdeutsche Landesbank	28	205.00	1,029.11	—	1,234.11	7.84
6 Dresdner Bank	31	186.00	1,014.30	—	1,199.30	7.62
7 Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas	9	820.00	—	45.00	865.00	5.49
8 Morgan Stanley International	19	695.00	—	157.64	852.64	5.29
9 Commerzbank	11	150.00	444.40	—	594.40	3.78
10 Orient Bank	12	415.00	—	105.00	520.00	3.30
11 Hambros Bank	8	425.00	—	—	425.00	2.70
12 Credit Lyonnais	7	235.00	83.00	—	318.00	2.02
13 Credit Commercial de France	7	255.00	—	45.00	300.00	1.91
14 European Banking Company	7	235.00	—	30.00	265.00	1.68
15 First Boston (Europe)	5	355.00	—	—	355.00	2.26
16 Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank	9	85.00	—	167.58	252.58	1.60
17 Daiwa Europe	10	140.00	—	91.20	231.20	1.47
18 Swiss Bank Corporation (Luxembourg)	5	230.00	—	—	230.00	1.40
19 BHF Bank	5	—	208.25	—	208.25	1.32
20 Klüber Peabody International	6	160.00	—	41.08	201.08	1.28
21 Goldman Sachs International	5	150.00	—	40.00	190.00	1.21
22 Morgan Grenfell	6	170.00	—	18.00	188.00	1.19
23 Banque Nationale de Paris	4	185.00	—	—	185.00	1.18
24 Nomura (Europe)	8	—	—	—	180.00	1.14
25 Hill Samuel	5	140.00	—	36.00	176.00	1.12

Source: Inter-bond Services.

ISSUES DURING 1977

By currency and maturity

Currency Group	Under 3 yrs	5 year	6-7 yrs	8-10 yrs	11-15 yrs	Over 15 yrs
Pound Sterling	—	—	45.0	54.0	117.0	—
Australian Dollars	—	11.3	—	—	—	—
United States Dollar	325.0	1,580.0	1,650.0	2,020.0	2,595.0	360.0
Bahrein Dinars	—	—	21.1	—	—	—
Canadian Dollar	—	245.0	251.0	80.0	40.0	25.0
Deutsche Mark	—	296.0	1,139.7	1,421.4	976.3	—
Netherlands Guilder	—	227.3	115.4	60.0	—	—
Hong Kong Dollar	—	33.4	21.2	106.6	—	—
Kuwaiti Dinar	—	—	32.6	75.4	—	—
Saudi Riyal	—	9.9	—	—	—	—
Swiss Franc (Dollar)	—	480.0	1,010.0	75.0	—	150.0
European Unit of Account	—	—	—	32.0	—	—
Japanese Yen	—	—	91.2	—	—	—
Total	325.0	2,852.8	4,377.1	3,923.4	3,728.3	535.0

Source: Inter-bond Services.

Francis Giles

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
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Republic National Bank of New York

Consolidated Statement of Condition

December 31, 1977

ASSETS	
Cash and demand accounts	\$ 95,775,359
Interest bearing deposits with banks	288,618,168
Precious metals	70,817,841
Investment securities	498,935,857
Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreement to resell	165,000,000
Loans, net of unearned income	1,255,150,131
Allowance for possible loan losses	(21,505,167)
Loans (net)	1,233,644,964
Customers' liability under acceptances	87,990,900
Bank premises and equipment	15,865,025
Accrued interest receivable	44,681,461
Other assets	71,019,346
	<u>\$2,572,348,921</u>
LIABILITIES	
Deposits	\$2,047,646,981
Federal funds purchased and securities sold under agreement to repurchase	55,422,000
Other liabilities for borrowed money	3,159,756
Acceptances outstanding	89,677,157
Accrued interest payable	97,328,755
Other liabilities	23,157,845
STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY	
Common stock	100,000,000
Surplus	78,146,591
Surplus representing convertible notes obligation assumed by parent corporation	12,490,000
Undivided profits	71,319,836
Total stockholders' equity	<u>261,956,427</u>
Letters of credit outstanding	\$ 101,625,469

As of December 31, 1977, the total investments in precious metals and the precious metal content of gold and silver coins were substantially hedged by forward sales. The total unhedged position at that date was \$2.5 million.

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REPUBLIC NEW YORK CORPORATION SUMMARY OF RESULTS

	Year ended December 31	
	1977	1976
Net income	\$19,522,394	\$16,582,371
Net income applicable to common stock	18,660,588	16,562,371
Per share of common stock:		
Net income — primary	\$5.96	\$5.30
— fully diluted	5.48	4.89
Dividends declared	1.00	.88

*On January 17, 1978, the Board of Directors of Republic New York Corporation declared a quarterly dividend to stockholders of record March 15, 1978 to be paid on April 1, 1978 of \$3.38 per share vs. \$2.25 per share paid on April 1, 1977

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EUROMARKETS VIII

Home and foreign interaction

One of the more striking features of the international capital market is the growing interaction between external bond markets and their domestic counterparts. This "increasing intercommunication," as the Bank for International Settlements described it in its 1977 annual report, has never been easy to gauge, and if anything, the currency upheavals of the past year have resulted in an even greater tangle of complexities. But the links between these two separate and quite distinct debt markets, though blurred, have not been weakened.

This is perhaps most noticeable in Europe. Rates of interest on foreign and domestic bonds in the major Continental areas like Switzerland and Germany are sticking remarkably close to each other, with a yield differential on D-mark bonds at present of little more than a quarter point. Five years ago this extended to almost two full points, whereas over the same sort of timespan the gap between U.S. rates on internal and external bonds was barely one point at its widest.

This is partly explained by the growing sophistication and familiarity of investors with European markets and currencies. At the same time, Europe has more readily adapted itself to the international investor—at all levels. International bonds have become more diverse—the latest fledgling addition to the European ranks is the recent rash of issues in Eurosterling—while domestic markets have become more open to cross-frontier investment.

Widened

As a result the bond manager's field of play has clearly widened substantially in recent years. A feature of the recent upsurge in the domestic capital market in Germany has been the way "international" money has washed over from the foreign bond market. In fact, the rush for DM assets has been a part of the domestic bond market in Frankfurt for a number of years, helping to reduce yields on outstanding bonds with a life of four years or more from 10.5 per cent. in October 1974 to less than 6 per cent. at present.

At the moment internal bond markets in Germany find themselves at the centre of a mini-renaissance. This is partly the result of the traditional upsurge in institutional liquidity at the end of the year. But it is also clear that the measures taken by the Bundesbank in the early part of December to curb the inflow of foreign funds into the country have had a beneficial side effect on local long term bond markets. The growing strength in foreign exchange markets of the D-mark forced the authorities to place an embargo on overseas investment in short term paper, a measure that was coupled with a full half point cut in the Bundesbank's discount and Lombard rates.

Thus the yield curve in Frankfurt was effectively steepened. Call money, which for most of last year hovered around 4 per cent. compared to little more than 6 per cent. for ten-year bonds, has eased significantly. This is helping new issue activity in the current year—some DM400bn. was raised on the domestic bond market in Germany in 1977 compared to around DM50bn. in the foreign bond market—where the new issue queue is known to be substantial.

The German Government's 1978 funding programme is heavy with a public sector net financing deficit publicly forecast to rise by around a quarter to DM50bn. The Federal Railway (Bundesbahn) set the ball rolling last month with a DM850m. offering with a maturity of 12 years on a 6 per cent. coupon. Following a dip at the beginning of January to coupons of 5½ per cent. in the foreign bond market it had looked conceivable that the domestic arena was about to be confronted with a similar move. In the event there was considerable relief among market makers that this did not happen.

Instead the issuing authorities opted for a slightly longer maturity (of 12 years) and in World Bank, the European Investment Bank and the Steel Community. A third—and in some ways most important—category awaited. The Bundesbank needs to keep its issue queue as orderly as possible, while at the same time creating enough interest and demand in the market to achieve its massive funding programme.

Curiously, the yield differential between domestic and foreign bonds in Switzerland is \$3.3bn. in 1974 to \$10.5bn. in 1978. Last year, however, the total fell to around \$6.6bn. partly reflecting the gradual increase in the cost of borrowing through

gains of 22 per cent. and 12 per cent. respectively last year). In Germany foreign bonds yield slightly less than domestic bonds, but in Switzerland foreign offerings return something like a half point more. During 1977 average long-term yields on the internal market in Switzerland eased from around 4.2 per cent. to 3.5 per cent., with external yields declining more rapidly from about 5.5 per cent. to just over 4 per cent. at present.

Differing

The tighter controls to be found in Zurich are perhaps one reason for this differing yield basis on external bonds between the two major currency areas in Europe. The Swiss authorities are perhaps more conservative when faced with the additional "political" risks invariably involved when foreign organisations tap monetary markets. But size may be a factor too. With just Sw.Frs.3.7bn. raised in 1977 the Swiss foreign bond market is barely 1/12th of the size of the new issue market for foreign bonds in Germany.

According to Credit Suisse, the local bond market in Switzerland put up Sw.Frs.6.7bn. of new money last year or roughly a fifth less than the Sw.Frs.8.4bn. peak achieved in 1976. The downturn is due to the absence of new government funding, with official financing dropping strikingly from the Sw.Frs.2.7bn. of 1976 to barely Sw.Frs.500m. last year.

Both countries have been affected by the excess liquidity built up as a result of sluggish demand internal for loans. Much the same picture emerges from the Netherlands but here the investment patterns are complicated by the occasional attacks of weakness in the guilder. This was especially noticeable in the final quarter of 1977 when foreign exchange pressures forced the Dutch central bank to lift interest rates sharply.

As a result yields on the Dutch internal bond market closed 1977 in much the same style that they began with a marginal decline of perhaps a quarter point over the year to around 8 per cent. for long-term paper. However, the situation has changed strikingly in recent weeks: bond dealers are hard pressed to recall a time when the interest rate background in Holland had altered so radically in so little time.

Halved to a point at the start

of the year, the premium on overdrafts charged by Dutch banks has been removed altogether as a result of the build-up in liquid funds at the short end of the market; and at the time of writing a cut in the central bank discount rate, probably to 4 per cent. from 4½ per cent., was widely anticipated. Demand for the latest State loan has been substantial despite the reduction in coupon compared to the Government issue in December. The latest state tender offer carries a coupon of 7½ per cent. whereas December's issue, which pulled in some Fls.350m., carried a coupon of 8½ per cent.

The interest rate background in neighbouring Belgium is influenced by events in Holland. And a 1977 fourth quarter blip in foreign exchange markets similar to that which affected the Dutch bond market occurred in Belgium. Towards the end of last year the Belgium discount rate was raised a full three points to 9 per cent. The sequence of events this year has been almost equally dramatic, with two subsequent cuts in January dropping the central bank rate to 7½ per cent.

On government issues of between 7 and 13 years' life, the average yield in Belgium last year dipped from around 7.6 per cent. to 6½ per cent.—and thanks to some fairly heavy government borrowing the new issue market was active. Gross new money raised in Brussels last year was some 35 per cent. higher at B.Frs.376.4bn. for the domestic bond market.

In the U.K. the feature last year of the interaction of internal and external bond markets was the sudden emergence towards the close of 1977 of a market in Euro-sterling bonds. Debt of this type actually predates last year for the U.S. company, Amoco raised money in this way in 1972: of the nine recent issues there have been offerings by a number of U.K. corporate borrowers.

The emergence of an international market in London springs directly from internal factors, with the dramatic turnaround in the balance of payments at the top of the list. Domestic markets in London had a buoyant year in 1977. The Financial Times Government securities index ended December several points below its peak (79.85) of late September

but the capital gains built up since January when the index stood at 60.45 are still massive.

At the moment gilt markets in London are uncertain of their overall direction. The recent stream of economic indicators has been generally unfavourable while the prospect of a breach in the Government's wages guidelines—which are crucial to the continued decline in the rate of inflation—is beginning to loom very large in the shape of threatened industrial action by the power workers.

Along with European currencies like the Swiss franc and the D-mark, the Japanese yen increased its international significance last year. Helped along by Japan's huge balance of payments surplus there has been a major boom in foreign yen-denominated bond issues in Tokyo. In fact the official Japanese attitude to overseas lending has changed dramatically over the past year. Banks, which were subject to very tight foreign exchange controls on their overseas activities, little more than a year ago, are now actively encouraged to play a more positive role.

Inflow

Tokyo's domestic bond markets are dominated by sluggish loan demand internally, and the need to lower interest rates in the face of a massive inflow of foreign funds seeking a strong currency base (the yen appreciated by some 22 per cent. last year). Yields on ten year money dipped last year from 9 per cent. on average to 6½ per cent.

Bond market: new issue activity increased by three-fifths to the equivalent of some \$250bn. last year partly because of a massive flow of new bonds from a government needing to finance a budget deficit. As a result the proportion of government bonds traded in the market moved up sharply from 4½ per cent. in 1976 to almost 11 per cent. It is widely expected that the projected budget deficit for 1978 will further increase this ratio—to possibly more than a fifth.

In foreign yen bond markets new issues rose by a startling 75 per cent. to accelerate sharply the five-year trend of rising overseas investment in foreign yen bonds.

Jeffrey Brown

Challenge to U.S. bond market

ACCORDING TO most expectations the U.S. credit markets will face still larger demands for money in 1978 than last year, when the total debt issued topped a record \$323bn. With U.S. domestic inflation seemingly lodged in the 6 to 7 per cent. annual increase pattern, short-term interest rates are expected to rise still higher, so that quality yield spreads in the long-term markets may well begin to widen this year.

It is still too early to say what impact this trend will have on the so-called Yankee bond market but a possible straw in the wind may have appeared last December when the French National railways switched a seven-year \$40m. bond issue to the Eurodollar market because it decided that a difference of up to 50 basis points between yields rendered the New York market unnecessarily expensive.

Nevertheless, the impressive liquidity of the U.S. market and domestic investors' appetite for the kind of long-term issues favoured by some sovereign governments mean that activity in the market will again be brisk this year. Traditionally, Yankee bonds are issued not only by governments and their agencies but also by supranational institutions such as the World Bank, the European Investment Bank and the Steel Community. A third—and in some ways most important—category awaited. The Bundesbank needs to keep its issue queue as orderly as possible, while at the same time creating enough interest and demand in the market to achieve its massive funding programme.

Curiously, the yield differential between domestic and foreign bonds in Switzerland is \$3.3bn. in 1974 to \$10.5bn. in 1978. Last year, however, the total fell to around \$6.6bn. partly reflecting the gradual increase in the cost of borrowing through

the year and some waning confidence about the strength of the dollar.

But the most potent factor, according to Morgan Guaranty Trust, was much reduced borrowing activity by Canadian governments. In 1975 the Canadians raised \$3.3bn. of that year's total new issues, \$5.7bn. of the 1976 total, but only between \$2.5bn. and \$3bn. last year. To some extent this was a result of a reduction in the borrowing requirement of Canadian provincial governments and their agencies, which managed to finance a much larger portion of their total borrowing needs in the American market.

Placed

In 1976 Canadian provincial and municipal governments and their agencies placed about 45 per cent. of their bond issues domestically, but last year the proportion rose to nearly 80 per cent. Moreover, the rise to power of the Parti Quebecois severely weakened the market for Quebec issues, so that the province, together with Quebec Hydro, which raised \$1.4bn. in the U.S. in 1976, placed only \$200m. last year. Among other borrowers were Sweden and Norway led the field with a total placement of around \$1.8bn., compared with \$1.69bn. the year before, while issues by developing countries were almost totally dominated by Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil.

Salomon Brothers in its annual publication "Prospects for the Credit Markets" expects a greater Canadian dependence on U.S. markets this year, but less activity by some other countries and B.A.L. agencies. The "very large future needs" of Canadian provincial authorities will encourage their return to the U.S. market, but, says Salomon, some other foreign

nations will be deterred by the higher yield levels which will be prevailing in the U.S.

A further inhibiting factor could be a weakening of the market for short-term five to seven-year Yankee issues, because foreign investors, who account for the bulk of the purchase of the short-term bonds, may be frightened away by possible currency exchange risks. Salomon says currency exchange fears will be less of a factor for international agencies which have a fairly large domestic market in the U.S. and have a greater capacity to offset exchange risks.

Nevertheless, international agency borrowing, which totalled \$2.2bn. in 1975, \$2.4bn. in 1976 and \$2.1bn. last year, may be lower this year because of the lower yields obtaining in other strong currency markets, notably the yen, the Deutschmark, and the Swiss franc. At the end of 1977 yields on high-grade seven to ten-year issues were just over 4 per cent. in Switzerland, less than 7 per cent. in Germany, and Japan, but a little over 8 per cent. in the U.S.

Since the U.S. bond market started to decline last autumn, shorter-term Yankee bonds of five to seven years maturity have held up better in the secondary market than corresponding U.S. Treasury issues and therefore spreads have narrowed. Longer term spreads have remained unchanged, however, so there are about 100 basis points between the European Coal and Steel Community 9½ per cent. bonds of 1987 and the U.S. Treasury 7½ per cent. of 2007. This helps to explain why U.S. domestic investors still are attracted to the longer term Yankee issues where the triple A ratings are impeccable and the yields advantageous.

John Wyles

The CD success story

ONE OF the biggest Euro market success stories of 1977 was the "certificate of deposit" (CD) market. The volume of U.S. dollar CDs outstanding in the London market grew very fast—from \$16bn. to \$23bn. while the idea, until then limited to the London and U.S. markets, was taken up in Kuwait and in Singapore. A further innovation was the floating rate certificate of deposit (FRCD).

Certificates of deposit (CDs) were seen for the first time in 1961 in New York. In 1966 the first London dollar CDs were issued by First National City Bank out of White Weld (institutions which have since been transmutated into Citibank and Credit Suisse White Weld respectively).

Whatever combination of institutional structure gave the market its initial impetus, it has now reached substantial size, though in proportion to London Euro market business, a whole CD market has grown only from 8 per cent to 10 per cent in four years. The \$23bn. volume of CDs outstanding compares with some \$70bn. in the United States. A clearing house, run by First National Bank of Chicago, was established in 1976 and now serves 80 institutions (up from 20 a year ago). A plethora of dealers provide secondary market back-up.

The basic principle of the CD is simple: on the one hand, banks want fixed term deposits on the other, those who place deposits with banks do not want to tie themselves down irrevocably for any significant period. By means of the bank issuing a certificate which can be sold to someone else, both sides get the best of both worlds. For the depositor the cost of retaining an option to get his deposit back is a slightly lower interest rate than he would have got if he had committed himself irrevocably by making a term deposit. From the bank's point of view, in addition to increasing its capacity to attract term deposits, CDs therefore cut the average rates payable.

Limit
CDs are mostly fixed rate, and are issued for up to five year maturities—the limit allowed by the Bank of England (although larger maturities can be obtained by forward contracts).

As far as the London market is concerned, a crucial development was the removal early in 1974 of the U.S. controls on exports of capital. This opened up a whole new group of potential investors in London dollar certificates of deposit—investors in the United States.

London CDs habitually pay slightly higher rates than New York CDs issued by the same banks because of the possibility that the Bank of England—or a British Government—might in extreme cases freeze foreign currency deposits in London, thus preventing holders of CDs from

On the other side of the coin, the list of institutions which report trading figures to the Bank has not yet been increased fully to take into account the large numbers of institutions which have started trading CDs in the past couple of years.

In addition, transactions between, say, two companies in the United States—deals which do not pass through one of the London houses either as a purchase or a sale—are not included.

It seems that moves are under way to make the list of reporting institutions more or less comprehensive again. It is more difficult to see how estimates can be gained of non-U.K. transactions. Although everyone agrees that an increasingly large volume of dealing is being carried on between buyers and sellers outside the U.K., it is difficult to get even a feel of how important such dealings are in the market as a whole.

One indication perhaps is that First Chicago reckons that of order a fifth of the transactions which pass through its clearing system might be between institutions outside the U.K. On the basis of the current turnover levels of about 130 transactions each day, this would mean about 6,000 transactions per annum.

In these circumstances all one can safely assume is that turnover is likely to be counted in billions of dollars per month.

Major
As far as investors are concerned, apart from the identifiable 15 per cent of outstanding issues held by London-based banks (a figure which compares with over 60 per cent of sterling CDs outstanding) the general belief in the market is that the three major groups of holders are U.S. companies, and the Middle East and the Swiss.

It is generally thought in the market that U.S. corporate treasurers have greatly increased their holdings—one dealer said that he thought U.S. companies accounted for most of the growth in the market since 1975.

However, it is understood that the proportions held by different groups have not changed very much since 1975. At times such as the present, when international investors are shy of committing themselves to long-term dollar Euro investments, it is probably the Bank of England. The fact is that the Bank of England, through the hands of the dealers who report information to the Bank of England, has put money into CDs on some scale.

The overall maturity structure of the CD market suggests that banks derive a considerable proportion of their long-term deposits from the CD issues.

A breakdown of the maturities of CDs outstanding has not been published by the Bank of England since its last analysis of the market in 1973 (in an article published in the *Quarterly Bulletin* of December 1973). However it is understood that the maturity structure has not changed all that much since then.

Although nearly half of the

issues outstanding at the time of the 1973 analysis were due to mature between one and six months later, 33 per cent had maturities of over a year or more. Applying this proportion to 1977 figures would suggest that London banks issue certificates for about a third of their medium term deposits.

The secondary market in London dollar certificates of deposit has greatly changed over the years and in particular as a result of the invasion by U.S. dealers.

When the U.S. controls on capital exports were lifted in 1974, few U.S. brokers were operating in the market. The secondary market had been mainly provided by a few international investment banks like the White Weld, the discount houses and the London money brokers (as in their other business, the latter do not buy or sell CDs for their own account—they only act on behalf of clients; this contrasts with other traders who hold CDs on their own books).

With the removal of the U.S. controls on capital exports, major U.S. stock and money market brokers found themselves at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their domestic U.S. corporate clients if they could not offer them London CDs. Many have since started up by themselves; others have linked up with a discount house.

The cut in trading commissions and the increase in the size in which deals could be made (as well as in overall trading activity) is attributed to the U.S. influence. The dealer's "turn" can now be comparable to that in New York. The difference between the buying and the selling price is up to 3 per cent per annum, but can be as low as 5 basis points, while an issuing bank

would expect to pay 1/50 per cent p.a. to the house placing an issue.

The amounts in which individual transactions can be made vary considerably according to maturity and the size of the issuing bank. For CDs issued by a big U.S. bank and due for repayment in the favoured three-six-month range, deals of \$1m-\$5m. are the norm while \$10m. is not unusual. Dealers say that transactions of \$100m. have been seen.

The introduction of floating rate CDs (FRCDs) in March last year arose initially from the ban by the Japanese authorities on issues of floating rate notes (FRNs) by Japanese commercial banks. However, FRCDs have since then been issued by French banks too and by one Swiss bank. The total amount outstanding now has been estimated by David Potter, of Credit Suisse White Weld (see *The Banker*, January issue), probably conservatively, at \$750m.

Maturities range between one and three years and interest is usually payable at an eighth or quarter of a point above interbank rates. The key differences between FRCDs and floating rate notes for an issuing bank are that they generally do not guarantee a minimum interest rate (which is likely to be more of an advantage when interest rates are falling than at present, when they are expected to rise) and that the costs of issuing are much lower than for an FRN. From the investor's point of view, one seldom noted advantage can be that a better quality of paper is obtained since FRCDs rank with deposits as having first call on a bank's resources while FRNs are sometimes subordinated.

M.C.



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New sources of information

A DECADE ago, lending to date to which the data refers and sovereign states was still the date of publication has been exception rather than the rule cut down to well under a year in international banking. Now the case of many countries, the assessment of country risk and the treatment of problems in sovereign lending have become an essential tool of the trade.

Part of the problem in the past has been lack of information about the size and maturity of individual country's debts. In the past year, great strides have been made in this area at only

least as far as the less developed countries are concerned. Among the various initiatives which have been taken, two in particular stand out, one by the World Bank to extend the coverage of its data and to make it generally available much faster than had previously been the case, and the other by the Bank for International Settlements (for by the central banks of the major industrialised countries under the aegis of the BIS).

The World Bank collects data on the debt of all the less developed countries and has traditionally been the main repository of information on this subject. However, there were some inadequacies in the nature of the data published and the publication of data on any country was held up until the slowest had reported—usually nearly two years out of date.

Now, the World Bank publishing data on individual major countries separately, as and when it comes in, and this has meant the delay between the

coverage was wide enough to

give substantial new insights into the drain on individual countries' foreign currency resources, which repaying the commercial banks and paying interest to them would pose.

The data was collected as of end-1976. Last December, the central banks decided to repeat the exercise as of end-1977 and every six months thereafter. The figures have not yet been published for the last occasion when they were released, only to banks which had contributed figures, it is intended in future that the information should be generally published.

What is particularly thrown up in this data but is not available elsewhere is an immediate problem arising from heavy debt repayment scheduled in the near future.

The central banks have also given the go-ahead to a project to publish a reference book explaining all the various sources of information on international debt statistics and the extent and ways in which they overlap with each other. This should considerably help banks in their attempts to collate the various different statistical series published by the World Bank, the OECD and the BIS in particular.

However, the idea of a central store-house where information on outstanding and new loans to all international borrowers would be stored (and even, constantly updated) has been dropped.

M.C.

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
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EUROMARKETS X

Line-up on debt

ONE WAY and another the subject of sovereign borrowing is likely to dominate international banking for some time to come. Governments and public sector entities are responsible for the bulk of the medium-term borrowing from international banks, while last year they became increasingly important on the international bond markets, accounting for well over a third of all issues.

It is now generally recognised—though the view was regarded as heretical even a few years ago—that international loans to governments will not be repaid except in the

most technical sense; that and partly because the borrowers are going to have access to the international markets to refinance maturing debt as well as to raise new debt, and that foreign currency debt is something which many governments will now have as a permanent feature of their borrowing. However the next few years are expected to be a particularly difficult period for the system.

This is partly because there is a ballooning of maturities coinciding with a cutback in the capacity of the debtor countries to earn foreign currency to repay their loans as the result of increased protectionism in the industrialised world; be needed for refinancing

markets—and the international banks and governments of both borrowing and lending countries—are still in the stage of building up expertise in the management of a new situation. The problems of the ballooning debt maturity have been recently analysed by Amex Bank. It reckons that amortisation of medium-term Eurocurrency loans will rise to \$16.4bn. this year from \$11.6bn. last year and \$5.2bn. in 1976. It had earlier made estimates to the effect that by 1980 50 per cent. of non-oil less developed countries' (LDCs) borrowing would be needed for refinancing

purposes. By 1985, Amex says, the percentage rises to 64 per cent.

As has been pointed out frequently, a key point about any survey of the countries' international debt is that the situation varies considerably from country to country and that no one country should be lumped together with another.

The rest of this survey is therefore devoted to special articles on the position of individual countries' outstanding debt situation, foreign currency earning prospects and future external borrowing requirements.

Mary Campbell

Britain

An early start to repayment of overseas debts

THE BRITISH Government has started a programme of large-scale early repayment of some of the massive overseas borrowings built up in the past few years. In 1978 so far prepayments of debt of \$1.5bn. have been announced; taking account of possible further moves and debt maturing anyway before next December the total for this year is likely to be at least \$3bn. This will be only partly cut into by new borrowings from abroad.

The U.K. has amassed large borrowings in the past few years to finance both current account deficits, which totalled \$6.44bn. (or \$12.5bn.) between 1974 and 1978 and capital outflows associated with the recurrent sterling crises of 1975-76. Government and other public sector bodies raised a net total of \$16.5bn. between the end of 1973 and the end of 1977, of which \$4.9bn. came from the International Monetary Fund, \$4bn. from two syndicated credits raised in the Euromarkets and nearly \$700m.

from foreign currency bonds issued last year to official sterling balance holders, while \$7bn. was for nationalised industries and other public sector bodies. The latter was mainly raised under the terms of the exchange cover scheme. Most of this money was for five or seven years with the result that by late last autumn the U.K. faced debt repayments of \$18bn. before 1982. The maturities build up from \$0.9bn. in 1978 to \$2.4bn. next year and remain above \$3.4bn. until 1983 with a peak of \$5.3bn. in 1981.

The priority to be attached to debt repayment has, however, become a controversial issue in the debate about the use of North Sea oil revenues. On the one hand, it is argued—for example, by the National Institute for Economic and Social Research—that repayment should not rank high on the alternative uses since for a surplus country like the U.K. foreign debt is both cheap and fairly easily recyclable. It has also been suggested that the maintenance of a fairly high level of overseas debt by past standards is consistent with the existence of large, and probably continuing, surpluses among the oil-producing countries. Moreover, the current account surpluses required in the U.K. to repay the debt will act as a constraint on the desired growth of domestic demand.

The Bank of England has put a different emphasis. In its December Quarterly Bulletin, the Bank said it was desirable for the current account to stay in surplus; although the repayment burden might be eased by some new borrowing, "it will be clearly desirable to provide for a net reduction of debt on a scale that is appreciable in relation to maturing repayment obligations."

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Attractions

Although the main North Sea decisions have not yet been taken, the Government has already decided to start repayment in order to flatten the hump of maturities in the early 1980s. There are obvious attractions in repaying now when the current account is in large surplus rather than relying on repaying later when the current account prospects are much less certain. Moreover, the fivefold rise in the official reserves during 1977 to \$20.56bn. has created freedom of manoeuvre, so that repayments this year will exactly match the estimated current surplus.

Within this programme, the main preference is for repaying debt which matures in the peak years and has a high or fixed interest rate above current market levels. Moreover, in some cases, such as the recently announced \$500m. prepayment

by the Electricity Council, there is also an exchange rate gain since the loan was raised in November, 1976 when sterling was much lower than it is now.

The U.K. has also started repaying part of its loans to the IMF, \$1bn. is due to be repaid shortly. This will be mainly from the first credit tranche drawn in May 1976 since this money will do much to boost the IMF's own resources available for lending; the money from the other tranches and the oil facility will mainly be returned to the original lenders.

A certain amount of new borrowing is also being undertaken. A total of \$400m. has been raised since last October, chiefly from the European Investment Bank and the European Coal and Steel Community. There may also have been fund-raising on Euromarkets where money can be obtained with maturity dates after the repayment hump in the early 1980s.

But there is only a limited amount of finance available for longer than five or seven years so the main drive for new borrowings is unlikely to occur for a year or two. In addition, some public bodies—notably British National Oil Corporation and British Airways—may raise money overseas where this is appropriate for operational reasons.

Peter Riddell

France

Left-wing victory would not worry foreign bankers unduly

WHILE IN no sense a non-event, the general elections due in France next month could well turn out to be much less important than some bankers fear. The country's dollar-denominated indebtedness should retain its triple A rating even if the Left coalition wins a majority. One of the two main bond rating organisations, Standard and Poor's Corporation, has recently re-evaluated the country's debt and confirmed that France's rating as a top-quality borrower would not be affected by the outcome of the March election.

The Standard and Poor's report points out that all parties of the Left coalition, the Radical de Gauche, the Socialists and the Communists, who have called for different degrees of nationalisation, are all agreed about the "principle of compensation to investors in nationalised industries." The report covered dollar-denominated bonds floated on the Eurodollar and U.S. bond markets, both Government-issued and Government-guaranteed.

The Standard and Poor's report confirms the view of most banks which are active in French loans and bonds. The possible victory of the Left coalition is not viewed as a disaster but simply as a fact of life which may well have to be faced. "No Reds under the bed scare here," one banker commented when asked how he viewed a possible Left coalition victory. "France will remain a country with a diversified economy, self-sufficient in many respects, whose indebtedness overall is far from worrying," this banker added.

Another commented that before running scared about what a Left-wing government might do, it was best to retain one's cool. He pointed out that European investors had learnt to live with Left-wing parties,

including Communists, and that it was unlikely a Left coalition government would impose measures which the bulk of the French people disliked. "Italy raises bonds and France will always be in a much better position than Italy, whatever the outcome of the election."

Despite the fact that France raised as much money in overseas borrowings, between January 1, 1976 and May 30, 1977 as it did in the years up to the end of 1975, bankers are not worried at the overall level of the French debt. The country started borrowing from a very low debt base and the funds borrowed are clearly earmarked for projects which have a discernable cash flow.

Record

Some bankers go further and suggest that a government of the Left will go out of its way to show that it is "responsible" in international financial affairs. That many of the Socialist Party leader (Mr. Mitterrand's) advisers are senior civil servants in the Ministry of Finance is not lost on bankers. The denizens of the forteresse de la rue de Rivoli "as the Ministry is sometimes nicknamed will no doubt ensure that the Socialists, which are the dominant partner in the Left coalition, keep to the straight and narrow. Last but not least, France has an impeccable record historically where the repayment of debts is concerned, the only hiatus having occurred during World War II.

France was very active as a borrower last year. It raised more than twice the 1976 total, though more in the form of medium-term credits than bonds. The Yankee bond market was successfully tapped and the foreign yen market approached for the first time. One major new potential borrower came to the bond market with a floating rate note last autumn—the Caisse Nationale du Crédit Agricole.

French borrowers were able to achieve the finest terms in the credit market, as befits names considered absolutely prime, such as Electricité de France (EDF).

EDF raised eight-year money on a split spread of 1 per cent. and 1 per cent. over the interbank rate last autumn and the fact that U.S. banks did not join did not prevent the opera-

tion from being very successful. The Caisse Nationale des Télécommunications got the same spread on a ten-year credit last month from two Japanese banks which refused to agree to the 1 per cent. spread which the French Treasury was keen to get.

The greater recourse to medium-term credits was no surprise as there is a lot of French paper around in the bond market. Despite some suggestions a borrowing spree would happen before the March elections, no greater momentum developed. EDF raised money earlier than it needed more to take advantage of the borrowers' market than for any other reason.

Official figures put France's external guaranteed debt at Frs.66.3bn. and direct funded debt of the Republic of France at Frs.5.7bn. a total of Frs.72bn. The debt is certainly higher overall if private debt is included but no accurate figures are available. More than half of the external public debt is denominated in dollars and most of it is not in the name of the State, but of a string of autonomous and semi-autonomous public agencies and nationalised services.

Names like Electricité de France, Crédit National, Banque Française du Commerce Extérieur, Caisse Nationale des Télécommunications and Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français are familiar and well respected in the market.

Comparing the composition of the debt outstanding at December 31, 1975, and the end of May 1977, some interesting changes took place. While the total amount of borrowings denominated in dollars was more or less the same (\$3.5bn. against \$3.9bn.), the amount of borrowings denominated in Swiss francs rose sharply (from Sw.Frs.1.28bn. to Sw.Frs.2.8bn.). While Deutsche-mark denominated borrowings fell (from DM30bn. to DM1.7bn.), looking to 1977 as a whole, however, borrowings denominated in D-marks increased over and above those denominated in Swiss francs.

The currency risk is a factor to be considered, although in some cases it is negligible because a company will simply

roll over its debt and the very much lower rates of interest on Swiss franc loans for example make the exercise more than worthwhile. If the Left coalition came to power, Swiss franc borrowings may be a little difficult for a while but no more.

Where borrowings in D.M. denominated bonds are concerned, dealers say they would expect the secondary market to take a knock. There is already some evidence of selling of French names, no doubt by French holders, ahead of the election. The same phenomenon is perceptible in the Dollar sectors of the market again where French names are concerned. Some dealers, however, point out they have clients just waiting for good buying opportunities at lower levels. Here again, raising money should not prove difficult for a Left coalition Government; unless matters went disastrously wrong.

Currency

Guessing how much money France may want to borrow this year abroad is not easy. Prime Minister Raymond Barre has considerably tightened the rules on borrowing in the domestic capital market which in any event is not very large and continuing recourse to the Euromarkets is therefore to be expected.

France's balance of payments deficit has been cut by half by 1977 as compared with 1976 and is expected to narrow further this year, which suggests that the country's foreign currency requirements will be less this year than last. Yet this will not necessarily be the case as: (1) the extent to which the balance of payments deficit improves is not certain; (2) the Government which "emerged from the elections, whether conservative or under Raymond Barre or another Prime Minister or a Left-wing coalition might turn out to have very different objectives, and therefore financing needs, from the present one. (3) France's domestic credit market is getting increasingly sick at a time when the borrowing requirements of nationalised companies such as EAF are increasing.

Francis Giles

Italy

Borrowers must get their timing right

Italy, led the way back into the world of international credit last year with a \$200m. issue, helped by the fact that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had earlier signalled its support for a further Italian borrowing. This IMF facility was a mere \$500m. What was important, however, was the agreement to a further Italian borrowing, something that had been a long time in the making. The IMF's certificate of approval for Italy's borrowing was a significant step towards the country's financial recovery.

On the plus side as it were, Italy has just returned a balance of payments surplus in 1977 of close on \$2.5bn., while the available reserves of the Bank of Italy currently exceed \$8bn. against around only \$1bn. at the beginning of 1976 when the authorities were obliged to close down temporarily the foreign exchange market in another political crisis.

Greatly

The current level of the reserves reflects in fact greatly expanded borrowing by the Italian banking system itself. Its net indebtedness abroad, which was less than \$500m. two years ago, had risen to more than \$7bn. by the middle of last year. Indeed, for a period—however theoretical the possibility—foreign banks had sufficient net claims with the Italian banking system to buy up the Bank of Italy's entire foreign exchange reserves.

There was some decline in this indebtedness in the second half of last year, but an overall international banking system has clearly been more than agreeable to extend its credit lines to Italian institutions, although admittedly the process was assisted positively by administrative measures to support the lira, including the temporary obligation to finance all advance payments of imports in foreign exchange.

This residual liability of the domestic banking system should

be viewed against the latest figures for Italy's total indebtedness for both monetary and non-monetary institutions, of close on \$20bn. Sig. Giulio Andreotti, the outgoing Prime Minister, has made it clear in his negotiations with opposition parties and the trade unions that there is little room to manoeuvre in terms of short-term economic management, since the Government must this year meet or rollover—or a combination of both—debt and interest payments in excess of \$4bn.

Thus the Treasury itself has little room for manoeuvre and given a resolution of the present political crisis will itself be seeking new facilities abroad this year. Meanwhile the industrial sector and its backstops, the credit institutions, are also in the market and in essence have nowhere to go but to international markets, since the capital market in Italy itself is for practical purposes non-existent.

Equally non-existent, unfortunately, is corporate profitability at a level—in the relatively few cases where it actually does exist—to allow any significant measure of self-financing for development. Instead, there is a growing burden on most major companies to meet interest commitments, let alone repay their notionally short-term debts. All in all, it is not an attractive lending proposition.

Dominick J. Coyle

Japan

Short-term liability shrinking fast

JAPANESE BANKS had net short-term overseas liabilities of \$12.5bn. in November last year, a figure equal to over half of Japan's official foreign exchange reserves. Their liabilities have, however, shrunk considerably since 1974. They are likely to shrink further in future, probably eventually reaching zero or being replaced by net assets.

The main source of the short-term overseas liabilities of Japanese banks is that Japan has traditionally borrowed in the U.S. for import usance financing (loans required to finance imports in transit which usually mature after six months). Lines of credit from U.S. banks for this purpose originally served as a means of support to Japan's shaky international payments situation but have continued in existence chiefly because of favourable interest rate differentials. In other words it has normally been cheaper for Japanese importers to finance their imports with dollars borrowed in the U.S. (or in Europe) than to borrow yen and

pay the higher interest rates that have traditionally ruled in Japan.

The amount of short-term liabilities of Japanese banks grew sharply immediately after the 1973 oil crisis for two reasons. One was that the quadrupling of oil prices automatically increased the value of Japan's exports and thus also increased the amount of funds needed to finance imports. The second reason was that on the eve of the oil crisis Japanese banks had become involved in competitive long-term overseas lending. These loans had to be financed by extensive short-term borrowing in the Euromarkets and elsewhere—a situation which led to the emergence of the now famous "Japan-rate" premium on loans to Japanese banks in 1973 and 1975.

Ban

Concern about the short-term liability problem and about the excessive rates Japanese banks were being made to pay for new loans led the Ministry of Finance in July 1974 to place a ban on overseas long-term lending in foreign currencies by Japanese banks. The ban was gradually relaxed from November 1976 onwards but guidelines are still in existence to prevent or discourage Japanese banks from lending long and borrowing short as they had been doing. The volume of overseas short-term liabilities related to trade financing started to fall last

spring when Japanese interest rates for the first time in many years dipped below U.S. interest rates. This produced the phenomenon known in Japan as "Yen shift"—meaning simply that importers began to pay off their overseas usance finance loans while taking out new loans in yen to finance future imports. The maximum rate of yen shift towards the middle of last year, was around \$1bn. per month. But the process came to a halt in the autumn as a result of upward pressures on the yen-dollar exchange rate.

The effect of these was to create a premium on the forward yen on the Tokyo foreign exchange market which in turn led to a sharp increase in the costs of importers borrowing yen to finance import contracts denominated in dollars (as most of Japan's imports currently are). The yen shift remains in suspense but could be resumed later this year if and when an atmosphere of stability returns to the foreign exchange market.

It needs to be emphasised that talk of the overseas liabilities of Japanese banks relates to the short-term position (up to one year) not to medium and long-term borrowing and lending. The Government publishes no figures on the long-term position of the banks but it has been unofficially calculated that they had net long-term overseas assets of around \$9bn. at the end of last year. Japanese banks are once again becoming actively involved in syndicated dollar loans to foreign borrowers, so this figure could rise. Very recently there has also been an increase in long-term yen-dominated loans to foreign borrowers.

Charles Smith

CANADA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

(\$2m.)

	1977	1978
Merchandise balance	+2.9	+4.3
Service balance	-7.7	-8.6
Net transfers	+0.4	+0.4
Current account	-4.4	-4.0
Net long-term capital flow	+5.6	+6.0
Net short-term capital flow	-2.3	n.a.
Net capital flow	+3.3	n.a.
Change to reserves	-1.3	n.a.

* Estimates. † Includes dividends and interest \$2.5bn. in 1977 and \$2.3bn. in 1978.

Canada

Worrying decline in foreign investment

THE STANDING of Canadian borrowers in international markets has remained remarkably good despite political and economic setbacks that have shaken away some of the gloss of the early 1970s.

The election in 1978 of a government in the French-speaking province of Quebec, rather to the political left than is usual in North America, has not generally thought to be 1980 and 1985. Of this year's requirement, U.S.\$1.25bn. has already been arranged from an international consortium; about \$750m. was intended to be drawn early in the year, the rest remaining as a standby.

Trip

Ontario Hydro's borrowing is done for it by the provincial Government. The Ontario Treasurer, Mr. Darcy McKeough, has just tested the temperature on a European trip that took him to Switzerland, W. Germany, and London. He estimates that Hydro will need Can.\$1.7bn. this year, rising to Can.\$3bn. in 1982. Half of this year's borrowing is likely to be done outside Canada, largely but not exclusively on Wall Street.

rapid decline of the role of foreign direct investment in the composition of capital imports, and the increase in straight borrowing.

That is in part an inevitable trend, given the great and growing importance of energy projects in the Canadian economy. The two biggest borrowers, Hydro-Quebec and Ontario Hydro, are provincially owned utilities. Wall Street's predilection for energy ventures has helped them greatly in the past, though the Quebec company has found life a little harder since the advent of the Parti Quebecois Government.

Hydro-Quebec needs \$Can.2bn. to \$2.5bn. a year for the giant James Bay power development which will be coming on stream progressively between 1980 and 1985. Of this year's requirement, U.S.\$1.25bn. has already been arranged from an international consortium; about \$750m. was intended to be drawn early in the year, the rest remaining as a standby.

Both events have had compensating advantages. The devaluation has improved the competitiveness of Canadian industry and has led to a healthy recovery of the merchandise account. And the Finance Minister of Quebec, Mr. Jacques Parizeau, agreeably surprised the business world with a budget of financial orthodoxy last year.

Taken together with an assessment of the underlying figures, the devaluation and the Parizeau budget make possible a calmer discussion than looked likely 18 months ago about whether Canada is overborrowed. Expressed as a percentage of GNP, total gross external indebtedness (including both direct and portfolio investment) is well below its peak of almost 100 per cent in the early 1980s, somewhere around 49 per cent, according to a Bank of Montreal estimate. The net debt end-1977 amounted to 26 per cent of GNP. The absolute figures are Can.\$100bn. gross (including portfolio debt of Can.\$44bn.) and Can.\$56bn. net. The interest bill has risen from Can.\$1.9bn. in 1976 to Can.\$2.9bn. in 1977, helped along by the devaluation, and can be estimated at Can.\$3.4bn. to Can.\$3.5bn. for this year.

Canadian economists do not and those figures alarming in themselves, especially since Canada traditionally depends heavily on capital imports that does worry them is the

W. L. Luetkens



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EUROMARKETS XII

The Nordic Zone

Welcome applicants on a growing scale

TAKEN AS a bloc, the Nordic countries have become the principal customers of the Euro-markets over the past few years. The first major leap in borrowing came when Norway needed to finance North Sea oil development. Then in 1975 the Swedish authorities, prompted by the oil crisis and the subsequent recession, switched their exchange policy to encourage foreign borrowing. Denmark and Finland have been traditional borrowers abroad and are already well into amortisation and rolling over of debts.

All four countries have been carrying a disproportionate share of the OECD countries' combined payments deficit. Thus during the 1974-77 period the Scandinavians were responsible for close to 40 per cent of the combined deficit of \$7.2bn. recorded by the European bloc of the OECD. Current indications are that the deficits will be only marginally reduced this year and that the Nordic countries will again be borrowing heavily on the Euro-markets. They will probably be looking for around \$10bn. in new loans.

A noticeable feature last year was the increase in foreign loans taken up by public authorities, induced mainly by expanding budget deficits and the decline in the borrowing interest of the private sectors. The Swedish State came on to the market for the first time and on a major scale. Denmark borrowed heavily to build up its reserves. The Bank of Norway, increased its borrowing, to cover both state oil investments and the budget shortfall, while the Finnish Government took up a small loan and announced its intention of borrowing more this year.

Leaving aside the effect of the increased oil prices, which was especially severe on Sweden and Denmark, the underlying reason for the Nordic countries' persistent payments problems has been the decline in the competitive power of their

traditional currency-earning industries. On foreign markets, which have been either shrinking or growing less swiftly, Nordic pulp and paper, engineering products and shipping services have lost shares because domestic costs have kept their prices too high.

With the exception of Norway, the Nordic countries took corrective domestic policy measures last year. Sweden led the way by devaluing twice and by leaving the European currency "snake". Norway and Denmark followed the devaluation of the krona half-way but remained in the "snake". Finland, which is not a "snake" member but has close trade links with the Scandinavians, also adjusted the Finnmark.

Estimate

Sweden's foreign borrowing last year totalled some SKr21bn. (\$2.3bn.), roughly equal to the estimated payments deficit, with the State taking up loans equivalent to SKr9.8bn., when converted at the exchange rates prevailing at the end of the year. The country's net foreign debt is less than SKr21bn. since it started the year at about zero. There has been controversy about the exact figure with some officials arguing that official statistics ignore patent and royalty income and exaggerate the deficit. Within the Riksbank (Central Bank) the current estimate is that the net debt was around SKr12bn. at the end of 1977.

The payments position is not expected to improve this year and the gross foreign borrowing requirement will be roughly the same as for 1977, around Sw.Kr.20bn. Foreign bankers who expect the Swedish State to kick off the 1978 programme with a repetition of last year's \$1bn. syndicated loan, may be disappointed, however. The Swedes' strategy is not yet clarified, partly because of uncertainty over the extent of company borrowings, and partly because Parliament still has to approve state guarantees for foreign loans, including those for the shipyards and the new steel company. One shipyard alone, Kockums, which is building two LNG tankers under State guarantee, could well be looking for foreign loans equivalent to Sw.Kr.1bn. this year.

After the \$1bn. syndicated loan, with which the National Debt Office marked its arrival on the international money

market last year, its strategy has been to go for low interest, fixed rate loans and to vary its markets to avoid saturation. For example, a yen loan is likely later this year. To illustrate the anticipated scale of Swedish foreign borrowing over the next few years, the Capital Market Commission has just estimated that the country's net foreign debt will be in the Sw.Kr.120-150bn. range by 1985.

Norway's payments deficit last year broke through all previous records and ended at an estimated Nkr.27.5bn. (\$2.8bn.), leaving the country with a net foreign debt of around Nkr.80bn. Of this some Nkr.35bn. is attributable to North Sea oil development and Nkr.36bn. to the shipping fleet, but a feature of the last two years has been the acceleration in borrowing by other sectors as well.

The oil operations are scheduled to show a modest surplus for the first time this year and the preliminary state budget assumed a decline in the payments deficit to Nkr.16bn., which would have to be covered by foreign loans. More recent data predictions suggest that this could be an underestimate and Norwegian State borrowing could show a big advance in 1978.

The budget assumed that two State banks, Kommunalbanken (which serves local authorities) and Industribanken, would take up foreign loans valued at Nkr.3.7bn. Of this sum Nkr.1.3bn. had already been negotiated last year. The State oil company, Statoll, whose foreign capital needs have so far been met by State borrowing, has been authorised to go on to the international market on its own account for the first time to the tune of Nkr.2bn. To cap Norwegian public borrowing, Parliament in December authorised the Government to take up further foreign loans equivalent to Nkr.7bn.

The Bank of Norway has so far preferred to take loans at fixed rates and on five-year terms in three main currencies, dollars, Deutschmarks and Swiss francs. The decision to borrow over five years arose from the assumption that the income from North Sea oil would bring Norway into payments surplus at the end of the 1970s. This no longer being the case, the Bank of Norway will have to renew some of these loans, starting this year.

Denmark had a current account deficit of DKr.9.5bn.

(£855m.) last year and a net capital import of DKr.15.3bn. The main bulk of the difference went to strengthen the reserves, which reached a record level of over DKr.13bn. in November before ending the year at DKr.12.3bn. The net foreign debt was around DKr.55bn. or about 37 per cent of GNP at the end of the year. The strong growth of Government and public foreign borrowing has characterised the Danish currency situation over the last two years but official policy is to return the market to the private sector as much as possible in 1978.

The payments deficit is scheduled to improve to DKr.7.5bn. this year, which will be roughly the foreign borrowing requirement, assuming there is no change in the country's international liquidity. The Government will try to hold the currency reserves at their present level and manipulate monetary policy to induce companies to seek finance abroad. This programme has two possible complications: a renewal of pressure on the krona within the European currency "snake" and the tendency, which developed in 1977, for companies to borrow abroad not to meet their trading requirements but in order to place the proceeds in high-interest Danish bonds.

Finland had a total gross capital import last year of FM6.5bn. (\$830m.), of which FM1.2bn. represented drawings by the Bank of Finland on its standby credits. Of the remaining FM5.3bn., amortisations accounted for FM2.7bn., leaving a net of FM2.6bn. The country's foreign debt at the end of the year, after making adjustments for the depreciation of the Finnmark, was equivalent to FM28.6bn. or almost one quarter of GNP.

The 1977 current account deficit was limited to Kr.700m., less than half the forecast at the beginning of the year, and it is hoped to get the account into balance this year. The government went into the international money market last year to the tune of FM490m., in order to finance industrial stimulation measures. It will borrow more this year. The Bank of Finland estimates that other foreign borrowing will be of roughly the same size as last year's, that is, some FM4.4bn., of which FM2.2bn. was government-guaranteed.

William Dullforce

Comecon

Accepted as a good risk in banking parlours

ALTHOUGH COMECON remains a major borrower on the international capital markets, developments in recent months have shown it to be a less controversial one than it used to be. Compared with a couple of years ago when doubts were raised in every quarter about the wisdom of lending to the East Europeans, the tone of comment in financial circles has undergone a marked change. Indeed, it has almost become fashionable to come up with good reasons why the West should lend to Comecon.

One explanation is that time has disentangled the various economic and political considerations behind lending to East Europe. And the latter (usually negative and exploited as ammunition in the ideological war) have yielded to the former, which are generally positive. The prevailing view in banking circles now appears to be that while certain "technical" problems exist, Comecon is a good risk both because of its record and the stable, tightly run nature of its economic system.

And the Comecon countries clearly want to maintain this trend, if possible. The plans for 1978 show much higher growth targets for exports than imports (for example Poland expects to increase exports by 10.3 per cent, and imports by 3.9 per cent), and several measures are being taken to make producers more foreign trade-conscious, including the restructuring of wholesale prices to reflect world trends, material incentives for exporters, and the establishment of industries specifically for export.

While these improvements are an indication of how centrally-managed economies can get out to achieve specific goals, performance has varied from country to country. The Soviet Union managed, according to its own statistics, to move back into surplus with the West in mid-1977. But other countries like Hungary and Bulgaria have got deeper into debt because of stagnation in either the value or volume of their exports.

Poland, whose position has seemed the most precarious, narrowed its trade gap considerably in the first half of 1977. But that was before flooding ruined part of the harvest and forced the government to import several million tons of grain. There were gradual improve-

hit \$8bn. having been in surplus only four years earlier.

That was also the year of the new Five Year Plans, all of which contained tough policy statements about the need to achieve a better external payments balance, if possible by raising exports, if not by cutting imports.

There was an immediate, if modest, improvement in 1976 when the deficit narrowed to some \$6.5bn. But this was no reason for self-congratulation in East Europe where government and party leaders continued to impress upon their people the need to raise exports: part of the blame though was laid on the West where the growing tide of protectionism was threatening staple East European exports such as food, metal products and textiles.

The improvement continued into 1977 where the deficit for the first half year, the latest figures available from OECD, was running at an annual rate of some \$5.5bn., with the second quarter producing the best monthly average for several years.

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Poland, whose position has seemed the most precarious, narrowed its trade gap considerably in the first half of 1977. But that was before flooding ruined part of the harvest and forced the government to import several million tons of grain. There were gradual improve-

ments in the remaining countries. These developments are reflected in a levelling out of the rate of Comecon borrowing in the Euro-markets. According to the OECD's Financial Market Trends identified medium-term Euro-credits rose from \$2.48bn. in 1976 to a provisionally estimated \$3.1bn. last year, a record level. But this rise was almost wholly accounted for by the Comecon International Investment Bank (IIB), which has been borrowing heavily to finance large multi-national projects like the Orenburg pipeline.

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Comecon is also having to cope with intensified pressure from Western banks for more information. Poland has begun to yield; its recent \$250m. loan for copper development carried what by Comecon standards was an exceptional amount of documentation.

On the other hand, that loan also showed how Western lending limits may be circumvented. Instead of being made out to the Bank Handlowy, which normally raises Polish loans, the loan went to the Lubin Copper Combine, and the U.S. Controller of the Currency agreed that this was an independent borrower for lending limit purposes. If more such anomalies are recognised as borrowers in their own right, the scope for Polish, and indeed Comecon, borrowing would be greatly expanded.

Another reason for uncertainty over Comecon is that the coming year will bring a marked change in the nature of its financial problems. In addition to grappling with its trade deficit, Comecon will increasingly have to confront the problem of debt repayment as its maturities on loans borrowed earlier in the decade fall due. Figures produced by the BIS indicate that repayments will rise sharply in 1978-79 for almost every Comecon member, except Poland which has a breathing space until 1984 due to its more favourable maturity structure.

Although this was foreseen by the Comecon countries, it could lead to difficulties. Much of the original borrowing went to import capital equipment which was to become operational within a given timespan and produce goods for the hard currency markets to pay off the loans. In practice, it has not always turned out like that. There have been considerable delays in the commissioning of imported plant and equipment throughout the region. And where plant is ready, it is having difficulty finding ready markets in the recession-hit West. In other words, through a combination of delay and misfortune, Comecon's hard currency earning capacity is not as high as planned. Although this is by no means disastrous, it does suggest that Comecon will remain a big borrower for the next year at least.

David Lasceller

EUROMARKETS XIII

Spain

Lenders put their faith in long-term prospects

Spain's position in the transition to a democratic society, the authorities in Madrid have taken measures which bankers feel will improve the situation in the longer term. Banks do not so much worry because a situation is bad as when a situation is known to be bad but goes unacknowledged by the authorities. Such is clearly not the case.

It is also the case that Spain's foreign account position is improving—it is thought that last year's current account deficit was around \$2.5bn, as against \$4.5bn in 1976, and it is hoped that this year's may be as low as \$2bn. Reserves at the end of last year were a healthy \$6.13bn, against \$5.28bn at the end of 1976.

However, the position of Spanish industry, and in particular that of many large companies, private or State-controlled, such as have been borrowing extensively on the Euromarkets, is weak and promises to get weaker. Spanish inflation also, following an extended period where Government control was virtually absent, climbed to over 27 per cent last year.

The Government is now fighting this with the combination of a 17 per cent credit increase guideline for this year, and a 22 per cent target for wage settlements. One has only to observe how far the credit expansion guideline is beneath both the wage rise target and the current inflation level to see how drastic a credit squeeze it implies. This could, in the course of the year, make foreign lenders more cautious about lending to Spain.

One development that could make the market nervous, though it probably in fact should not, is if some banks should fold, particularly as Spanish banks are estimated to own over 40 per cent of the country's industry. Already last month the Bank of Spain had to take over the administration of a small Spanish bank, the Banco de Navarra. The problem is that many smaller Spanish banks have paid high interest rates in order to compete with the larger banks, and to finance

these have got unduly involved in speculative investment. Thus they are in a poor position to cope with the current credit squeeze.

But though the collapse of some small banks could produce a domino movement affecting some rather larger ones, there is no likely prospect of the seven banking giants that dominate Spain's financial system—and a good deal of its industry—being affected. Not only do these banks have a tradition of being conservatively financed; they have profits which in the past have been large enough to stand some squeezing. In any case, no Government could afford the political repercussions of letting any of them go to the wall.

It is at the problems of industry—particularly those of the steel, shipbuilding, and capital goods sectors—that prospective foreign lenders need to look very carefully indeed. The first two in particular are in deep trouble throughout the world. In Spain, their problems are exacerbated by two legacies of the Franco era—heavy dependence on loan finance, due to long years of artificially cheap State-directed credit, and the acute difficulty of shedding labour.

Already there have been numerous reports of companies defaulting on social security payments, payments to suppliers, and even wages. There have also been a number of technical defaults on loans to Spanish borrowers—to which lenders often turn a blind eye because of the problems caused by default clauses.

Quite how much worse the situation gets will of course depend to a great extent on how wages rise. There is good news on wages: indications so far suggest that their rate of increase is falling off, and may even be under 23 per cent at the end of the year.

However, the rate of credit expansion in the past four months has actually been under the Government target. This development is hard to interpret, but it may indicate that Spanish banks—hardly the

Francis Ghiles and David Habakkuk

Turkey

A spot of trouble in getting the sums right

It is a sad reflection of the emiral coalition's management of the Turkish economy that at the end of January, one month after taking office, members of the new Turkish Government were still trying to get out just how much Turkey owed its creditors.

The figures published in the previous Government's introduction to the 1978 budget have proved to be inaccurate. Only a few officials at the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance managed to put together some improved but still provisional figures. According to these, Turkey had a debt of \$1.94bn at the end of 1977, of which \$1.75bn was due under the CED scheme, though in practice this amount will be largely rolled over.

Regular

Only for the following years is there anything like a regular pattern of repayments and interest, though experts now warn that present data is misleading and stress that in any case Turkey has a tradition of being a way strongly justified by refinancing its debts.

The problem facing the Turkish officials, though, is not so much the figures as the fact that the \$1.94bn due in kind dealing with Turkey has long under various clearing agreements as well as the close on there was a rudderless \$42bn due under the convertible currency (CLD) scheme. If truly massive, trade deficit—

all these are taken in, then Turkey's total debt and interest reaches \$14.5bn.

As for evaluating a debt service ratio, one official says that at present this would be a meaningless exercise—a comment which reflects not only the inadequacy of the information available but also the structure of the debt. Past due obligations of various sorts total \$1.9bn, while there is a further \$1bn in the payments queue—representing funds lodged by importers with the Central Bank and awaiting transfer abroad.

If this is the 1977 debt still to be paid, this year \$225m of interest has to be paid, while a further \$1.26bn of liabilities are falling due. Apart from this, over \$1bn are due under the CED scheme, though in practice this amount will be largely rolled over.

The Government's hope is to slash the current account deficit by cutting imports back from \$5.8bn to \$4.85bn, by increasing exports, in particular of grain and cotton, from \$1.75bn to at least \$2.4bn, and increasing workers' remittances from \$1bn last year to \$1.3bn this year.

At present the remittances are being largely side-tracked into the parallel market financing system, which has meant Turkish importers have continued importing even when they can no longer make the transfers from Turkey on which their suppliers have been insisting. However, the new Government hopes that the workers will respond to the various measures they propose, and in particular to the changed political climate in Turkey.

The State Planning Organisation expects the current account deficit to be halved to \$1.4bn, though TUSIAD, the Turkish industrialists' and businessmen's association, forecasts that it could still be \$1.9bn.

Between 1973 and 1976 GNP grew at an average of 6.9 per cent per year in real terms. In 1977 growth seems to have been cut back to 5 per cent, and this year, with factories working as low as 50 per cent of capacity, growth is likely to be relatively low again. This is a particularly grave problem in a country where even the high expansion of recent years has not prevented the emergence of unemployment as a serious structural problem.

As the economy moves out of a trough of mismanagement foreign banks are beginning to hint that they might be prepared to make fresh advances to Turkey even in the absence of a sizeable agreement between Turkey and the IMF.

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

TURKEY'S DEBT STRUCTURE (\$m. end 1977)

	Total	Arrears	1978	Maturity Medium Long
International Monetary Fund	550			550
Other Int'l Organisations	1,205.3			1,205.3
of which:				
IBRD (a)	442.6			
IFC	122.2			
IDA	178.3			
ERF	375.6			
Foreign Govt. Loans	2,500			2,500
of which:				
U.S.	1,175.9			
W. Germany	524			
Britain	71.1			
Private Foreign Credits (c)	520			620
Suramarket Lns (d)	530			530
Commercial Credits (e)	5.2			5.2
Commercial credits under budget law (f)	120			120
Central bank managed credits				
1. Bankers' acceptances	700			700
2. Bankers' credits and placements	400			400
3. Overdrafts	110			110
4. B.I.S.	90			90
5. Pre-export financing (g)	70			70
6. Cash against goods (h)	1,500			1,500
7. Letter of credit applications	1,000			1,000
Total	9,400.5	2,610	1,260	4,325.3
Interest	2,500		225	1,250
Dresdner scheme (i)	130			130
Clearing agreements (j)	510			510
Convertible T. Lira deposits (d)	1,962	300	1,050	612
Grand total	14,502	2,910	2,535	6,827.2

Note: Sources for all items in first column and for 1978 interest (a) Minimum.
(b) Of which \$175m. for Botas pipeline, \$150m. for State Investment Bank and \$150m. for Petrol of Isl.
(c) Under 1959 Paris agreement.
(d) Mainly to State economic enterprises.
(e) Mainly by Deutscher bank for wheat.
(f) Part of this has already been met by Turkish businessmen from funds they held abroad so liability is in part in practice to Turks.
(g) Emigrants' workers funds made available to central bank.
(h) Payable in kind, with \$200m. due to Russia.
(i) See text.

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EUROMARKETS XIV

North Africa

Pattern shifts in Maghreb borrowing

THE THREE Maghreb countries continued as active medium-term borrowers in the Euro-markets in the past 12 months but while the total amount they raised increased if compared with 1976, there was a marked shift in the pattern of activity.

The market's oldest customer, Algeria, emerged from a rather rough period in the market and ended up by borrowing less than during the previous year. It was very slow to benefit from the shaving of spreads and lengthening of maturities which characterised the market; by last month it finally had, despite the fact that the terms on the \$35m. loan to Sonatrach, the State oil company, which is being arranged by Marina Midland (a maturity of ten years

on a spread of 1½ for ten years) were finer than they would have been had there not been a link with export credits, in this case from Italy. Banks usually get a higher return on financing linked with export credits, so they feel they can afford to be more generous on the medium-term portion of the credit.

Morocco's State phosphate company OCP went for a similar kind of mix on a \$200m. credit last September. This allowed OCP to achieve a spread of 1 per cent. on the \$50m. medium-term portion of this financing, only \$35m. of which was effectively syndicated. With its balance of payment situation worsening and the price of phosphates staying low, Morocco increased its borrowing activity last year and will no doubt want to raise as much this year as last—that is over \$1bn.

Unhappy

OCP raised a loan on this market for the first time last year, not an easy operation as many banks were unhappy with the fact that no European firm had audited the company's accounts, only Inspecteurs des Finances from the Ministry of Finance in Rabat. Morocco was able to borrow on finer terms later in the year, the split spread of 1½-1½ per cent. on the \$325m. loan to the Kingdom marking a definite improvement on the 1½ per cent. spread achieved by OCP in February 1977. Despite the economic and financial problems the country faces, Moroccan borrowers will remain attractive to many banks on account of the country's low indebtedness.

Tunisia was without doubt the success story of the year so far as Maghreb borrowers were concerned. Its maiden voyage in the market enabled it to raise \$125m. for seven years on a spread of 1½ per cent. throughout. The management fee of ½ per cent. was low by market standards. Apart from this sovereign loan, two other Tunisian State agencies raised smaller sums of money,

the Central Bank's policy being to establish the name of one of two State-owned companies in the market in their own right.

Tunisia will be active in the market this year; the ambitious Five-Year Plan launched last year allows for much greater recourse to borrowing abroad from private sources. The authorities will be tempted to raise funds earlier than needed if the present borrowers' market persists. Whatever economic and political difficulties Tunisia faces, it should encounter no

difficulty in raising loans. A reasonable track record in the economic field, low indebtedness and up-to-date information on its economic and financial affairs should ensure a good reception in the market.

This year might well see Algeria return to its position as the Maghreb's most important borrower. When its major gas liquefaction plant is opened in Arzew in a few weeks' time, many bankers will breathe a sigh of relief. This project is

two years behind schedule, not an unusual delay by developing country standards but one which added with Algerian secretiveness until recently on economic and financial data has not made life easy for the banks.

The new rules being worked out by the U.S. authorities are likely to cause headaches for the banks where Algeria is concerned. In particular rule No. 1, which says that the borrowing entity must have resources or

income of its own sufficient over time to service its debt obligations.

It is open to question whether a company such as Sonatrach will ever wish to disclose enough information to satisfy the U.S. authorities. If it does not, even those banks which have full confidence in the way the Algerians are developing their oil and gas might find they have severe constraints on their lending limits.

F.G.

Sudan

Probable increase in future loans

AT THE beginning of December a senior Sudanese minister stated publicly that Sudan was not proposing a collective rescheduling of its debts. But Mr. Mohammed Hashim Awad, Minister for Co-operation, admitted that his Government had been in touch with some of its creditors asking them to wait for payment while it negotiated. "There have been one or two contacts with Arab countries to reschedule debts, specific loans, but we have not sought any collective rescheduling," he said.

Sudan's foreign debt stands at about \$1.8bn., of which about \$250m. is short-term. Euro-market borrowing. Debt service obligations amount to more than 40 per cent. of net export and invisible earnings. A balance of payments current account deficit of \$574m. is unofficially foreseen for the current financial year (which ends in June). A net capital inflow makes the

deficit on current and capital account a rather better \$407m., according to the projections.

The critical situation, which has led to delays in paying for imports and in making loan service payments (not nearly as great as the more lurid stories suggest), is the ironic result of a flood of funds into Sudan since the 1973/4 oil price rise.

Serious efforts are at last being made to exploit a far greater chunk of Sudan's agricultural potential than before and Arab—and to a lesser extent—Western investment and aid has poured in. Longer term plans drawn up by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development envisage Sudan becoming a major food exporter to the rest of the Arab world, with its development carefully controlled and partly financed by the already established Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (usually known as the triple-A-I-D).

The trouble is that development in the past four years has gone more slowly than had been expected and few new foreign exchange earning or saving projects have yet made a significant impression on the balance of payments. The very weak transport infrastructure has caused terrible bottlenecks,

while little has been done to adapt the pervasive but sleepy Sudanese bureaucracy to the need for more dynamic management of the economy. But the Government is determined to press on with development with all that this implies in terms of soaring imports and invisible payments, trusting that the oil-producing countries of the Arabian peninsula will meet the short-term deficit.

Saudi Arabia, Sudan's principal financial backer, has shown itself reluctant to bail out its neighbour across the Red Sea except on conditions that are considered in Khartoum to be tough. In co-ordination with the IMF, which has been expressing its concern about the Sudanese financial position (reserves were recently only \$18m.), Saudi Arabia would like Sudan to introduce a package of economic measures.

Devaluation

These are thought to include some form of devaluation of the Sudanese pound (possibly by the creation of more incentive rates for different categories of transaction), a cut in the budget deficit, reduction in the losses made by public sector corporations and an improvement in the tax system and tax collection methods to give both greater incentives to investors and more revenue to the government. In return Sudan would get Saudi and IMF short-term credits. Unless this happens the Euro-market's appetite for more loans to Sudan will be small.

Government Ministers appear to consider that these conditions would be politically dangerous, since they would increase short-term inflation while postponing the moment of economic breakthrough and the first real rewards for the bulk of the population. The Government appears to prefer to ex-

tend the terms on what loans it can, mainly those with Arab backing (a \$300m. Eurodollar loan backed by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency has been extended by five years). It also wants discreetly to cut back on spending and to switch the emphasis in development to less costly projects with a quicker return. It has sold this year's current cotton crop forward for about \$400m. (and already spent the money to meet commitments, according to Sudanese bankers).

Fortunately, the transport bottlenecks are gradually being broken. An oil pipeline to take the strain off the railway from Port Sudan to the capital has just come into operation, and a hard surfaced road linking the two should be complete within a year or so. The Rahad irrigation scheme is starting to produce crops this year.

But the need for borrowing will increase as development grows and more projects are implemented. The intention of the Arab Fund is that Sudan's development should be controlled, in agreement with the Sudan Government, by the AAAID which will be able to give special tax and other concessions to projects with its imprimatur and will keep a check on borrowing while providing an institution funded and supported by the majority of Arab governments. But the AAAID cannot operate effectively until a chief executive has been appointed—something which has been delayed by an inter-Arab dispute.

When it does start operating it should be able to guarantee much of Sudan's future long term borrowing. But until the immediate crisis is resolved it is uncertain where Sudan will turn for its short-term balance of payments needs, which may run at about \$200m. a year.

James Buxton

Nigeria

First recourse to market facilities

LAST MONTH Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, signed a \$1bn. syndicated Euro-market loan. It was the first time that the Federal Government had come to the market, and it marked the first step in a programme under which Nigeria aims to raise \$5.5bn. from various sources over the next two years to help finance its current development plan. This envisages public sector spending of \$41.34bn. over a five-year period ending in 1980.

With foreign currency reserves standing at \$4.6bn. last August and proven reserves of mainly light low-sulphur crude put at 26bn. barrels (equal to 25 years' output at current rates) Nigeria was able to command a spread of only 1 per cent. above LIBOR on the seven-year facility.

At the same time as the loan was signed (it is co-led by Chase Manhattan Limited, Morgan Guaranty Trust and Compagnie Financière de la Deutsche Bank) the Nigerian Government confirmed that it had obtained a commitment of \$500m. per year for the next two years from the World Bank. The loans to be tied to specific projects and conditional on Nigeria putting forward sufficiently evaluated and acceptable projects.

Nigeria also expects to raise \$1.5bn. in supplier credits, a further \$1bn. in syndicated bank loans and \$1bn. in project-related market loans.

Nigeria's external public debt outstanding at the end of 1976 was only \$1.28bn., comprising a mixture of bilateral and multilateral loans (of which those from the World Bank and its affiliates made up nearly half). This gave an external debt service ratio (on the basis of 1976 exports) of 0.7. As the servicing of the \$1bn. loan becomes heavier Nigeria expects a debt service ratio of 3.7 in 1981—the peak year—taking into account existing debt. But this figure does not cover other borrowings likely to be arranged in the next two years.

Nigeria went to the market for \$1bn. because it foresaw a shortfall on its funds available for development. Recurrent expenditure exceeded original estimates (as did the cost of implementing projects in the plan), leaving a smaller surplus for investment. Oil revenue turned out to be smaller than the projections; in fact production is around 1.7m. barrels per day compared with estimates of 3m. in the plan.

The Government estimates that it can meet Naira 12.5bn. of its capital spending requirement out of revenue, leaving a balance of N.14bn. to be borrowed. Of this up to N.10.5bn. (depending on actual project implementation) can be raised locally, the Government thinks, leaving N.3.5bn. (\$5.5bn.) to be raised abroad. The Government this year expects a budget deficit of about N.3bn. after recurrent spending of N.4.9bn. and development spending of N.5.8bn.

Growth

These projections could be upset by the continued rapid growth of recurrent spending (which the Government is anxiously trying to rein back) and the drop in oil revenues caused by the arrival of North Sea, Alaskan and Mexican oil in its traditional major markets, the U.S. and Britain, which could bring oil production down to 1.5m. to 1.6m. barrels per day by the end of the year, implying a 20-40 per cent drop in revenue.

But perhaps a more serious trend is the slow rate of project implementation experienced so far as a result of bottlenecks and a complex decision-making process. There has been little sign yet of a reversal of the decline of Nigeria's traditional foreign exchange earners, the agricultural commodities, nor of food production for internal consumption. Oil still makes up 80 per cent. of revenue and more than 90 per cent. of export earnings.

It therefore appears likely that the Nigerian Government will need to borrow more heavily in the early part of the next decade when development spending is likely to be at a peak. The economy may not be cushioned by such large reserves at that point, unless there has been a sharp upturn in the world oil market and a rise in Nigeria's oil productive capacity (the Government has given incentives to the oil companies to step up exploration), and unless the two projected LNG plants have come into operation to capitalise on the other main part of Nigeria's hydrocarbon reserves, natural gas.

David Tonge

J.B.

Turkey

CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

The banks have been considering a group loan of up to \$750m. with attached to this the demand that Turkey should discourage further CLD. The latter system allows foreign banks to lend to Turkish banks with all the foreign exchange risk guaranteed by the Turkish Central Bank, it has meant that Turks have been borrowing at the low Swiss or West German interest rates and lending locally at between 14 and 17 per cent., with the Central Bank taking all the entrepreneurial risk inherent in the interest rate differential.

The loans have been mainly short-term and are described by the present Minister of Finance, Mr. Ziya Muesezinglu, as the worst form of borrowing imaginable. They have become bread and butter for Turkish bankers who insist that they are long-term debts since in practice they are rolled over. But by more rigorous standards they are a short-term obligation.

The Central Bank says that of close on \$2bn. CLDs outstanding at the end of 1977, \$300m. are past due obligations, \$1,050m. are due in 1978, \$345m. due in 1979, \$90m. due in 1980 and \$25m. due in 1981. These figures exclude CLDs made openly by Turks, many of which are on a call basis but are not in practice withdrawable.

Rescheduling these CLDs has become almost essential if Turkey is to raise fresh loans on the scale needed. The short-term outlook for the economy is daunting, with 1978 exports forecast only just to exceed a half of the debts repayable this year, let alone the expected current account deficit.

But with its rich agricultural potential and growing industrial base the future is not entirely bleak. Turkey's 600,000 emigrant workers hold an estimated \$3.6bn. in banks abroad, while Turkey's industrialists have been proving that they too have assets abroad by financing many of the imports still awaiting official payment transfers. "The Turkish businessman is like the Italian one in having huge deposits in Switzerland," one official says, adding wistfully, "if only an amnesty for capital exporters would boost the Turkish lira as much as it helped the Italian one."

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EUROMARKET LETTER
A FINANCIAL TIMES NEWSLETTER

Latin America

No better customer over the years

THE EUROMARKETS have not been better customers than the Latin Americans. Before, during and after the oil crisis they came to the market and they were the same. They were not the same as the customers who were not such as to affect their international trade to any great extent.

The fact that in 1976 Argentina stumbled under the weight of the money it had borrowed and all but defaulted for a time on its debt service did not appear to worry the lenders in the long term. Neither did the fact that a poor price for copper and a dearth of fish for the fishmeal industry were compounding Peru's payments problems. Nor did the fact that Brazil's foreign obligations were inexorably mounting towards the present day figure of \$30bn.

Lenders came forward for Chile and its military junta and Jamaica and its hard pressed socialist democratic government.

In few cases was the borrower's capacity to repay questioned. The careless nature exhibited by the lenders could be argued to have been soundly based. At a time of stagnation elsewhere the growth rate of the area was a good one, going from 3.2 per cent in 1975 to 4.4 per cent in 1976 and 5.2 per cent last year. At the same time the inflationary pressures which the continent had suffered since the early 1970s abated a little. Despite higher growth rates the area's ability to export did not seem much affected and last year Latin America threw up a Venezuelan Government has been doing the most prudent nearly \$1bn compared with a deficit of \$3.5bn in 1976. The current account deficit dropped from \$10.1bn to \$7.0bn and the region's reserves rose by \$2bn.

The record was not a bad one and it all the simpler to borrow compared with the highly disappointing results achieved by embarrased. The Venezuelans

many examples of the industrial world. It demonstrated that the Latin Americans were in general able to support a big debt burden because they were earning their way in the world and the restrictions on their exports to the industrialised countries were not such as to affect their international trade to any great extent.

Lenders, however, take comfort from the fact that the Latin Americans were in general able to support a big debt burden because they were earning their way in the world and the restrictions on their exports to the industrialised countries were not such as to affect their international trade to any great extent.

So it was, for instance, that Latin Americans were able to appropriate the biggest slice of the Euro market lending done with the developing countries. In the second quarter of last year the developing countries were responsible for publicised borrowings of \$3.4bn, or 52 per cent of all the borrowing done.

Of this, \$2.2bn went to Brazil, \$242m to Argentina, \$186m to Mexico and \$100m to Panama.

But while the overall Latin American picture is one of growth and expanding confidence, conditions vary greatly from country to country. The whole picture is far from small extent distorted by the great weight of Venezuela's very big oil revenues and its consequent financial strength.

With reserves of around \$9bn, the Venezuelans have billions more dollars than any other Latin American country—their nearest rival being Brazil, which has less than \$5bn, but a population ten times that of Venezuela. If one were to subtract Venezuela's financial strength from the region it would look decidedly shakier.

In the Euro markets the balance of trade surplus of nearly \$1bn compared with a deficit of \$3.5bn in 1976. The current account deficit dropped from \$10.1bn to \$7.0bn and the region's reserves rose by \$2bn.

The record was not a bad one and it all the simpler to borrow compared with the highly disappointing results achieved by embarrased. The Venezuelans

pal source of national income and a deteriorating overall balance of payments position. But the general outlook is still most favourable. The country's most important money earner—the nationalised oil industry—is managed by highly qualified technocrats who are investing to keep the industry modern, efficient and competitive. Exports over the past few years have remained stable at around \$10bn per annum, and the country boasts the greatest store of international financial reserves in Latin America. In addition to borrowing, the Government itself and the State-owned Venezuelan Investment Fund are contributing the lion's share of financing for major projects.

Inflation and the stabilisation of oil prices have cut back the Government's real income from oil exports from 1974-75 levels, but the decrease has not been a major one. The foreign credit obligations Venezuela has contracted since 1976 are spread for the most part over seven to ten years. Even after factoring in the additional \$1.4bn, the Government said it would require before 1980, Venezuela's foreign debt service stays well below 15 per cent for the greater part of the next ten years.

In a study of the Venezuelan economy made by the World Bank in 1976 economists from the institution predicted that the country would encounter a balance of payments deficit over the medium term as the Government purchased large quantities of capital goods and services abroad while implementing its basic industrial projects.

The reason it had opted to compress much of the development was that costs would be much higher for the nation if capital investments were delayed even a few years. The worst that can be said for Venezuela is that despite its good intentions and generally laudable plans, it is very inefficient and tends to be a spendthrift. Imports of expensive motor cars, liquor and other luxury goods have skyrocketed since 1974 but this is hardly unusual for a developing nation.

The most important thing to remember is that the Government—for all its flaws—is investing in the right areas—industry, agriculture, transportation, public works and social improvement. Both this administration and the next (to be elected at the end of 1978) will be committed to the tasks of reducing the country's lopsided dependence on oil and substituting domestic goods and services for those now imported.

Anyone analysing Venezuela's economic prospects over the next few years can identify some problem areas: lack of control over the Government's current expenditures, continued (through loans and buyers' cost overruns and waste in credits) of around \$4.5bn from official programmes, heavy 1976-80, with additional \$1bn, dependence on oil as the primary

record is discussed at greater length elsewhere in this survey. Suffice it here to say that the country provides some gift on a piece of Latin American gingerbread which at times tends to crumble at the edges.

The situation of Peru is particularly intricate. The collapse in the prices of some of its main export lines, the disappointing performance of its fisheries and the bunching of its debt repayments into a short period has produced very severe problems of cash flow. The measures that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suggested would correct the situation have proved politically unpopular and have been hotly debated within the country. This debate has come about at a particularly sensitive moment for the Government of General Francisco Morales Bermudez, who is trying to turn the country back to civilian rule after nearly a decade of military administration.

Peru has also proved to be the graveyard of an experiment, novel for these times, under which private foreign banks took over the monitoring of Peru's financial policies. Uncertainty about the IMF conditions for making credits available to Peru and even greater uncertainty about the extent to which they would be accepted and carried out have affected Peru's relations with lenders in the Euro markets.

Nevertheless, the fact that the Fund has decided to disburse money to the Morales Government should calm fears about the future and persuade lenders that the only viable policy for all concerned is to roll over Peru's more pressing liabilities. It is clearly unrealistic that nearly half of all Peru's export earnings should be channelled to debt servicing, as they are at the moment.

Chile's financial relations with the Euro markets have improved after the decision of General Augusto Pinochet that the country would not seek any refinancing of its foreign debt in 1977 or 1978. Despite this improvement lenders are still shy of giving publicity to loans to Chile which continue to

attract political criticism. But the strong support that the Pinochet Government has received from international financial institutions like the Fund, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and—at least until the advent of President Carter—the U.S. Administration itself has been a great comfort to lenders.

The debt service burden is nevertheless a heavy one which will absorb nearly 40 per cent of Chile's foreign exchange earnings this year.

The way Brazil has constructed its towering foreign debt and has continued to keep it erect despite the winds of doubt about the country's creditworthiness is something that commands continuing admiration. More than any other Latin American country Brazil depends on keeping foreign markets open for its exports and on being allowed to earn the money to keep servicing its debt and borrow more. This has been able to do at the same time as it has tackled the problem of finding more oil at home and so cutting down the biggest item in its import bill.

Last year it demonstrated its continued hold over the imaginations of the banking world by obtaining the largest ever project loan—more than \$500m, for the Acominas steel works.

Argentina is possibly the most problematical of the big borrowers. The stability of the government, or at least of the present economic policies being pursued by Sr. Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, are constantly being called into question. As the pace of inflation quickens voices are yet again heard calling into question the viability of such policies, and Argentina's standing as a reliable borrower.

Hugh O'Shaughnessy

Mexico

Oil wealth offsets drawbacks of economic crisis

MEXICO VIES with Brazil as the largest foreign borrower among developing nations but there is one big difference between them that does not go unnoticed by their creditors: Mexico has oil—lots of it—and Brazil does not. As a result, although Mexico is going through its worst economic crisis in 40 years and is having to abide by the strictures of the International Monetary Fund, private bankers are literally queuing up to lend in Mexico City.

Oil is of course not the only reason to lend to a country whose foreign debt is already equal to almost half its Gross National Product. During the 14 months since President Jose Lopez Portillo took office, the Government has adopted a daring austerity programme that has helped rebuild confidence in the economy after the chaotic final months of 1976 when the Mexican peso was devalued for the first time in 22 years. Since then the "floating" peso has stabilised around 23 pesos to the dollar (compared to 12.50 pesos before August 31, 1976), the current account payments deficit has fallen by 40 per cent to \$1.6bn, and inflation has slowed to about 12 per cent per annum.

But oil made the difference. Just as foreign bankers were beginning to worry about Mexico's prospects early last

year, the true scale of Mexico's oil wealth became apparent. During the previous administration of President Luis Echeverria it was Government policy to be secretive about the country's oil reserves. But when Sr. Lopez Portillo took office, the State oil monopoly, Pemex, immediately raised its reserve estimate from 6bn to 11bn barrels and now claims 16.8bn barrels of proven reserves, 30bn barrels of "probable" reserves, and 120bn barrels of "potential" reserves.

Even more important, the new Government decided to get this oil out of the ground as fast as possible—without allowing foreign oil companies in to lend a hand. Production is now 1.2m b/d, of which 200,000 are being exported. By 1982 production could be as high as 2.5m b/d, with more than 1m b/d exported. At current prices this means annual foreign oil revenues of \$5bn, plus future earnings from natural gas exports.

But Pemex's ambitious six-year investment programme—currently estimated to cost \$17.5bn—also requires enormous foreign credit. Last year, this year, and for the foreseeable future, Pemex will therefore be the largest single Mexican borrower. But for all no one minds lending.

Mexico's real problem now is to find money for social development. Under President Echeverria its public foreign debt quadrupled to \$10bn, as bankers financed growing budget and payments deficits, unproductive social projects and inflationary wage increases. But after the public foreign debt jumped by \$5.5bn in 1976 alone, the IMF stepped in, and therefore began developing new credit markets, particularly in Western Europe, Japan and the Middle East. Significantly, in

Last year Pemex was not affected by the limit but this year the same ceiling applies—including Pemex. The public debt will reach \$25bn by the end of 1978 but there will be little extra money available for health, education and other social services. The rule now is that foreign credit must go to productive operations and not to finance budget and payments deficits.

But despite the attraction of lending to Mexico the IMF's ceiling is not the only limit. With three-quarters of Mexico's public debt owed to American banks, the U.S. Comptroller of the currency has begun tightening his rules on foreign lending by the banks he monitors. In future these banks cannot lend more than 10 per cent to any single foreign client, a measure certain to affect Mexico.

Anxious to stimulate investment but with domestic credit also tight, the Government now has a "back-to-back" mechanism by which dollars borrowed privately abroad can be deposited with the Bank of Mexico and exchanged for pesos, with the Government carrying the devaluation risk. In the past five months about \$500m have entered the country this way and have been channelled towards plant expansions or new beneficiaries, however, have been the local subsidiaries of multinational corporations. But once the recession is over, supposedly late next year, direct private borrowing abroad should resume.

This time, though, there will be no gambling against a possible devaluation. The Lopez Portillo administration is determined to keep the peso floating relatively cleanly. The fact that the currency has stabilised without the imposition of exchange controls is evidence that the strategy is working well.

Alan Riding

Venezuela

Free-spending policy adds growing burden of debt

"YOU REALLY have to live the Venezuelan dream. Not only have they managed to spend everything they've earned since 1974, but they've got into debt besides."

This comment by a foreign correspondent who has covered Latin America for many years captures the scepticism expressed by some observers over the Venezuelan Government's grandiose spending programmes and the concurrent borrowing which has pushed total official debt—and external obligations—to unprecedented levels.

Since 1974, when higher OPEC prices trebled Venezuela's oil revenues, the democratically elected Government headed by President Carlos Andres Perez has begun to implement a wide range of industrial and social improvement projects calling for spending which outstrip the country's already spectacular income levels.

While some domestic and foreign observers have questioned the wisdom of undertaking a highly ambitious development scheme with admittedly limited human resources available, most bankers here are industrial development programmes and public works. The knows what it is doing and has \$550m was to be used for the financial and oil reserves to back it up.

Over the past year and a half the Government has turned to credit in London which will be foreign credits as never before in order to finance part of its on-going projects in steel, aluminium, hydro-electric power, transportation and a four-year grace period. The physical infrastructure and to managing group was headed by refinance certain short-term Manufacturers Hanover Trust debt. The Government's external Swiss Bank Corporation and debt, which averaged around Daichi Kangyo Bank.

\$1.68bn for the years 1973-1974. Adding this credit to the rose to \$2.05bn in 1975, to others already made for the \$3.5bn the following year and purpose of funding its industrial and public works programmes. Total Government indebtedness gives a total of around \$2.83bn, which reached a record borrowed thus far out of the high of \$3.05bn at the close of 1976. Under 1977, should reach more than credits needed up to 1980. Under \$10bn this year, according to current borrowing plans the Finance Minister Luis Jose Silva Government will therefore need Luongo. A major portion of this some \$3.07bn in additional increase will be in foreign debt, credits over the next three, although the precise amount is years.

Anyone analysing Venezuela's economic prospects over the next few years can identify some problem areas: lack of control over the Government's current expenditures, continued (through loans and buyers' cost overruns and waste in credits) of around \$4.5bn from official programmes, heavy 1976-80, with additional \$1bn, dependence on oil as the primary

(equivalent) to be raised in bolivars on the domestic capital market. Only recently, though, the Finance Minister revealed that the Government would seek an additional \$1.4bn for public works projects, thus bringing total projected foreign credit requirements during 1976-80 to around \$5.9bn.

It would not be surprising, however, if the Government were to seek still more foreign capital as a result of unexpected cost overruns or unforeseen declines in oil exports. (Total exports for 1974-77 averaged \$10bn a year, with the bulk derived from oil sales. Thus far this year, however, sales have been down considerably from 1977 because of the glut of oil in international markets.)

Venezuela made its first big jump into the Eurodollar market in 1976, when it secured a \$1bn credit (seven years) for refinancing part of its short-term obligations. Last year, it borrowed \$1.55bn in syndicated loans (\$1.2bn for seven years and \$350m for the same period) and offered three bond issues totalling \$350m in New York and London. The Government also sold \$20bn in Republic of Venezuela bonds in Tokyo, thus making its debut on the yen market. Despite the country's excellent credit rating, the London and New York bond issues were not as successful as had been anticipated.

Of the funds raised last year most were to be applied to industrial development programmes and public works. The knows what it is doing and has \$550m was to be used for the financial and oil reserves to back it up.

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Joseph Mann



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Caisse Nationale des Autoroutes
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9½% Guaranteed Bonds due March 15, 1997

Electricité de France
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Inter-American Development Bank
\$100,000,000
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Ito-Yokado Co., Ltd.,
\$50,000,000
6% Convertible Debentures due August 31, 1992

Kingdom of Norway
\$150,000,000
7½% Notes due February 1, 1982

Kingdom of Norway
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7½% Notes due June 15, 1982

Province of Saskatchewan
\$125,000,000
8½% Debentures due 2007

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\$50,000,000
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Ford Motor Credit Company of Canada, Limited
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Cdn. \$20,000,000 8½% Notes due May 15, 1987

General Foods, Limited
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8½% Notes 1984

Kao Soap Company, Ltd.,
\$20,000,000
6% Convertible Bonds 1992

Walter Kidde Overseas Finance N.V.,
\$50,000,000
8½% Guaranteed Notes due July 1, 1985

Orient Leasing (Caribbean) N.V.,
\$20,000,000
8½% Guaranteed Notes due 1983

Singer International Securities Company
\$50,000,000
8½% Guaranteed Notes due April 1, 1982

Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français
\$45,000,000
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Tokyu Department Store Co., Ltd.,
\$15,000,000
6% Convertible Bonds 1992

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A bid to clean up the tanker mess

By IAN HARGREAVES Shipping Correspondent

THE SHRELL voice of survivors, which can go up to 100m. tons of the world's tanker capacity. With around 33m. tons of tankers laid up because of lack of work and a further 35m. tons of spare capacity in operational ships, segregated ballast would almost close the gap. In fact, it might close the gap completely because some older vessels would not be worth the conversion cost, which averages out at around \$800,000 per vessel, and then would be scrapped.

If this happened, the market would be in balance for the first time since 1973 and very large crude carrier spot rates would rise from their present world-scale 20, at which tanker owners are not even covering operating costs. This would head off the threat of further large-scale collapses in the industry, which in Norway is only being propped up by Government finance. At the end of last year difficulties spread to the mighty Japan Line, which announced that it had asked for a rescheduling of some bank debts.

The cost of the whole segregated ballast operation is put by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development at \$4bn. to \$6bn., and Britain says its own fleet would be faced with capital charges of £150m. in addition to a further loss of £150m. a year because of the reduced carrying capacity.

The cost would have to be borne by Governments in a subsidy, or by consumers via a 2 per cent. increase of the price of oil products. At least, that is so unless the arguments of some independent tanker owners are to be believed. That segregated ballast would be paid for by help from banks overjoyed at spending money to bring relief to a group of clients who have caused them nothing

but worry since 1974. Some oil cargo. About 80 per cent. of the world's tankers now operate under charter parties, and estimates of what ballast conversion would cost. Salen of Sweden for example says it has just converted a 96,000-ton vessel for a mere \$20,000.

At the outset of the London conference, it seems certain that the segregated ballast lobby will be in a minority, an additional device known as

two weeks. No one wants such a thing to occur. Both sides, naturally, claim to have arrived objectively at their positions, but that is not to say that there is no room for bargaining. We can expect in the days of committee work conference sessions of next week some trading with the

achieved something. This is the point where the oil industry reminds you that of the 6m. tons or so of oil released into the seas each year, only 200,000 tons is a result of accidents to tankers. Indeed, only 2m. tons derives from marine transport at all.

Statistically, the argument is beyond reproach, but it does omit the fact that there can be devastating consequences for the marine life and coastline of a tanker accident. The collision of the American supertankers Venol and Venpet off the coast of South Africa in December, serves as a reminder that such statistics could be doubled overnight. Had one of the ships broken up, as seemed likely at one point, 250,000 tons of oil would have been floating around.

SBTs, COWs and LOTs have little relevance to that kind of accident, which in 85 per cent. of all cases is associated with human error.

That brings us to the nub of a subject which falls sufficiently to interest a significant minority of shipowners and Governments. A second IMCO conference in the summer will attempt to draw up the first proper international agreement on some of these matters, but the insistence on and supervision of certification and training by some of the flag of convenience States especially is less than adequate, to put it mildly. Stories of crews who don't know how to work fire appliances, and lifeboats that cannot be lowered because of rust are still common.

When it comes to dealing with straightforward navigational hazards, there has been some improvement through moves such as the new lane separation scheme in the English Channel.

Meanwhile, of course, the American public without whose pressure this conference would not be taking place, will probably be bored by the technicality of it all. The environmentalists may be useful to the independent tanker owners, but the converse does not hold. The U.S. team not only needs a deal which will prevent the oceans being polluted with oil, it needs one which will convince the American public that it has

but at the same time as gadgetry has become more sophisticated the appalling boredom of crewing a supertanker has created new problems.

The Americans have been no less pressing on this theme as on SBTs in the past year and a

list of improvements to standards of inspection and certification regulations will be adopted by the conference without much argument this week. Likewise a British proposal to set up a flying marine safety corps to help out states lacking safety resources has wide support.

Training

There is a good deal of agreement with the Americans that tankers should have a spare radar, inert gas systems, emergency steering systems, and some kind of collision avoidance warning system—although there is a high degree of suspicion that fancy computerised hardware is not much good unless your crews are trained to deal with them.

IMCO itself has something of a navigational boredom difficulty in that it has visited the waters of the SBT controversy before. Its anti-pollution convention, adopted in 1973, said that segregated ballast should be compulsory in all new vessels over 70,000 tons. That convention has so far been ratified only by Kenya, Jordan and Tunisia—not the greatest of tanker owners. Maritime nations say it contains requirements technically and economically beyond the power of the industry. It is at least to be hoped that the London conference will not overlook the question of what is manageable.

"It is fear of the U.S. issuing a declaration unilaterally banning tankers with unsegregated tanks from their waters, throwing world oil trade into regulatory chaos, which will most worry the diplomats during the coming two weeks."

possibly by as much as one ton. This reflects both the force of the opposing case and the success of the immense diplomatic effort which countries like Britain have put into winning support from Governments that have no passionate interest in the question one way or another. It is of special note that most of the Arab oil producing States now appear unlikely to join the American camp.

Britain argues that almost the same environmental gains can be made by applying two existing anti-pollution techniques already widely practised by the major oil companies. The older of these is known as "load on top," whereby tanker crews, instead of simply pumping out in mid-ocean several hundred tons of crude oil mixed with water from a ballast tank, allow the oil to settle on top of the water and return it to the

British almost certainly willing to consider compulsory pollution prevention measures (either COW or SBT) not only for the big vessels, but for those between 20,000 dwt and 70,000 dwt. At present, the British package says nothing about tankers in this class—a position designed simply to engage the Americans, whose lack of deep water ports makes them heavily dependent on vessels of this size.

Meanwhile, of course, the American public without whose pressure this conference would not be taking place, will probably be bored by the technicality of it all. The environmentalists may be useful to the independent tanker owners, but the converse does not hold.

Letters to the Editor

Good luck to Leyland

From Mr. A. Beard

Mr. Beard, I am writing to you to say that I am very pleased to see that the Leyland group is to be taken over by the British Leyland group. I am sure that the Leyland group will be able to do a very good job of running the Leyland group and I am sure that the Leyland group will be able to do a very good job of running the Leyland group.

Only a short time ago the company was having considerable trouble trying to centralise its various operations. It was now being taken over by the British Leyland group. I am sure that the Leyland group will be able to do a very good job of running the Leyland group and I am sure that the Leyland group will be able to do a very good job of running the Leyland group.

Whether an organisation is "centralised" or "decentralised" is not really a matter of management style. Both systems can work perfectly well. The advantage of successful companies is that they are able to adapt to the needs of the market. The disadvantage of successful companies is that they are able to adapt to the needs of the market.

In a recent letter to the Press, Mr. Anthony Bowley has suggested that the Leyland group should be taken over by the British Leyland group. I am sure that the Leyland group will be able to do a very good job of running the Leyland group and I am sure that the Leyland group will be able to do a very good job of running the Leyland group.

Equality in pensions

From Mr. A. Furse

Sir, The Sun Alliance and London should have little difficulty in persuading the Government that its adjustment to staff salaries and pension contributions is after all within the Government's guidelines. It insists that they be related to the true actuarial cost of the pension scheme. The Government's pension scheme is a very good one. It is a very good one. It is a very good one.

Need for a new contract

From Mr. J. English

Sir—Your correspondent Mr. A. E. Laybourn observes (February 3): "In these inflationary times, the time has come when the need for a new contract is essential."

Desirable, no doubt, but essential? No. No private-sector scheme dare go for full index-linking. No insurance company with a hope of staying afloat will write such a scheme. The Government must say to those already with us, on the terms then offered—but all new recruits from now on must have pensions based upon a proper commercial appreciation as they would get in the private sector.

Grade-for-grade, the new recruits would be offered higher immediate salaries to compensate them for non-indexed pensions: whereas those already employed could be given the option of switching to the new higher immediate salary if they gave up their index-linked pension rights, should they so wish. They could have no grouse, should they not switch, about "being paid less than their colleagues," because their future pay, so far from being in the sky, would be very real.

There seems to be a fatalistic resignation to the fact that since public sector pensions are presently index-linked, the country is saddled with the system for ever. I would not for one moment suggest that the Government should renege on existing contracts—but must it continue to make new ones?

TUC wrong about lawyers

From the Chairman, British Legal Association

Sir—If accounts of the TUC down to resisting the suggestion that the salary adjustment on Legal Services are correct, the demand required for indexation must one must conclude that TUC

Airport options

From Mr. R. Bonart

Sir—Reading between the lines of the recent White Paper, one gets the impression that the airlines will be obliged to invest heavily in improved medium-distance aircraft during the mid-1980s—only to be faced with a severe lack of landing space after 1980. There will then be tremendous pressure for a third London airport, at a minimal cost—according to Mr. Rogers of £1bn. This, incidentally, is the amount which, according to Mr. Edwards, the Government will have paid out on subsidies and grants to a less successful branch of our transport industry.

The White Paper makes it clear that a major constraint on air operations over south-east England will be the noise factor, especially for night flying. It is therefore difficult to understand why Mr. Rogers should have recently barred the way out of intolerable air traffic congestion by declaring that the Channel Tunnel would be built. It is precisely by the establishment of a fast inter-city rail system between London and the traffic-generating "industrial quadrangle" encompassing Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam and Düsseldorf that it would be possible to reduce demand on airport space in the Greater London area. About £1bn. spent during the next five to ten years on a tunnel and on Berne-gauge rail links to a Greater London passenger terminal and freight transshipment point would save us all a lot of trouble and noise before the end of this century. This would also create much useful employment and encourage us to our construction engineering and electrical industries during a period when their resources are unlikely to be fully stretched.

Mr. Bonart. There appears to be a built-in assumption all along the line that the individual who has no money capital cannot possibly have any entrepreneurial skill. Until such fundamental defects are eradicated from a reformed system, we cannot possibly hope to achieve social justice in practice.

One of the major problems with any taxation system is that of avoidance and these new proposals do not seem to have clearly set out any safeguards to prevent massive avoidance of tax by the wealthier members of society (once again at the expense of the lower income bracket members who will be labouring under the basic rate of deduction). Therefore, it is better to search for a specific rather than a general expenditure tax which falls upon an item that cannot be avoided by any members of society and yet which ultimately allows complete freedom of choice in action and prevents the build-up of massive fortunes through "saving and investment" in property and land.

The fears expressed by the so-called left wing journalist referred to by Mr. Britton do not seem at all unjustified and only a tax system which used as its base individual and corporate expenditure on land, whose ultimate value depends upon the very existence of society, could

Crossroads is the greatest

From Mr. J. Graham

Sir—Winston Fletcher's article (February 1) "What the people want" is both patronising and inaccurate. If he is going to write at length about "Crossroads" he might have done the elementary homework to establish that it goes out four times, not five times, a week. A minor point, but typical of the shipshod attitude so prevalent with the modern journalist, and not what one hopes for in your august paper.

One reason for Crossroads' large viewing figures, which may not be immediately apparent, is the relaxing and soothing effect of a programme which requires no mental effort whatsoever from the viewer. As a graduate holder of a professional qualification, and a director of a public company, I am possibly not typical Crossroads viewer, but I am, nevertheless, an addict. It is screened at the precise moment that I most want to relax—home, after a little bit tense

begin to establish a situation where all members of society have something approaching equal opportunity. It is time to be truly radical instead of merely paying lip service to the idea of equality. Adrian Park, 31, Russell Road, Wimbledon, S.W.19.

No automatic up-lift. From Mr. S. Fisk. Sir—John Philip in his article "Index-linked cover for homes" (January 21) rightly draws attention to the effect of inflation on the cost of rebuilding and what the insured can do to safeguard himself against increases in building costs, even to the extent of a monthly up-lift. As he states, a similar arrangement can be made for contents: it is in fact advised by insurance companies.

When, however, insurance of contents is on the basis of replacement at second-hand value, there seems no sense in increasing cover automatically by the amount of the Retail Price Index because this will not be the basis on which a claim would be settled. If an item in 1974 was worth £100, according to the RPI it would now be worth about £160, but being four years older it could be worth less for insurance purposes than in 1974. I think one has to do it the hard way and check values at every renewal, and not adopt an automatic up-lift. Such an arrangement may be trouble-free but it is certainly expensive in premium.

No automatic up-lift

From Mr. S. Fisk

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Unnecessary activities. From Dr. K. Posner. Sir—May I offer Joe Rogaly (January 31) the following comments? The use of the word "secretary" has changed greatly since the days when being a secretary was largely a male occupation, as Mr. Rogaly seems to accept when, implicitly, he refers to "secretary and secretary/short-hand typist in much the same breath. Those secretaries who still deserve the designation are increasingly hard to find, and they should be more adequately rewarded in all respects than is the case. If the job were worth while and paid well, and if the inequitable barrier to promotion were removed, then it would again become attractive.

Mr. Rogaly assumes that all executives must be male and all secretaries female. He might care to rethink his arguments if the tables were turned (for example, if secretarial posts did indeed attract more male applicants).

It could be all to the good that there are not enough of the kind of secretary Mr. Rogaly refers to: it may just lead executives to question what they actually do. In many contemporary business and service environments jobs are done, stacks of paper moved, records kept which are rarely essential for achieving the objectives behind the activity at hand; and it is usually left to the secretary to do them. Such status symbols we can do without (not to mention "office wives").

GENERAL

Prime Minister meets CBI to discuss progress towards Bullock Committee proposals for workers' directors. President Sadat of Egypt continues visit to U.S. prior to tour of Western Europe. Mr. Roy Jenkins, president, European Communities Committee, is guest speaker at CBI Industry Society lunch, Hyde Park Hotel, S.W.1. Lord Roli (chairman, S. G. Warburg and Co.) chairs conference on "China and Britain—the Prospects for Trade" at Royal Lancaster Hotel, W.2. Other speakers are Mr. Edmund Dell, Trade Secretary, Mr. Edward Heath, M.P., Sir John Keswick, Vice-President, Sino-British Trade Council; Mr. Peter Marshall, the

To-day's Events

Council's director of trade promotion; Lord Robens, chairman, Vickers, and Mr. Kenneth Thorogood, executive chairman, Toser, Kemsley and Allibourne Holdings). PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS House of Commons: Private Members' motions. Debates on broadcasting Commons' proceedings on report of the Committee of Privileges. OFFICIAL STATISTICS Retail sales (December, final). Hire-purchase and other instalment credit business (December). COMPANY MEETINGS See Week's Financial Diary on Page 31.

Scandinavian Bank Limited

Group Accounts		
Extract from Audited Consolidated Statement of Accounts 31st December 1977		
	1977 £000	1976 £000
Authorised Capital	25,000	25,000
Issued Capital	20,250	20,250
Reserves and Retained Profits	10,563	8,039
Total Shareholders Funds	30,813	28,289
Subordinated Loan Notes	15,750	17,626
Current and Deposit Accounts	753,232	638,722
Cash at Bankers, Money at Call and Short Notice	160,875	142,207
Deposits with Banks	137,922	131,730
Loans and Advances:—		
(a) under one year	209,654	191,882
(b) over one year	270,934	206,558
Acceptances	31,112	28,081
Total Assets	851,889	729,809
Profit before Taxation	7,251	6,503
Profit after Taxation	3,739	3,185
Proposed Dividend	1,215	810

The Bank will be pleased to send copies of the latest Report and Accounts on request.

Scandinavian Bank Limited		International Offices	
Paris	Representative Office	Madrid	Representative Office
Hong Kong	Scandinavian Far East Limited	Singapore	Representative Office
Tokyo	Representative Office	Bahrain	Scandinavian Bank Limited (Branch Office)
Sao Paulo	Representative Office	New York	Representative Office
Bermuda	Scandinavian Finance Limited		

Registered Number 949047 London. Head Office 36 Leadenhall Street, London EC3A 1BH. Tel: 01-709 0565. Telex: 889093 Scanbank.

COMPANY NEWS

Watshams ahead midterm Expansion hopes at J. F. Nash

TURNOVER FOR the half year to September 30, 1977, of Watshams dropped from £2.35m. to £1.07m, reflecting the transfer of the electrical transmission contracting activities to Hawker Siddeley Power Engineering last year. Pre-tax profits however advanced from £207,500 to £248,000.

After tax of £124,000 (£108,000) and minority interests of £13,000 (£9,000), earnings are shown to be up from 4.1p to 5p per 25p share and the interim dividend is lifted from 1.5p to 1.65p net.

The directors say they would like to increase the dividend to properly reflect the improved performance in recent years, and will, if permitted, recommend a final dividend which would result in a substantial increase over the totals of previous years.

For 1976-77, a total of 3,807,500 was paid from stated earnings of 10.5p. Profits before tax came to £507,464.

Mr. W. G. Haydon-Bellie, the chairman, says that progress in the main operating areas in the home and export markets is in line with expectations.

The company continues to hold large cash resources with which it intends to enlarge the group in areas related to its established activities, as well as continuing its internal re-equipment and investment programme.

Confidence at Bakers Stores

CURRENT YEAR trading for the first quarter up to Christmas of Bakers Household Stores (Leeds) was at a record level but Mr. Barry Baker, the chairman, feels it would not be prudent to make any forecast in view of the uncertain nature of consumer spending.

The directors look forward with quiet confidence, he says in his annual statement, especially as the company is in an excellent position to take advantage of suitable opportunities for further expansion.

As reported on January 13, pre-tax profits rose from £204,625 to £225,101 for the 33 weeks to October 1, 1977, on turnover up £2,342,000 against £2,171,000. The dividend total is the maximum permitted 0.847p (0.75p) net per 10p share.

A statement of source and application of funds shows an increase in building society, bank and cash balances of £127,779 (£23,064).

Mr. Baker says the results are satisfactory, having regard to the depressed state of the economy, spending, and the poor spring and summer weather in the year.

Towards the end of the year the head office and central warehouse were transferred to new premises. The effect on trading was minimal but certain non-recurring costs were involved, all of which were charged against the year's profits.

The move has proved most satisfactory, and the extra facilities and large increase in storage space afforded by the new building, will prove beneficial to the company, in particular by facilitating future expansion.

BOARD MEETINGS

The following companies have notified dates of Board meetings to the Stock Exchange. Such meetings are usually held for the purpose of considering dividends. Official indications are not available whether dividends are expected to rise or fall and the sub-divisions shown below are based mainly on last year's results.

TO-DAY
Initials: U.C. Investments.
FUTURE DATES

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acquisitions, take-over defences and general financial advice.

The investment department again increased its business and now manages 23 pension funds with assets exceeding £100m. A successful offer was made for the Atlantic Shipping and Trading Company, an investment holding company, enabling the department to offer a £10m portfolio of listed securities for the bank's clients, including pension funds.

International activities were rationalised and further developed with the sale of the bank's interest in the consortium bank, Atlantic International Bank, and the acquisition of a further 51 per cent interest in Etablissements Financier de Placements SA, Geneva, giving 100 per cent ownership. In addition, the bank acquired 31 per cent of the shares of ED Sassoon Bank and Trust International of Nassau, Bahamas.

Services in the U.K. also were expanded with plans for CJ (Northern) to provide commercial banking as well as its present corporate finance services.

The bank's range of services has been greatly expanded in recent years. Mr. Wells says, and it is well placed to meet the broadening requirements of both present and future customers.

Charterhouse Japhet is a wholly owned subsidiary of Charterhouse Group.

Reserves now stand at a relatively high level in relation to their company's issued capital and the directors, therefore, feel it appropriate to recommend a capitalisation issue on the basis of one share for every two shares now held. They also propose to increase the authorised share capital from £300,000 to £500,000 by the creation of a further 2,000,000 shares.

Meeting, Leeds, on March 8, at noon.

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FT Monthly Survey of Business Opinion

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
GENERAL OUTLOOK

Optimism about home demand

OPTIMISM ABOUT the general business situation had improved in all three sectors interviewed last month and especially among stores and consumer services companies.

In the latter sector, the improvement was based upon a good Christmas sales season, upon the signs of an upturn in consumer spending during recent months, and the belief that, with rising disposable incomes, this would continue.

In electrical engineering, the increased optimism was based upon evidence of growing investment intentions in industry as well as upon the signs of a recovery in consumer demand.



The stores and consumer services and the cars and consumer durables sectors were also

more optimistic about the outlook for the U.K. economy generally.

These hopeful signs were offset, however, by growing worries about export prospects. On balance, electrical engineering companies were expecting exports over the coming 12 months to be higher than last year. But the hardening of sterling exchange rates, the shortage of customer liquidity, delivery times, and local competition in European markets were all cited.

These points were made in the other two sectors, together with the less optimistic outlook for world trade.

GENERAL BUSINESS SITUATION

Are you more or less optimistic about your company's prospects than you were four months ago?	4 monthly moving total				January 1978		
	Oct.-Jan. %	Sept.-Dec. %	Aug.-Nov. %	July-Oct. %	Elect. Eng. %	Consumer Durables %	Stores %
More optimistic	47	39	40	37	59	77	89
Neutral	36	43	40	46	41	23	11
Less optimistic	15	16	20	17	—	—	—
No answer	2	2	—	—	—	—	—

EXPORT PROSPECTS (Weighted by exports)

	4 monthly moving total				January 1978			
	Oct. Jan. %	Sept. Dec. %	Aug. Nov. %	July. Oct. %	Elect. Eng. %	Consumer Durables %	Stores %	
Over the next 12 months exports will be:								
Higher	79	83	86	89	100	76	50	
Same	10	10	10	10	—	6	50	
Lower	11	7	4	1	—	18	—	

NEW ORDERS

The trend of new orders in the last 4 months is:	4 monthly moving total				January 1978			
	Oct.-Jan. %	Sept.-Dec. %	Aug.-Nov. %	July-Oct. %	Elect. Eng. %	Consumer Durables %	Stores %	
Up	48	41	42	45	99	77	64	
Same	20	19	17	17	1	23	25	
Down	11	16	15	17	—	—	—	
No answer	21	24	26	21	—	—	11	

PRODUCTION/SALES TURNOVER

Those expecting production-sales turn-over in the next 12 months to:	Oct.-Jan. %	Sept.-Dec. %	Aug.-Nov. %	July-Oct. %	Elect. Eng'g. %	Consumer Durables %	Stores %
Rise over 20%	5	4	4	4	24	3	9
Rise 15-19%	9	5	5	3	16	50	—
Rise 10-14%	18	18	19	21	55	—	2
Rise 5-9%	16	22	24	27	1	47	24
About the same	46	44	40	37	2	—	65
Fall 5-9%	3	3	3	—	—	—	—
No comments	3	4	5	8	—	—	—

STOCKS

		Oct.- Jan. %	Sept.- Dec. %	Aug.- Nov. %	July- Oct. %	Elect. Eng. %	Consumer Durables %	Stores %
Raw materials and components over the next 12 months will:								
	Increase	43	30	31	23	70	54	76
	Stay about the same	48	56	54	54	30	23	24
	Decrease	4	7	8	10	—	23	—
	No comments	5	7	7	13	—	—	—
Manufactured goods over the next 12 months will:								
	Increase	31	23	29	25	46	47	59
	Stay about the same	43	48	41	42	53	30	6
	Decrease	2	4	5	8	—	23	—
	No comments	24	25	25	25	1	—	35

FACTORS CURRENTLY AFFECTING PRODUCTION

	4 monthly moving total				january 1978		
	Oct. Jan. %	Sept. Dec. %	Aug. Nov. %	July. Oct. %	Elect. Eng'g. %	Consumer Durables %	Stores %
Home orders	82	81	76	77	31	73	96
Export orders	56	60	60	57	28	50	35
Executive staff	30	20	25	13	42	27	35
Skilled factory staff	39	38	36	28	70	23	35
Manual Labour	7	3	4	4	—	—	26
Components	8	8	8	6	3	—	18
Raw materials	9	10	8	10	—	—	18
Production capacity (plant)	11	11	10	17	—	23	46
Finance	—	1	1	1	—	—	—
Others	7	12	13	10	—	—	—
Labour disputes	36	32	29	21	66	47	2
No answer/no factor	5	2	2	2	26	3	4

LABOUR REQUIREMENTS (Weighted by employment)

Those expecting their labour force over the next 12 months to :	4 monthly moving total				January 1978		
	Oct.-Jan. %	Sept.-Dec. %	Aug.-Nov. %	July-Oct. %	Elect. Eng. %	Consumer Durables %	Stores %
Increase	25	24	25	23	28	55	26
Stay about the same	64	56	54	55	72	31	72
Decrease	11	20	20	21	—	14	2
No comment	1	—	1	1	—	—	—

CAPITAL INVESTMENT (Weighted by capital expenditure)

Those expecting capital expenditure over the next 12 months to :	4 monthly moving total				January 1978		
	Oct.-Jan. %	Sept.-Dec. %	Aug.-Nov. %	July-Oct. %	Elect. Eng. %	Consumer Durables %	Stores %
Increase in volume	56	54	53	51	94	60	31
Increase in value but not in volume	11	11	15	10	1	—	18
Stay about the same	16	15	10	14	2	34	51
Decrease	14	14	16	21	3	6	—
No comment	3	6	6	4	—	—	—

COSTS

	Oct.- Jan. %	Sept.- Dec. %	Aug.- Nov. %	July- Oct. %	Elect. Eng.- %	Consumer Durables %	Stores %
Wages rise by:							
5-9%	6	8	8	11	3	3	2
10-14%	74	70	70	57	96	97	52
15-19%	11	14	15	19	1	—	18
20-24%	—	—	1	2	—	—	—
25-29%	—	—	—	1	—	—	—
No answer	9	8	6	10	—	—	28
Unit cost rise by:							
0-4%	5	3	4	5	—	—	9
5-9%	22	12	11	8	72	23	37
10-14%	60	64	64	52	27	77	42
15-19%	5	8	8	19	1	—	9
20-24%	—	—	—	3	—	—	—
Same	2	2	2	1	—	—	—
Decrease	1	1	1	—	—	—	—
No answer	5	10	10	12	—	—	3

PROFIT MARGINS

Those expecting profit margins over the next 12 months to:	Oct.	Sept.	Aug.	July.	Elect.	Consumer	Stores
	Jan.	Dec.	Nov.	Oct.	Eng.	Durables	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Improve	22	27	29	35	27	53	13
Remain the same	55	46	45	45	72	47	60
Contract	21	22	22	15	1	—	18
No comment	2	5	4	5	—	—	9


ORDERS AND OUTPUT

Retail sales lead the way

THE STEADILY declining trend of "ups" over "downs" for new orders was reversed last month, and at the retail end of business the change of trend is expected to continue.

Most firms in the stores and consumer services sector said they expected a continuing improvement in consumer spending and in consumer confidence over the next four months. They based this on the potential recovery in disposable incomes and particularly in discretionary spending.

In the cars and consumer durables sector progress has some companies detected signs



of more money around for certain types of durables.

The trend of new orders had also improved in electrical engineering. This was based upon rising investment intentions as well as upon an improvement in consumer demand.

In this sector, and in stores and consumer services, the rate of deliveries had improved. But few firms had thought the change sufficient to raise their production forecasts for the next 12 months. Indeed, the median output forecast dropped back fractionally last month.


CAPACITY AND STOCKS

In better balance

THE QUICKENING pace of activity in the consumer goods sectors has led to some increase in the number of companies which say they are operating at or above planned rates of capacity working.

It has had an even more marked impact upon expectations about stocks during the next 12 months, especially for stores of raw materials and to a lesser extent work-in-progress and finished goods stocks.

Even more significantly, perhaps, fewer firms are now saying their stocks are too high and many more are saying they



are about right. As a result the all-industry figures for "too high" and "too low" are closer to being in balance than at any time since August 1974.

The recovery in consumer spending has not yet altered the balance between demand and supply constraints as factors affecting current output. The significant features of this table, however, are the relatively large number of mentions of labour disputes and shortage of skilled factory staff, and the growing volume of complaints about difficulties in recruiting or retaining executive staff.

CAPACITY WORKING

	Oct. Jan. %	Sept. Dec. %	Aug. Nov. %	July. Oct. %	Elect. Eng'g. %	Consumer Durables %	Stores %
Above target capacity	12	13	13	16	29	—	1
Planned output	55	52	49	54	70	53	80
Below target capacity	32	34	37	28	1	47	19
No answer	1	1	1	2	—	—	—


INVESTMENT AND LABOUR

More jobs in prospect

BOTH the electrical engineering and the stores and consumer services sectors were more inclined than they had been last September to say that they expected their employment levels to increase over the next 12 months. As a result, the balance of "ups" over "downs" is now larger than for over a year.

It remains to be seen whether this trend is sustained when other sectors are re-interviewed during the next few months.

What is interesting at this stage is the answers to a question on the factors currently affecting employment levels. This has now been running long




four months (weighted by employment) cited difficulties in recruiting staff with suitable skills (38 per cent.), the high cost of labour in relation to profitability (26 per cent.), or the desire of existing staff to work overtime.

Nearly three-fifths mentioned the potential cost of redundancy payments (32 per cent.) or other aspects of employment legislation (25 per cent.). Exactly half cited plans to improve productivity, 40 per cent. mentioned product demand, 17 per cent. mentioned uncertainties about the future, and 12 per cent. cited other factors.

COSTS AND PROFIT MARGINS

Inflation rate is falling



cases, the activities of the Price Commission—is still the dominating factor for prices, however. Expectations about profit margins in the next 12 months have continued to worsen, with the "ups" now virtually in balance with the "downs" for the first time in almost a year.

The falling trend for return on capital employed was reversed last month however. Whereas views on profit margins are based upon the next 12 months, the question about earnings relates to the current financial year. Earnings are of course also affected by changes in turnover.

These surveys, which are carried out for the Financial Times by the Taylor Nelson Group, are based upon extensive interviews with top executives.

The all-industry figures are four-monthly moving totals, covering some 120 companies in 11 industrial sectors (mechanical engineering is surveyed every second month). Complete FT-Actuaries Index, which can be purchased from Taylor Nelson and Associates.

Three sectors and some 30 companies are covered in turn every month. They are drawn from a sample based upon the FT-Actuaries Index, which can be purchased from Taylor Nelson and Associates.

To the Holders of
JUSCO CO., LTD.

6% Convertible Bonds Due 1992

NOTICE OF FREE DISTRIBUTION OF SHARES
AND
ADJUSTMENT OF CONVERSION PRICE

Pursuant to Clause 7 (B) of the Trust Deed dated June 16, 1977 under which the above described Bonds were issued, you are hereby notified that a free distribution of Shares of our Company at the rate of 1 share for each 10 shares held will be made to shareholders of record February 20, 1978.

As a result of such distribution, the Conversion Price at which shares are issuable upon conversion of said Bonds will be adjusted pursuant to Condition 5(C) of the Bonds from 1307.6 Japanese Yen to 1188.7 Japanese Yen effective as of the close of business in Tokyo on February 20, 1978.

JUSCO CO., LTD.

Dated: February 4, 1978

PLANT & MACHINERY SALES

Description	Price	Telephone
2 BLOCK (400 mm) IN LINE, NONSLIP WIRE DRAWING MACHINE in excellent condition 0/2000ft/min variable speed 10 hp per block (1968), 26" DIAMETER HORIZONTAL BULL BLOCK by Farmer Norton (1972), ROTARY SWAGING MACHINE by Farmer Norton (1972), SLITTING LINE 500 mm x 3 mm x 3 ton capacity.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
TWO VARIABLE SPEED FOUR HIGH ROLLING MILLS Ex. 6.50" wide razor blade strip production.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
MODERN USED ROLLING MILLS , wire rod and tube drawing plant—roll forming machines—slitting—flattening and cut-to-length lines—cold saws—presses—guillotines, etc.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
1974 FULLY AUTOMATED COLD SAW by Noble & Lund with batch control.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
1970 CUT-TO-LENGTH LINE max. capacity 1000 mm x 2 mm x 7 tonnes coil fully overhauled and in excellent condition.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
1965 TREBLE DRAFT GRAVITY WIRE DRAWING machine by Farmer Norton. 27"—29"—31" diameter drawblocks.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
STRIP FLATTEN AND CUT-TO-LENGTH LINE by A.R.M. Max. capacity 750 mm x 3 mm.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
9 BLOCK WIRE DRAWING MACHINE and 1000 lb spooler—non slip cumulative type with double tiered 22" dia. x 25 hp draw blocks.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
2 15 DIE M54 WIRE DRAWING MACHINES 5,000Ft./Min. with spoolers by Marshall Richards.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
3 CWT MASEY FORGING HAMMER —pneumatic single blow.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
9 ROLL FLATTENING MACHINE 1,700 mm wide.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
7 ROLL FLATTENING MACHINE 965 mm wide.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
COLES MOBILE YARD-CRANE 6-ton capacity lattice lift.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
16 MM to 28 MM ROLL STRAIGHTEN and cut to length line with flying shear and capstan for handling 2 ton steel coil.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
RWF TWO STAND WIRE FLATTENING AND STRIP ROLLING LINE , 10" x 8" rolls x 75 HP per roll stand. Complete with edging rolls, curbs head flaking and fixed, recoller, air gauging, etc. Variable line speed 0/750Ft./min. and 0/100Ft./min.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
NARROW STRIP STRAIGHTENING AND CUT-TO-LENGTH MACHINE (1973) by Thompson and Munroe.	P.O.A.	0902 42541/2/3 Telex 336414
ACME GRIDLEY (BSA) 6 SPINDLE AUTOMATIC , 28" rebuilt and not used since. Will turn and index to makers limits.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
WICKMAN 31 SINGLE SPINDLE AUTOMATIC , Extensive equipment. Excellent condition.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
VICKERS 200 TON POWER PRESS . Bed 40" x 36", Stroke 8". New cond.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
200 TON PRESS BRAKE 8' x 1" by Sedgewick. Air brake, air clutch light gauge. Excellent condition.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
MACHINING CENTRE . Capacity 5 ft. x 4ft. x 3ft. 5 Axes, continuous path. 51 automatic tool changes. 5 tons main cable load. Main spindle 10 hp. Had less than one year's use and in almost new condition. For sale at one third of new price.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
CINCINNATI CYLINDRICAL GRINDER . Model NDO, 14" dia. x 51". Excellent.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
WICKMAN 28" 6 SP AUTOMATICS 1961 and 1963. Excellent condition.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
COLD HEADERS 10" NATIONAL 1 1/2" and 1" DSSD. Excellent.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
INTERNAL GRINDER—BRYANT Type 1460 60" swing. Excellent.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
LUMSDEN VERT. SPINDLE GRINDER . 91MLT. Rescuable Table 36" dia. Excellent.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
CHURCHILL ROLL SURFACE GRINDER . 24" diameter rolls. Excellent cond.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
4,000 TON HYDRAULIC PRESS . Upstroke Between columns 92" x 52" daylight 51", stroke 30".	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
HME 70 TONS PRESS DCP3 . Bed 36" x 34", stroke 6", excellent.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
FINE BORER, 2-SPINDLE, VERTICAL Herbert 21V. Stroke 14", Hydraulic. New and used, at substantially below current price.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
CINCINNATI CENTRELESS GRINDERS . Sizes 2 and 3. Excellent.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
COPY LATHE—FISCHER KOM 80/150 .	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
BECHLER AUTOMATIC CR32 6 Cross slides, 6 Station turret, excellent.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
BAR PEELER 4" CENTRELESS .	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
10 TON BROADCH, STROKE 48" Reconditioned, excellent.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
HEY NO. 3 FACING & CENTREING . Between centres 30". Reconditioned.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
PFALTZ & GLENN HOBER 9250 . Max. dia 10", reconditioned, excellent.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771
COPY LATHE, HEAVY DUTY . 8" between centres, reconditioned.	P.O.A.	01-928 3131 Telex 261771

OFFSHORE AND OVERSEAS FUNDS

[illegible][illegible]

Next sub. day Feb. 23. — — — — —
 2, 4, Cockspur St., SW1Y 9RH. 01-930 5909

New Court Property Fund Mgrs. Ltd.
 N.C.P.F. Dec 30 — 114.1 — 122.4
 81, Swiss Lane, London, EC4. 01-632 4356
 Next sub. day March 31. — — — — —

Target Life Assurance Co. Ltd.
 Target House, Gatehouse Rd., Aylesbury, — — — — —

[illegible]

Equity Fund	516.0	592.4	-4.0	Ret. Plan Ac. Pen.	69.1	75.1	-1.1
Property Fund	120.7	127.0	—	Ret. Plan Cap. Pen.	57.2	62.1	-0.9
Fixed Inc. Fund	254.4	244.8	-2.8	Ret. Plan Man. Acc.	118.6	123.9	—
Deferred Port.	101.9	107.2	—	Ret. Plan Man. Cap.	110.7	117.2	—
Corp. Unit. Ins. B.	205.3	—	—	Grh Pen. Acc.	157.4	164.7	—
				Grh Pen. Cap.	151.4	158.8	—

Phoenix Assurance Co. Ltd.
 5, King William St., EC4A 3HR. 01-826 9876

Transatlantic Life Ins. Co. Ltd.

Prop. Equity & Life Ass. Co.			Tulip Manor, Fd.	266-1	211-6	-	-
			Man. Bond Fd.	189-6	114-9	-	-
			Man. Pen. Fd. Cap.	211-4	217-2	-	-
			Man. Pen. Fd. Acc.	217-0	223-1	-	-
Silk Prop. Bd.	269-3	-					
Co. Equity Bld.	72-7	-	Trident Life Assurance Co. Ltd.				
Co. Fr. Mng. Bd. Fd.	254-9	-	Rensselaer House, Gloucester			OASZ 235-1	
			Managed	219-7	126-N		

Investment Fund	Assets	Liabilities	Net Assets
Property Fund (A)	171.8		171.8
Property Fund (A)	170.6		170.6
Agricultural Fund (A)	492.5		492.5
Ag. Fund (A)	348.2		348.2
Libby Nat. Fund (A)	149.1		149.1
Libby Nat. Fd. (A)	149.1		149.1
Investment Fund (A)	55.3		55.3
Investment Fd. (A)	65.1		65.1
U.S. Gov. Bond Fund	101.4		101.4
Foreign/American	77.6		77.6
U.S. Gov. Bond Fund	101.4		101.4
High Yield	148.6		148.6
Gift Edged	125.0		125.0
Money	120.3		120.3
International	92.7		92.7
Fiscal	127.5		127.5
Growth Cap.	127.0		127.0

[illegible][illegible]

Reg. Soc. Cap. U.L.	118.1			Do. Equity Feb. 1.	244.2		
				Do. Bond Feb. 1.	169.0		
				Do. Prop. Feb. 1.	81.8		
Provincial Life Assurance Co. Ltd.							
			01-247 6533				
2, Bishopsgate, E.C.2				Vanbrugh Life Assurance			
Prov. Managed Fd.	114.3			41-43 Maddox St., Ldn. W.1R 9L.	01-499 4223		
Prov. Cash Fd.	108.7			Managed Fd.	138.9	145.5	-0.6
Inv. Fund 20	123.9						

01-408 4222	Fixed Fund.....	171.6	181.5	-0.9	—
	Fixed Interest Fd.....	135.6	142.6	-7.0	—
	Property Fd.....	138.6	142.6	-4.0	—
	Cash Fund.....	216.1	222.3	-6.2	—

Vanbrugh Pensions Limited

01-438 4323	41-43 Madder St., Ldn. W1R 1SL	01-438 4323
	Managed.....	100.0

Welfare Insurance Group	New Hall Place, Liverpool.	051 227 4422	Fixed interest.....	75.0	100.0	—
	Royal Shield Fd., £39.5	138.0	Property.....	75.0	100.0	—
							Guaranteed see 'Ins. Size Rater' table.
Aave & Prosper Group†							
Gt. St. Helens, Ldn., EC4P 3EP	01-554 8889						
St. Inv. Fd., £117.2	124.1	-0.1					
Welfare Insurance Co. Ltd.*	The Lees, Folkestone, Kent.	0303 57333					
	Monetary Fund.....	100.5				-0.7	—

ed.	128.2	135.5	-1.1	-	Manchester Group.
deposits Pd.	321.2	327.5	-	-	
gains Pens. Pd.	199.7	206.0	-	-	
gains Pens. Pd.	163.0	172.1	-1.4	-	
gains Pens. Pd.	204.4	215.5	-	-	
in Pens. Pd.	93.5	98.8	-1.5	-	
deposits Pens. Pd.	36.1	381.2	-	-	
Prices on January 18.					

Windsor Life Assur. Co. Ltd.		
1 High Street, Windsor.	Windsor	631.44
Life Inv. Plans	68.4	72.9
Future Assn. Cntrb.		19.0
Future Assn. Cntrb.		57.75
Ret. Assn. Plans		421.75

Enterprise House, Portsmouth,		0705 27733
Equity Jan. 31	211.6	---
Equity 2 Jan. 31	202.9	213.7
Equity 3 Jan. 31	210.7	216.6
Fixed Inv. Jan. 31	142.5	150.1
Fixed Inv. Jan. 31	153.0	161.0

NOTES

Prices do not include 3 premium, except where indicated & are in pence unless otherwise

50s Glase Jan. 31	124.3	124.3	include all expenses. b Today's prices.
50s Glase Jan. 31	124.3	124.3	c Yield based on offer price. d Estimated.
50s Glase Jan. 31	124.3	124.3	e Today's opening price. f Distribution free
50s Glase Jan. 31	124.3	124.3	of U.S. taxes. g Periodic premium insurance
50s Glase Jan. 31	124.3	124.3	plans. h Single premium insurance.
50s Glase Jan. 31	124.3	124.3	i Offered price includes all expenses except
50s Glase Jan. 31	124.3	124.3	agent's commission. j Offered price includes
50s Glase Jan. 31	124.3	124.3	all expenses if bought through managers.

Pn.Acc.Jan.31		126.5				Realised capital gains unless indicated by ☐.
n.Pn.Cp.Jan.31	189.2		199.2	(199.2)		☐ Guernsey gross. * Suspended. + Yield before Jersey tax. † Ex-subdivision.
Pn.Acc.Jan.31	221.6		233.6	(221.6)		

Insurance Co. Ltd.	Eagle Star Insur/Midland Ass.	M & G Group	Scottish Widows' Gro
relyard, ECA	01-3489111	01-5881212	FO Box 600, Edinburgh EDIN
	1 Theresede St, EC2	Three Quay, Tower	
	Eagle/Mid Units	49-51, A14	
	Equity & Law Life Ass.	Conc. Pensions	

[illegible]

Prices do not include \$ premium, except where indicated \$, and are in pence unless otherwise indicated. Yields \$ shown in last column allow for all buying expenses. Offered prices include all expenses. Today's prices, unless noted, are offered in cash. Today's opening price. Distribution free of U.K. taxes. p Periodic premium insurance plan. Single premium insurance. Offered price includes all expenses except agent's commission. y Offered price includes all expenses if bought through managers. \$ Tax on capital gains. Tax on realised capital gains unless indicated. \$ Gains tax. \$ Suspended. y Yield before Jersey tax. f Ex-subdivision.

WANCE LAND—Continued

[illegible][illegible]

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FINANCIAL TIMES

Monday February 6 1978

BRC
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Jenkins hits at EEC unity plan critics

BY REGINALD DALE

MR. ROY JENKINS, President of the European Commission, has called for a new pattern of government in the EEC, with a new set of relationships between the Community, national Governments and regional and local authorities.

Hitting back in a major policy statement in London at critics of his plans for European monetary union, he said that the Community must either take a further step forward or move backward.

There was no need for the Community to develop into a federal State on the lines of the U.S. or West Germany, he said. But there must be a significant transfer of power from the national to the Community level, including control over the money supply and exchange rates.

This could be matched by a transfer of other Government functions "downwards" to provincial and regional authorities.

Only option

The classic European nation—State was both too small and too big for all purposes—too small to restore full employment or promote economic growth, and too big to satisfy the growing demand for cultural differentiation and popular participation in decision-making.

There was no satisfactory model for the new pattern, which would have to be built up gradually. A new Community system

of Parliamentary control would have to be devised. Mr. Jenkins, giving the Rita Hilden Memorial Lecture, said that even economically strong countries like West Germany could not by themselves pull the Community out of recession. They were too heavily dependent on exports.

The only option was for the EEC countries to cut through the vicious circle of unemployment and inflation at Continental level, and do so at the level of the European Community as a whole.

He did not claim that monetary union would automatically lead to full employment. But he saw hope of returning to acceptable employment levels unless exchange rate uncertainties were ended, and this could be done only through monetary union.

Mr. Jenkins rejected arguments that monetary union presupposed convergence in economic performance. If it did, "the monetary union known as the U.S. would long since have fallen apart."

The essential was that all parties to the union, stronger or weaker, share benefit and be seen to benefit.

If the EEC took in Greece, Portugal and Spain, an unquestionable political imperative, the achievements of the past 20 years would be placed in jeopardy if no advance strengthening measures were taken.

FT Monthly Survey of Business Opinion

Rise in consumer spending expected to continue

THE long-expected upturn in consumer spending is at last beginning to come through.

Stores and consumer services companies interviewed last month for the Financial Times survey of business opinion said they had had a good Christmas selling season, had seen a rise in consumer spending in recent months and, with disposable incomes growing, they expected the improvement to continue.

Many electrical engineering companies reported improved demand for consumer electricals as well as for capital goods, while firms in the cars and consumer durables sector said there were signs of more money around.

These encouraging signs were offset by growing worries about export prospects. The recent hardening of sterling was cited by many companies, together

with the less optimistic outlook for world trade.

The improved outlook at home has encouraged some firms to be a little more bullish about future employment levels. But the number expecting to take on more labour in the next 12 months is still only slightly larger than the number expecting to make do with fewer.

In answer to a question about the factors currently affecting employment levels, half of the firms contacted for the survey in the last four months cited plans to improve productivity, nearly three-fifths mentioned the potential cost of redundancy payments or other aspects of employment legislation, and 40 per cent cited lack of demand.

Among the other reasons given were difficulties in recruiting staff with suitable skills, the high cost of labour in relation to profitability, or the

desire of existing staff to work overtime.

Inflation expectations continue to improve. The median forecast for the rise in wage costs over the next 12 months has peaked at about 12½ per cent, while the median forecast increases for total unit costs and output prices have dropped back to around 11 per cent.

On balance, industry is still hopeful of higher earnings on capital employed in the current financial year. But, looking further ahead, a further recovery in profit margins is thought unlikely in face of rising costs and price competition.

The outlook for industrial investment remains promising. Over half of the latest all-industry sample of companies expect to spend more in real terms in the next year.

Details, Page 30

EARNINGS ON CAPITAL	4 monthly moving total				January 1978	
	Oct.-Jan.	Sept.-Dec.	Aug.-Nov.	July-Oct.	Elect. Engs.	Consumer Stores
Those expecting earnings during current year to:						
Improve	47	43	47	57	67	54
Remain the same	23	22	20	17	32	23
Contract	25	26	24	14	1	23
No comment	5	9	9	12	—	—

Statistical Material Copyright Taylor Nelson Group Ltd

Environmentalists halt uranium hunt

BY RAY PERMAN, SCOTISH CORRESPONDENT

THE programme of uranium prospecting in Britain, partly financed by the European Commission, has virtually stopped in the face of opposition from environmental groups.

Last year, the South of Scotland Electricity Board was refused planning permission to sink trial bore holes in Orkney and, after assessing public opinion in the islands decided not to appeal.

More recently, it ran up against opposition in Deeside, where uranium traces were detected.

The conservation group, Friends of the Earth, has been organising resistance to the Board's programme. A local "doomwatch" committee was set up and, although protests were not as vociferous as in Orkney, they were strong enough to cause second thoughts.

Mr. Roy Berridge, the Board's chairman, said that it had underestimated the reaction to its proposals. "We knew that people would be concerned about mining and understandably so—but we did not think they would be concerned about drilling."

"The position on uranium stocks is very much better now than when the programme started, so there is not the same urgency. We were caught on the hop. We do not enjoy stirring up trouble or upsetting people."

Although the Board had been talking to landowners on Deeside to get permission to prospect on their property, it had no intention of applying for planning permission from the local district council in the near future.

Although uncertain whether this permission is legally required, the Board said it would not go ahead without it.

Conservatives may outline devolution policy to-day

BY ANTHONY MORETON, REGIONAL AFFAIRS EDITOR

CONSERVATIVE PARTY policy towards devolution and the position of Scotland is likely to be outlined in a major speech to-day in Edinburgh by Mr. Francis Pym, Shadow spokesman on devolution.

With the committee stage of the Scotland Bill completed under gullionism the Commons has a short respite before the Government decides what to do about those amendments which have been carried against its wishes.

Some indication of its thinking should come at the report stage in a few weeks.

When that has been completed the Wales Bill will be brought before the Commons and the fight between the parties will start again.

The Conservatives have implacably opposed the Govern-

ment's proposals on devolution. Mr. Pym has said that the Bill was ill-considered, as was its predecessor introduced in the last session of Parliament, and he is known to believe that if the Scots and Welsh do get assemblies there is no justification for their continuing to send the same number of MPs to Westminster.

While there has been hard-line opposition to the Government's proposals it is less clear what the Conservatives would like beyond setting up a constitutional conference to consider the issue.

It is not thought they would advocate such a conference being held under the auspices of the Speaker, although there are precedents for such a course, because of the enormous pressures on him.

The probability is that such a conference would be entrusted to a senior judge, possibly the Lord Chief Justice, though this, again, would depend on the workload being undertaken by the bench.

The drawback of such a conference is that it would take a long time over its deliberations, probably a couple of years, and would almost certainly not produce a unanimous report.

It could therefore be seen in Scotland and Wales as a means of postponing a decision.

As the Conservatives are electorally weak in Scotland this might not be a bad thing from their point of view as it would allow them to regroup to meet the challenge from Labour and the Scottish National Party.

Poll will be tough, says Thatcher, Page 4

Tories 'will set councils free'

BY DAVID CHURCHILL

THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY is planning a complete overhaul of Whitehall intervention in local government as an early priority of a future Conservative Government.

Its strategy will include legislation to allow council tenants to buy their own homes, more contracting out of council services, and a new partnership with local industry.

Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Tory leader, disclosed this at the party's local government conference in London at the week-end.

She told delegates, mainly councillors from all over Britain, that it was "time-wasting and pound-wasting for central government to spend so much time looking over your shoulders."

Mrs. Thatcher quoted the example of the Community Land Act, which resulted in a total of 111 official instructions to local authorities about how the Act should work.

She pointed out that in its first year of operation, only 33 acres of land acquired by local authorities were re-sold to developers. "That is a ratio of

about four Whitehall Orders to each acre."

The next Tory Environment Secretary would "review as a matter of urgency every Whitehall circular and rule governing your activities. Our aim will be to give you more responsibility for your own communities."

"Every local authority should examine the opportunities for audit by practising firms of accountants." Many council services, such as contract cleaning, catering, maintenance, gardening and printing, could be provided by small local businesses.

The Tories also intend to compile local registers "to establish what development sites in municipal hands can be sold."

They were seeking to forge a new partnership between councillors and local industry, Mr. Heseltine went on.

The design and planning of public works could be carried out by private sector architects, engineers and surveyors, and construction contracts awarded to independent builders, he suggested.

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THE LEX COLUMN

Waiting for a City rule book

For a body that is supposed to be in the final stages of preparation, the Council for the Securities Industry remains a mystery to most of the City. More than a year after it was originally conceived, the idea has barely been discussed beyond a select circle in the Bank of England and the Stock Exchange Council.

The signs are that the proposed Council will have a much narrower brief than some of its proponents originally envisaged. The Council's inquiry into the affairs of Sir Hugh Fraser, successfully went beyond the confines of the City—but only because the people involved decided that it was in their interest to play ball. Outsiders will not always be so co-operative.

For this reason, it is possible that the prestige of the Takeover Panel could be jeopardised if it were swallowed up by the Council and presented with a wider disciplinary role. Instead, it should be allowed to keep its independence and simply operate under the umbrella of the new system.

Another contentious point is the position of the accountants. The effectiveness of the new council would be strengthened if it were swallowed up by the City's latest move to bolster self-regulation, know very little about it. Even in the merchant banks, there is a surprising mixture of ignorance and diffidence when the talk turns to the new Council.

Blueprint

A public announcement is expected from the Bank in the next month or so—coinciding happily with the period when the Wilson committee will be turning its attention towards the regulation of the markets.

The general assumption is that the Bank's blueprint will then be up for discussion among the interested parties.

There will be plenty to talk about. Even within the comparatively limited area of the securities market, there are strong feelings about how much, and what, the new organisation should attempt to bite off. For instance, although there is general agreement that the supervision of prospectuses and rights issue documents ought to come under its wing, it is not at all clear how it will mesh in with the Quotations Department of the Stock Exchange, which already does this job.

There are those who would also like to see it active in such areas as directors' share dealings, the selling of unit linked life assurance and the control

of licensed dealers. But the more widely it tries to impose its authority, the greater its problems will become.

Takeover Panel

The success of the Takeover Panel is based on the fact that it deals with a relatively narrow circle of professionals who know the rules and want to continue to play the game. The Stock Exchange's inquiry into the affairs of Sir Hugh Fraser, successfully went beyond the confines of the City—but only because the people involved decided that it was in their interest to play ball. Outsiders will not always be so co-operative.

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Concorde likely to be given U.S. boost

BY JOHN WYLES

NEW YORK, Feb. 5.

AN EXPANSION of Concorde services looks likely in the second half of this year with British Airways expecting to step up its New York-London flights from seven to 10 a week and Braniff International seeking to operate from New York to South America.

These extra services would raise the number of flying hours of the British Airways and Air France Concordes and would enable British Airways to consolidate the profit which it claims is being made on the transatlantic services.

On February 11 British Airways joins Air France in offering a daily Concorde service from New York which is earlier than planned.

However, with load factors running over 80 per cent, British Airways believes that it will be in a position to operate 10 flights a week by June.

Shortly after, the British

Concorde which provides a three days a week service between Washington and London, is expected to be operated by Braniff International, the Texas-based airline, between Dallas-Fort Worth and Washington.

Braniff is waiting for the Federal Aviation Authority to give Concorde a certificate and for Civil Aeronautics Board approval for the aircraft's subsonic use on the domestic leg.

Braniff plans to use both British and French Concordes linking Dallas-Fort Worth super-sonically to London and Paris.

The flights will give Braniff the experience with Concorde to fulfil its other objective of leasing the plane for a supersonic New York-Panama service.

Negotiations on a leasing charge are expected to start shortly.

Flying time to Panama would be cut from five hours to two hours 30 minutes.

Continued from Page 1

Pay sanctions face tests

In this case, instead of sanctions being applied, the Government would attempt to use the Counter-Inflation Act of 1973 to force a reduction in insurance premiums.

Under the threat of sanctions, Imperial Chemical Industries has amended a pay deal involving more than 84,000 workers. The Department of Employment objected because ICI agreed to November to a productivity deal in addition to a Phase Two settlement.

The employees were promised a productivity bonus of 6 to 10 per cent. Now a new agreement has been secured ensuring that if sales growth fails to achieve 6 per cent, unions and management will meet again to discuss what bonus might be paid.

Pauline Clark, Labour Staff, writes: The sanctions row comes at a sensitive time for the Government as several major industrial groups threaten to make trouble in the final lap of the present pay policy.

The power workers, led by Mr. Frank Chapple, EPTU general secretary, are maintaining an aggressive stance on their "substantial" pay claim and have warned of industrial action if militants' demands for pay rises of up to 40 per cent are ignored.

With the miners also taking an obstinate line on their claim, the Government seems faced with a tough ride until March—its mutual pay settlement date—from two traditionally interrelated groups with strong industrial muscle.

This week the Government

also faces continuing worries from the national tanker drivers' overtime ban.

Esso said at the week-end that it was encouraged by a narrowing in the gap between the drivers' original claim of 30 per cent, revised to nearer 20 per cent, and the company's offer of 15½ per cent, with production allowances up to 18 per cent, more for the higher skilled.

But the national action has already cut petrol deliveries by 30 per cent, and the cumulative effects of the first week of the ban are unlikely to be known until mid-week.

A pay rise of 10 per cent, for MPs from next June in line with the Government's pay guidelines is expected to be announced shortly by Mr. Michael Foot the Leader of the Commons.

Weather

U.K. TO-DAY
SCOTLAND and eastern districts of England will be cloudy with rain, while other areas will have scattered showers.

London, S. W. and N. England, E. Anglia, Midlands
Fog patches at first. Scattered showers and sunny intervals. Max. 7C (45F).

East, N.E. England, Borders
Cloudy with rain at times. Wind light to moderate. Max. 6C (43F).

Channel Is., S.W. England, Wales
Scattered showers dying out. Sunny intervals. Increasing cloud later. Max. 7C (45F).

Isle of Man, N. Ireland
Scattered showers dying out. Sunny intervals. Increasing cloud later. Max. 6C (43F).

Scotland
Cloudy with showers or longer outbreaks of rain. Wind S.W. moderate. Max. 6C (43F).

Outlook: Sunny intervals and some wintry showers.

BUSINESS CENTRES

Y'day	Y'day	Y'day	Y'day
Mid-day	Mid-day	Mid-day	Mid-day
Almaty, C 10	Madrid, C 12	Paris, C 12	Stockholm, C 12
Athens, C 10	Moscow, C 10	Rome, C 12	Stockholm, C 12
Bombay, C 10	New York, C 10	St. Petersburg, C 10	Stockholm, C 12
Buenos Aires, C 10	Osaka, C 10	Tokyo, C 10	Stockholm, C 12
Calcutta, C 10	Seoul, C 10	Yokohama, C 10	Stockholm, C 12
Canton, C 10	Singapore, C 10	Manila, C 10	Stockholm, C 12
Cebu, C 10	Taipei, C 10	Shanghai, C 10	Stockholm, C 12
Colon, C 10	Tientsin, C 10	Beijing, C 10	Stockholm, C 12
Hankow, C 10	Urumchi, C 10	Harbin, C 10	Stockholm, C 12
Hong Kong, C 10	Yantai, C 10	Qingdao, C 10	Stockholm, C 12
Kobe, C 10	Zibo, C 10	Jinan, C 10	Stockholm, C 12
Lahore, C 10	Wulumuqi, C 10	Ulaanbaatar, C 10	Stockholm, C 12
London, C 10	Yancheng, C 10	Yantai, C 10	Stockholm, C 12
Lyons, C 10	Yantai, C 10	Yantai, C 10	Stockholm, C 12